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Abstract 
 
Doing Good or Looking Good?  
Communicating Development, Branding Nation in South Korea 
 
Kyung Sun Lee, Ph.D.  
The University of Texas at Austin, 2018 
 
Supervisor:  Karin G. Wilkins 
 
This dissertation examines foreign aid-related activities of South Korea to 
demonstrate how the discourse and practice surrounding development is understood, 
interpreted, and enacted by an emerging donor. The past two decades have given rise to a 
diversity of development actors committed to doing good for their inter/transnational 
counterparts, evidenced in the multi-directional flow of development programs and funds 
to support such causes. Emerging from the multi-polar structure of the development 
landscape are a diverse range of articulations, motivations, and understandings guiding 
development aid. This has raised fundamental questions about how to approach and 
understand the geopolitical field of development at present moment in time, and the 
possibility of emerging actors to dismantle the dominant discourse of development. The 
scholarly field of development communication, however, has been slow to take such 
shifts into consideration.  
Following a critical approach to development communication, this study 
understands development as a discursive field where negotiation and struggle among 
  viii 
different actors take place at multiple levels. Based on the theoretical understanding, this 
study examines South Korea’s development thinking and practice, specifically, in relation 
to its international development volunteer program.  
Drawing on a discourse analysis of multiple sources data, including news 
coverage that examines how development is discussed over time by Korean popular 
press, visual images of Korea’s volunteer program, and interviews with former 
volunteers, this study makes three points. First, geopolitical and domestic conditions over 
time have closely tied the understanding of development with nation building, where the 
two projects mutually constitute one another. Second, in examining how such enduring 
association of development with the national project is manifested in its representational 
practices of volunteer encounters, I show that the host becomes simplified, depoliticized, 
and romanticized, against which Korea is foregrounded as culturally rich, competent, and 
compassionate. Finally, drawing on an interrogation of multiple structural conditions that 
are implicated in development volunteering, I show the ways in which Korean volunteers 
navigate and complicate the dominant imaginaries of development, bringing new 
perspectives to nation, race, and gender in volunteer-host relationship.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The year 2010 in Korea marked an important break in its history in global 
development. A decade after “graduating” from its status as a recipient of international 
aid, the country formally gained recognition as a member of the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC). Korea became the first-ever country to transition from previously an 
aid recipient in the Third World to a DAC-based donor country, joining the coordinating 
body of major bilateral donors1. The country sought to demonstrate its new status through 
its commitment to transnational issues by hosting international events such as the G20 
Summit and High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. For then- president, Lee Myung-
bak, the recognition of Korea’s role as a central development actor was embraced as an 
opportunity to uplift its international image not only in terms of economic strength but 
more importantly, through its cultural attractiveness. In a congratulatory address 
commemorating Korea’s 60th birthday, Lee remarked:  
It is very important for Korean people to be respected by the world. But the value 
of brand Korea only accounts for approximately 30 percent of the nation’s 
economic power. The proportion is no more than a small fraction of that of the 
United States and Japan. Even though we are one of the strongest semiconductor 
countries, labor disputes and violent street protests are the very first images that 
come to foreigners’ minds when they think of Korea. 
If we want to be an advanced country, we need to improve our image, our 
reputation in a groundbreaking way. I will establish a committee under the 
presidential office to raise the country’s brand value. I will upgrade the national 
brand to make it on par with that of advanced countries. 
We need to make friends in the international society. We need to increase Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) to a level that befits our status and actively 
engage in peacekeeping operations. I will uphold our history, culture, and 
                                                 
1 The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) consists of 30 bilateral donors. Its work focuses on: 1. 
Setting standards of development co-operation through definition of official development assistance 
(ODA), recommendations on the conditions of aid, and principles of evaluation; 2. policy coordination in 
aid programs among member countries; and 3. periodic reviews of members’ aid policies and programs.   
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valuable development experience to a ‘global Korea model’ and share it with the 
world.  
I will send our 100,000 youth to parts of the world to work, study, and to 
volunteer. I will build a global network with 7,000,000 overseas Koreans to take 
an active part in the world stage (Lee, 2008, para. 43-46, translated by author) 
What is noteworthy about Lee’s speech is the ways in which the idea of 
development, or development as a frame of reference is weaved into the former 
president’s vision of governance, nation-building, and foreign policy. The speech shows 
that development works both internally and externally, through global and local spheres. 
It is conjured to promote a nation’s identity and to inspire its people to become citizens, 
in ways that both befit and benefit the global status of their nation. This study builds from 
this context, in order to understand how development is understood and communicated 
by Korea in a global context.  
This global context needs to be considered through historical trends and power 
dynamics (Escobar, 1995; Wilkins, 2000). This means that development not only refers 
to economic considerations and national policies, but also to political agendas.  The 
discursive field of political development foregrounds this as an arena for competition and 
contest for control over resources and meanings. Depending on who is in place to 
articulate how problems are defined and what solutions are posed, development takes on 
very different understandings and substantial material outcomes. This study takes a 
critical perspective, building on Foucault (2013) and Gramsci’s (1971) conceptualizations 
of discourse and hegemony as the cultural production of a society’s values and beliefs by 
the state and institutions that pervade the daily life of its people so that they appear to be 
logical and to project common sense. Hegemony refers to the asserted control over 
resources that may be contested in the practice of programs and experiences. In this 
process, communication is inseparable from the processes of development in that 
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communication contributes to maintenance, modification, and creation of beliefs and 
understandings surrounding development. Through public broadcasting of presidential 
speeches like the one presented above and through institutions such as schools, in Korea, 
development has become a concept deeply ingrained in the everyday, defining how 
people understand themselves and the nation in relation to others in the world.  
However, extant work in communication in development has accorded more 
attention in scholarship to recipients of aid than to their donors or the broader global 
industry (Waisbord, 2008). Critical studies in development communication have 
investigated how the dominant institutions of development engage in linear and top-down 
modes of intervention that continue to marginalize voices of the poor (Dutta, 2011; 
Wilkins, 2014). While critical, participatory, dialogic, and other approaches to 
development communication have introduced ways to move development communication 
forward to amplify the voices of the marginalized, on the other hand, much less research 
has examined how donors seek to position and represent themselves through overseas 
development.  
Development communication needs to accommodate the growing multi-
directionality of development and the complexity of development actors. For example, 
countries like Thailand and Turkey serve as both donor and recipient of aid. And Saudi 
Arabia provides greatest amount in aid after the U.S. but limits its scope of recipients to 
predominantly Muslim countries (Brian Tomlinson, 2014). Furthermore, the emergence 
of alternative articulations of development posed by South-South development 
cooperation is an area that has to a large extent, remained outside the purview of 
development communication.  
The term South-South development and its framing of geography of aid has come 
under criticism by scholars (Balie Smith, Laurie, & Griffiths, forthcoming; Mawdsley, 
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2012). The term presupposes a totality of the “South” furthering the binary construction 
of the dominant paradigm of development. As much as the absurdity of grouping 
countries that are diverse in economic, cultural and political contexts such as China, 
Nigeria, Brazil, Korea, and Saudi Arabia, the term connotes that the landscape of 
development aid is still predominated by a dichotomized frame of understanding. 
Nonetheless, the multipolarity of development landscape brought about, according to 
Emma Mawdsley (2017) an ontological shift in the “hegemonic developmental regime” 
through “profound re-making of (inter)national identity that has accompanied the 
achievement of global recognition and respect for Southern states in their role as 
development partners” (p. 110). Mawdsley (2017) goes on to state, “Their status as 
providers and not just recipients, as necessary and legitimate contributors to global 
development governance, ideas and resources, and indeed as rivals in the same fields, is 
now universally acknowledged” (p. 111).  
Aid given by bilateral donors not associated with the DAC increased from five 
percent of the total ODA aid in the late 1990s to 20 percent of the total aid in 2013 
(OECD, 2015a). This new emerging group of donors comprises nation states of diverse 
geographic location, size of economy, political system, and objectives shaping aid 
amount and delivery. Among the members of non-DAC group, rising as an alternative to 
the current dominant institution of development aid is South-South development 
cooperation. South-South development cooperation has been discursively positioned to 
represent an alternative model of aid. It is “based on solidarity, horizontality – as opposed 
to the perceived vertical nature of traditional DAC aid – non-interference in domestic 
affairs, and mutual benefit” (de Renzio & Seifert, 2014, p. 1861).  
It is precisely this point in time that we need to question whether or not the shift 
in power that the global development landscape has witnessed over the past two decades 
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has also brought about a shift in the dominant discursive paradigm of development itself. 
The dominant paradigm of development views social change in terms of the maintenance 
of the status quo. Within the dominant paradigm, social order constitutes asymmetrical 
power relations formed in and through development. If the so-called South-South 
development cooperation is to have any potential to transcend such forms of domination 
we need to interrogate development thinking and practices of emerging actors. Such 
endeavor calls for an in-depth examination of the discourses of development and national 
articulation among emerging development actors, looking at how their development is 
accountable to whom, in other words, whose interests development serves and whether 
“doing good” translates to “doing well” (Wilkins, 2016, 2018)2.   
Second, this study is concerned with the current market-oriented globalization 
that privileges promotional practices of branding as a tool of governance and identity 
politics. Critical studies in development communication need to engage with how donors 
publicize and promote their “do good-ing” (Enghel & Noske-Turner, 2018) as a tool of 
legitimacy and to articulate a competitive national identity. Studies of development 
discuss the role of branding of aid as private actors engage in development (Richey & 
Ponte, 2011). However, there are not many studies that link development with nation 
branding, which uses public goods, in this case, foreign aid, as discursive tools to project 
a desired national identity.  
Current trends in development indicate that countries such as Australia, Canada, 
and the UK have restructured their international development agencies, accompanied by 
                                                 
2 The notion of “doing good” and “doing well” come from a study by van Tulder and Fortainer (2009 , 
223–4), in which the authors discuss corporate responsibility in development in terms of the ethics of 
cooperating with other stakeholders based on the dialogic negotiation of solutions. Wilkins (2016) uses 
these terms in the context of development communication to make the claim that the spectacle of need to 
look good comes at the expense of doing well. In most recent research, Enghel and Noske-Turner (2018) 
uses the phrase, “doing good or looking good” to distinguish between development communication using 
communication to engage in development from using communication to inform about the good done.  
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explicit pursuit of national interests. This has been accompanied by re-formulated 
discourses of virtue, doing good, and “smart aid” (Mawdsley, 2017). The foregrounding 
of national interests begs us to consider how market-oriented globalization has 
contributed to politics of development. This study considers the integration of 
development as a branding device as a direct manifestation of market-oriented 
globalization. Embracing development as a tool of nation branding, in other words, 
taking ideas, feelings, and images associated with development to represent a certain 
identity of the country, extends this interest in the political agenda of development. It is a 
timely endeavor to understand how communication is used by development actors to 
publicize their activities and for what ends.  
Studies on globalization, culture, and development have shown that culture is 
increasingly seen as a resource to be appropriated (Yúdice, 2003). Colin Sparks also 
notes the “increasing incorporation of all areas of human life directly into the world 
market” (2007, p. 154). I understand nation branding to be a manifestation of such logic 
of thought pervading the global relations. Development itself is defined in cultural terms 
for its translation to economic capital. Furthemore, commitment to development 
intervention is justified in cultural terms. As Lee Myung-bak’s speech conveys, 
development is seen as a vehicle by which to spread the donor’s culture abroad and 
enhance cultural attractiveness of the donor.   
The overarching question of the dissertation asks, can South-South development 
cooperation subvert the dominant paradigm of development? Here, subversion would 
mean that development would be defined as social justice rather than furthering the 
current mode of capital accumulation that sustains asymmetrical relationship between the 
actors involved. It also involves breaking or complicating the hegemonic imaginaries 
related to development, such as the field’s tendency to compartmentalize the world into 
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North v. South or West v. East or the widespread assumption of the development actor as 
being a Euro-American white male and culturally superior to the donor.   
Within the overarching question, I use Korea as a context to understand how one 
national actor works within this global context of development. Korea is an apt case 
study to interrogate critically some of the documented recent shifts in development. It is a 
post-colonial nation state whose geostrategic location placed it at the center of the U.S.-
led modernization intervention targeting Third World countries during the Cold War. 
Having achieved unprecedented economic growth in a compressed period of time, Korea 
has tried to shed its negative image associated with its geopolitical instability in part 
through its cultural policy and foreign aid programs. Korea’s case offers insights into 
globalization of development, consistencies and ruptures in the dominant paradigm of 
development, the politics of development in relation to nation branding, and how 
citizenship is implicated in this process.    
I begin by identifying Korea’s conceptualizations of development within a global 
landscape. I raise the questions: How is the notion of development articulated by Korea’s 
popular press? How does this vary over time? How do the ideas associated with 
development serve as a nation building strategy? And How does this fit within global 
development discourse?  The chapter draws on news coverage related to Korea’s 
development from 1960 to the end of 2014. I seek to understand how the idea of 
development evolves over time by unpacking how the three dominant ideas associated 
with development in Korea – geundaehwa (modernization), segyehwa (globalization), 
and seonjinhwa (becoming advanced) – are brought up and discussed in the popular 
press.  
The next chapter analyzes Korea’s government-sponsored international 
development volunteer program, in particular, its visual strategies to promote its 
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activities. In this chapter, I conduct a visual analysis of volunteer photos that are selected 
as winners in KOICA’s annual photo competition from 2009 to 2013. I ask, how does the 
volunteer program serve Korea’s development strategies? How does the program 
articulate Korea’s position in the world? And its role as humanitarian agency? I pay 
attention to visuality as discourse, looking at the discursive process by which visual 
imagery of the (inter)national is produced.  
Finally, the study goes onto look at volunteer experiences on the field. How do 
volunteers in this program articulate their role as development agents? How do they 
understand their encounters in the host country? This chapter is based on 20 interviews 
with returned volunteers. Based on the accounts of volunteer experiences with the host, I 
analyze how Korean volunteers navigate sociopolitical, cultural, and institutional 
conditionalities. I illustrate how such conditionalities act as both enabling and 
constraining forces in the ways that volunteers form relationships with the host. The 
chapter explores how volunteers assume the positionality of both producer and consumer 
of development as they encounter hegemonic understandings of nationality, race, and 
gender in development.  
The following literature review begins with the idea of the nation as a symbolic 
construct. In the post-Cold War era, nations have undergone shifts in how they are 
understood and presented. The literature review provides an overview of major academic 
debates concerning globalization and the nation state. I bring in research on the political 
economy of development aid, focusing on the role of emerging donor states in 
articulating alternative assumptions and models of development aid. These discussions 
frame the overarching question guiding this research: Can South-South development 
subvert the dominant paradigm of development? The literature review on the political 
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economy of emerging donors is used to contextualize the case of Korea, followed by an 
introduction of its volunteer program, WFK.  
The subsequent section of the literature review draws on critical studies of 
development and development communication. I bring Foucault and Gramsci in 
conversation as a basis for a theoretical framework with which to approach development. 
Then existing analytical frameworks in development communication are examined, 
considering how communication about development and communication of development 
may inform contemporary phenomena of development that is worked into and driven by 
the logic of branding nation.   
The methods section lays out in detail the research purpose, research questions, 
methodological approach, and data collection and analysis process. The conclusions 
chapter integrates the three findings chapters to discuss how the nation produces and is 
produced by development. Along this line, I focus on the meanings and implications of 
nation branding in development. Finally, I attempt to re-situate Korea into the global 
context as an emerging donor and discuss my own take on South-South development and 
its potential to bring about some sort of change toward a more equitable and socially just 
relationship.   
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review brings into conversation several bodies of literature on 
globalization, nationhood, and development as a basis to think productively about 
Korea’s engagement in development aid. I introduce theoretical perspectives that 
consider the nation as a symbolic construct that is constantly being re-constructed in 
response to the changing global and domestic social, economic, and political conditions. 
Then I introduce relevant literature on political economy of development, specifically 
those concerning the emergence of the so-called Southern countries as development 
actors. These studies illustrate how the emerging (or in some cases, re-emerging) donor 
states have propounded multiple models and narratives of development aid, some which 
challenge the dominant paradigm of development.  
Making sense out of this shifting space of development is informed by Foucault 
and Gramsci’s notions of discourse and hegemony. These frameworks inform an 
understanding of development as a field of discursive practices, in which different actors 
are involved in multiple levels of ongoing negotiation and contestation by mobilizing 
financial, cultural, and political resources.  
This study goes onto contextualize development within communications studies, 
by bringing together a range of studies that have examined how communication channels 
and messages can be used as tools for social change. I also examine studies that approach 
communication as a political and symbolic resource whose control determines how social 
relationships are formed within the field of development. Based on a review of this body 
of literature, I lay out three analytical frameworks to be used in this research project: a 
critical approach to communication for development; communication about development; 
and communication of development. In particular, communication of development offers 
a link to intervene in growing instances of branding and marketing practices in 
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development aid activities to enhance the actor’s reputation. To better understand the 
logic behind communication of development, the last section of the literature review 
introduces studies that look at how culture is figured into development and national 
identity building. 
2.1 The Nation in Global Context 
How do people come to think of themselves as part of a nation? And how is it that 
a majority of people foreground national affiliation over ever-increasing connections and 
alliances forged at subnational, regional, and transnational levels?  This section draws 
on relevant literature that formulate the idea of ‘nation’ as a construct that is constantly in 
flux, influenced by the geopolitical context on one hand and domestic political context on 
the other.  
2.1.1 THE NATION AND ITS COMPONENTS 
An abundance of studies has over the years sought to explain why and how 
nations developed, and how nations are maintained over time (Anderson, 1983; Billig, 
1995; Gellner, 2006; Hobsbawm, 2013; Smith, 2010). While the point of creation is 
debated, it is generally understood that the nation is a socially constructed entity that 
grows out of aspirations and loyalties. One of the first efforts to define the meaning of the 
nation was by Earnest Renan (1882/1990). argued that a nation is, above all, a product of 
human needs and the will to form a social union. As he put it,  
A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth are but one, 
constitute this soul or spiritual principle. One lies in the past, one in the present. 
One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is 
present- day consent, the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of 
the heritage that one has received in an undivided form. (Renan, 1882/1990, p. 
20).   
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Renan’s work inspired many subsequent publications that explored what 
constitutes and sustains the idea of nationhood. These studies are noteworthy here for 
how they conceived of culture coming into play in constituting the idea of nationhood, 
which works to bind its constituents together. Benedict Anderson (1983/1991) built on 
Renan’s work to defined the nation as an “imagined community”: It is imagined because 
people who will never come into contact with one another nonetheless share certain ideas 
and ideals about their nation (1991, pp. 5-7). Anthony Smith (2010) also notes that the 
ideal of nationhood relates to cultural issues that other ideologies neglect. Unlike other 
political ideologies, the nation is seen as a cultural artifact in that it is bound by a shared 
system of ideas and signs, which forms the basis for what Anderson refers to as a 
“community,” or “deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson, 1991, p. 6).  
Studies that approach the nation as a political construct explicate how nation-
building involves selection, combination, and codification of previously existing values, 
symbols, memories and the like, as well as the reworking of this process over time and 
with change in circumstances (Smith, 2010). In a similar way, Hobsbawm (1983) 
observed that traditions such as the national flag and the national anthem were “invented” 
in order to “inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour” (p. 1). Such inventions  
are “modified, ritualized, and institutionalized for new national purposes (Hobsbawm, 
2013). Scholars of nationalism have suggested that such collective consciousness of the 
nation is produced and perpetuated through large-scale public institutions, such as 
education, religion, and media. Anderson saw print capitalism (i.e. mass media) and the 
vernacular language as opposed to Latin, which allowed people to imagine themselves as 
part of a community. Understanding the nation as a singular concept, has over time, been 
criticized  for its neglecting contested meanings that different groups compete to control 
(see Verderey, 2012). However, for the purpose of this study, I am concerned with the 
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national project as a hegemonic ideology that seeks to create national citizens in and 
through first, cultural social institutions, such as family, school, and the media (Balibar, 
1991), and second, through constant re-interpretation and re-invention of cultural norms 
and practices. 
Understanding the national form as a construct entails that it is not static but 
undergoes changes according to political and economic conditionality. Ernest Gellner 
posits that the idea of the nation is “contingent” (2006, p. 6). As Smith states, “change is 
built into the definition of national identity, yet it is change that operates within clear 
parameters set by the culture and traditions of the nation in question and its distinctive 
heritage” (p. 23). Here, I argue that we need to consider the geopolitical as well as the 
societal and the institutional context to understand how constructive components 
associated with nation evolves.   
In recent times, scholars have raised the question of how ideas of nationhood and 
national identity evolve amidst globalization (Beck & Levy, 2013). Competing 
perspectives exist on whether the nation state is still a legitimate and powerful site of 
belonging and identification despite the increasingly porous nature of national boundaries 
(see Jin, 2014). While this debate is ongoing and has yet to be settled, others argue that 
the debate is rendered less meaningful when one considers the concept of a nation as a 
“perpetual imaginary” that has and will continue to adapt to and shift along with shifting 
political economic conditions (Croucher, 2015).  
2.1.2. GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONHOOD  
The first part of this review provides an overview of relevant literature that 
examines the relationship between contemporary globalization and the response of nation 
states to shifts in the global political economic order. Scholarly debate on globalization at 
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the turn of the 21st century was focused on the impact of globalization on nation states. 
Questions such as “Will the nation-state survive globalization” posed in Foreign Affairs 
(Wolf, 2001) sought to figure out how increasing flows of people, capital, and goods 
across national boundaries as well as environmental and security issues that transcended 
territories would affect the legitimacy of nation states as a necessary framework of 
identity, allegiance, and affiliation.  
Early debates on globalization and the nation state were divided into whether or 
not the power and the autonomy of the state would be weakened by the shift in the 
political economic order. At the one end of the academic debate, the emergence of a 
fundamentally new world order was seen as weakening the autonomy of nation states 
(Appadurai, 1990; Castells, 2010; Gill, 1995; Hardt & Negri, 2001). Stronger alliances 
beyond the national boundaries through the network (Castells, 2010) and widening 
“scapes” of mobility of people and content (Appadurai, 1990) were seen to compromise 
the imaginary of a national identity. Research on transnational networks as a form of 
collective organizing emphasize political and social participation above and beyond the 
nation state, emphasizing network connections (Castells, 2012; Hardt & Negri, 2001; 
Keck & Sikkink, 1998). These studies explore the possibility of post-national sensibilities 
and cosmopolitan subjectivities formed around the idea of democratic principles, which 
transcend the boundaries of the nation. Cosmopolitanism and global citizenship in this 
context stand in opposition to globalization, which is conceived to be an expansion of 
neoliberal capitalism as world order. 
At the other end of the debate, the nation state was still seen to constitute a 
powerful entity in the global political economic system. Ellen Wood (2003) argues, 
“neoliberal globalization does not bring about an end of the nation state but that the state 
continues to play an indispensable role in circulating and maintaining the conditions of 
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capital accumulation” (p. 139). In particular, when it comes to controlling the everyday 
lives of people, the nation state continued to be of prime importance. “National 
governments are still key sites of power,” Curran (2002) notes, in that: “They are still 
centrally important, for example, in determining the organization of welfare services, 
education, moral regulation (or the lack of it), penal policy and acts of war. They also 
continue to be dominant in an area of particular concern to media studies – 
communications policy” (p. 183). Zygmunt Bauman’s claim that “states set up and 
enforce rules and norms binding the run of affairs within a certain territory” (1998, p. 60) 
also echoes Curran’s claim.  
However, towards the mid-2000s, scholars moved away from questioning 
whether or not, but towards inquiries of how nation states might perceive and adapt to 
changes in the neoliberal geopolitical context. Ulrich Beck and Daniel Levy (Beck and 
Levy, 2013) argue that it is essential “to explore how exactly this malleability and 
contingency of nationhood evolves in a global context” (p 5). In the context of post-Cold 
War globalization, representational strategies of nation states increasingly follow the 
logic of branding in order to justify their existence (Van Ham, 2002).  In both 
supranational and national level, the emergence of culture as a driving force of state 
identity, such as the notion of “soft power” (Nye, 2004) as a post-Cold War principle in 
international governance, have increasingly pushed nation states to compete based on 
attractiveness of values rather than fear of military might.  
2.2. Political Economy of Development  
The emergence of diverse actors in global development towards the turn of the 
millennium has brought about a substantial shift in the landscape of development. In 
particular, the tremendous diversity and growing number of emerging (or re-emerging) 
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donors present a range of opportunities for their beneficiaries and for development 
policies, ideologies, and governance. And reflecting the diversity of donors are multiple 
interests and concerns that drive development practices. Jan N. Pieterse (2010) refers to 
such architecture of global development as a “development field.” In referring to 
development as a “field,” Pieterse is concerned with how certain meanings of 
development, dimensions of development, and perceptions of development taken place 
over time.  
Uncovering the dynamics of different interests and concerns within the 
development field may be achieved by attention to its changing context and structure. 
Attention to the political economy of global development helps us improve our analysis 
of development as a field of scholarship and as an institutional project (Enghel, 2015). I 
look at politics of bilateral development aid, bringing to consideration the emergence of 
different models and, specifically, looking at how Korea fits into this broader structure of 
the global development field.  
2.2.1 GLOBALIZATION, NATIONHOOD, AND DEVELOPMENT 
Foreign aid in its modern conception was institutionalized following WWII. 
Inspired by the Marshall Plan’s reconstruction work in Europe, Organization for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) was created in 1961 to provide 
economic, financial, and technical assistance to Third World countries (Hynes & Scott, 
2013). Within the OECD, Development Assistance Committee (DAC)3 serves as a 
primary forum in setting definitions and norms regarding what constitutes “development 
                                                 
3 The 30 members of DAC are comprised of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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assistance.” It sets the parameters of what should be counted as aid and the proportion of 
aid that goes to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) over middle-income countries. In 
light of increasing cross-border flows of people, resources, and ideas, the DAC has been 
undergoing debates on whether or not to count as spell out ODA domestic expenditures 
on students from developing countries, cost spent to refugees in donor countries, and 
development awareness programs targeting domestic citizens, among others (Hynes & 
Scott, 2013). Such debates reflect the nature of development as a site of enduring 
contestation of meaning by different actors involved, and in constant flux along with 
global circumstances.    
The development field is constituted by a diverse range and multiple levels of 
actors. This includes networked NGOs, civil society, supranational organizations like the 
UN and the World Bank, philanthropic organizations, multinational corporations, and at 
the level of individuals, migrant workers. Such actors all have differentiated 
understanding of development as well as different concerns and priorities – interests that 
are articulated and contested through ideas and funding. These actors in the development 
field have created multiple centers of power and interest in the structure of global 
development. This is indicated by the diversification in the source of aid as well as the 
growing total amount of aid. While the proportion financed through classic ODA and 
loans has remained relatively steady over time, it is the private sources, from foreign 
direct investments, private grants, bonds and securities, and migrant workers that have 
increased, making up this difference. For example, remittances flowing into developing 
countries are higher than ODA funds by approximately four times4 (World Bank Group, 
2017). From 2012 to 2016, an average of 70 percent of the total amount going to 
                                                 
4 Remittances to developing countries are estimated at $444 billion in 2017 (World Bank, 2017). 
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humanitarian assistance was funded by bilateral donors while approximately 30 percent 
came from private sources including trusts and foundations, corporations, and 
individuals.  
2.2.1.1 Bilateral Donors 
Although responsible for the highest proportion of global development assistance, 
the possibilities for citizens and governments to receive money directly from private 
contributions, through families, foundations, corporations and other non-public sources, 
have been steadily increasing with more integrated economic globalization (OECD 
2014). Still, bilateral assistance remains central to the global development industry. 
Focusing on DAC donor contributions to development assistance, overall ODA 
has been steadily increasing over the last five decades, propelled by increased funding to 
bilateral and to multilateral programs. In 1960, ODA was registered at US$ 37.6 billion 
in allocations. Twenty years later, this amount had increased by 70 per cent (US$ 63.7 
billion in 1980), and even more by 1990 (US$ 85.4 billion). Although the total volume of 
aid went through a sharp decline then throughout the 1990s with a 20 percent decrease to 
US$ 70.5 billion by 1997, in our more recent decades we are witnessing the highest 
amounts ever documented for development assistance: From 2006 to 2016, development 
funding rose by 30 percent from USD 128.1 billion to USD 146.6 billion (OECD, 2018a).  
In charting the bilateral agencies’ presence in global development, we could 
consider the overall amounts dedicated to foreign aid, or the proportions of their 
government funding allocated for this purpose. If listing donor countries in terms of the 
absolute amounts given, the top five include the US (US$ 35.3 billion), Germany (US$ 
24.7 billion), the UK (US$ 17.9 billion), Japan (US$ 11.5 billion), and France (US$ 11.4 
billion). Together, these five countries contributed US$ 100.8 billion, or 69 per cent of 
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total DAC assistance in 2017. But when considering how much a country donates in 
relation to their available resources, as percent of their Gross National Income (GNI), 
different countries lead, starting with Sweden (1.01 percent), followed by Luxembourg (1 
percent), Norway (0.99 percent), Denmark (0.72 percent), and United Kingdom (0.7 
percent; OECD, 2018a). While the US may be the largest donor in terms of absolute 
amount given, its percentage of resources devoted to development is only 0.18 per cent, 
placing it at19th in rank among all DAC members. 
 
Table 1. Net ODA flows, in volume and as percentage of GNI, 20175 
 
                                                 
5 Source: OECD (2018), Development Co-operation Report 2018: Joining Forces to Leave No One 
Behind, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2018-en.  
This table includes ODA as reported by both DAC and non-DAC countries  
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2.2.1.2 Politics of Bilateral Development Aid 
National agencies devoted to foreign aid seek to articulate their image and 
position themselves through their foreign aid policy on a geopolitical stage. Foreign 
assistance is said to comprise an instrumental tool of soft power, or the ability to attract 
others by promoting a positive image and values toward which others aspire (Nye, 2004). 
The abilities of national governments to perform as development donors reflect not only 
their available surplus wealth, but also their position within a geopolitical context. Post 
WWII Cold-War politics forced many governments to align themselves along east-west 
axes, in accordance with US and Soviet Union (SU) agendas. As Japanese and German 
economies began to recover post WWII, bolstered by serious reductions in military 
expenses, these nations began to emerge as donors. And as other countries in the global 
South accumulated more comparative wealth and as regional dynamics gained in 
strength, these geopolitical conditions fostered more diverse development donors. 
In 2016, approximately 22 per cent of total development assistance (US$ 135 
billion) was dedicated by countries outside of the dominant DAC (OECD, 2018b), 
representing a significant shift in the development industry to include an emerging group 
of donors not previously part of this industry. This new emerging group of donors 
comprises nation states across geographical regions, with divergent political systems, as 
well as disparate economic resources. These non-DAC members exemplify an alternative 
to the current dominant institution of development aid through what is being called 
South-South cooperation. This model of cooperation is posed as an alternative to the 
conventional DAC approach given assumptions that this form of development will be 
“based on solidarity, horizontality – as opposed to the perceived vertical nature of 
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traditional DAC aid – non-interference in domestic affairs, and mutual benefit” (De 
Renzio & Seifert 2014, 1861). The volume of South-South development cooperation is 
growing at a rapid pace, at an annual average of 21 per cent (Atwood, 2012). This South-
South cooperation, while including many donors, does appear to be dominated though by 
the governments of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and China, 
together accounting for 90 per cent of the “South” initiated development aid (B. 
Tomlinson, 2014, p. 176). 
Many of these emerging donors work primarily within specified regions, 
connected through linguistic, cultural and religious associations. For example, while 
Brazil’s ODA flows are allocated across the globe, its technical cooperation projects are 
launched specifically in Portuguese-speaking countries (Center for Global Prosperity, 
2013). Saudi Arabia, which has been the largest donor in volume of foreign aid after the 
U.S. over the past four decades, focuses its funding to Muslim countries. Between 2003 
and 2012, Yemen was the largest recipient of Saudi foreign aid. Turkey is another 
regional donor whose increasing role in humanitarian assistance is directed toward 
preserving Islamic solidarity and historic ties within the region. In 2011, Turkey pledged 
US$ 250 million in humanitarian relief assistance to Somalia (Aynte, 2012). More 
recently, the country provided 70 percent of non-DAC global humanitarian aid (US$ 2.3 
billion), most of which was directed at Syrian refugees displaced along its border region. 
Although technically a member of OECD if not formally of DAC, Turkey has continued 
to identify its development activities as South-South cooperation, leading some scholars 
to conclude that “Turkish development cooperation … seems to be aimed at fulfilling the 
function of a mediator between Northern and Southern positions and players by placing 
itself in neither camp” (Renzio & Seifert, 2014, p. 1868). 
  22 
The four countries comprising the majority of non-DAC funding have their own 
particular senses of mission, some of them using their wealth to leverage status and some 
building potential markets. While development funding from varied countries in the 
global South may date back as far as the 1950s, it is not until the early 2000s, with the 
rise of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and from 2010, South Africa) that we see 
these national actors leveraging their economic growth to strengthen their geopolitical 
stature (O’Neill, 2001). Dominant particularly in their own regions, these countries differ 
dramatically in their political systems, economic conditions, and cultural histories. As a 
group these five countries represent 20 per cent of the world’s GDP, as well as 26 per 
cent of global military expenditures (Armijo, 2007). 
China leads this group in total allocations for overseas development (US$ 2.47 
billion in 2011), followed by India (US$ 0.73 billion), Russia (US$ 0.50 billion), Brazil 
(US$ 0.36 billion) and South Africa (US$ 0.10 billion; Center for Global Prosperity, 
2013). Notably, China has provided resources to countries that have been ostracized by 
Western donors. These recipients include North Korea, Myanmar (until its recent 
transition to democracy), and Sudan (Stallings & Kim, 2016). Stallings and Kim (2016) 
note that In Latin America, “Venezuela and Argentina have counted on China when they 
could not obtain resources elsewhere” (2016, p. 126).  
It should be noted that there is some question as to the degree to which this 
documented funding fits operational definitions of official development assistance. More 
direct comparative research needs to be done to consider the ways in which their 
approaches to development differ, contingent upon their own internal conditions and 
geopolitical positions, as well as the degree to which there is evidence to support a shared 
alternative development model, juxtaposed with a dominant “west to rest” approach. 
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Such multiple trajectories of foreign aid delivery have led some scholars to 
believe that different models of development aid are possible (Walz & Ramachandran, 
2011). However, whether BRICS are able to sustain a shared, alternative approach with 
significantly different consequences remains an open question. Some foresee a truly 
alternative model of development that will decenter the hegemonic influence of Western 
conception of development embodied by the OECD DAC (Khanna, 2014). Others are 
less optimistic that the model of South-South cooperation will alter global relationships in 
any significant way, seeing the rise of these emerging powers as being “firmly located 
within the Western global hegemony” (See Gray & Murphy, 2013, p. 185). Nonetheless, 
both sides agree that emerging donors in South-South cooperation advocate for increased 
representation of non-Western nation states in principles and interests shaping the 
discourse of international development. Brazil’s role as a “norm entrepreneur” 
exemplifies such effort to bring about an alternative dominant discourseof aid and 
development.  
Part of Brazil’s discomfort with aligning with DAC members arises out of 
resistance to being pigeonholed into categories associated with Northern aid. 
Brazilian diplomats bristle at the suggestion that Brazil is an ‘emerging donor’ 
because they claim that the country is not a provider of aid but rather a solidarity 
partner in horizontal cooperation (Abdenur, 2014, p. 1883). 
There are many debates about the differences in these different “models” of 
development in practice. However, what is certain is that, on a discursive level, they are 
used as different models to speak about the different models of giving aid. From this 
perspective, the co-existence and contestation of such different models of development is 
not as important for the recipient as is the donor of aid. The existence of these models 
suggests that there are different instruments through which nation states identify how 
they want to be perceived and positioned in the global affairs. It shows with whom or 
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what ideologies they seek to be aligned. In this way, the models may be considered as 
strategic narratives to shape the structure and politics in the global system.  
2.2.2 SOUTH KOREA IN THE FIELD OF DEVELOPMENT  
Being one of the newest members of DAC, Korea has sought to attain its status as 
a development donor through 1. Diversification of aid by sector and region; 2. Partaking 
in global aid and development cooperation fora; and 3. Creating a distinguished identity 
as a donor. Korea gives substantially less in foreign aid compared to other DAC 
members. In 2015, Korea provided US$ 1.9 billion in net ODA, ranking 14th in volume 
of aid and 24rd in ODA as percent of GNI (0.14 per cent) among national agencies 
(OECD, 2016). However, this amount is consistently rising. In the past five years South 
Korea’s ODA investment has increased from US$ 1.3 billion in 2010 to US$ 1.8 billion 
in 2014. And from 2014 to 2015, the country increased its ODA by 8.3 percent.   
Like its neighboring donor, Japan, Korea’s foreign aid mostly benefits the region6 
(53 percent), although the proportion of aid allocated to Asia has decreased over the 
years. It maintains a strong tie with Vietnam. In 2015, South Korea targeted 15 percent of 
its bilateral funding to Vietnam, a sizable amount that is comparable to the combined 
bilateral aid of 20 percent allocated to the entire Sub-Saharan African region. The top 
five recipients of Korea’s aid following Vietnam include Afghanistan, Tanzania, 
Cambodia, and Bangladesh. Although not counted as ODA7, South Korea provides 
substantial amount of humanitarian aid to North Korea. Depending on the political 
orientation of its government, it has provided tens of millions of dollars per year. In 2014, 
                                                 
6 In 2015, Korea gave 53 percent of its total ODA to Asia while Japan allocated 66 percent to Asian 
countries.  
7 Funds directed to North Korea are not reported to DAC as ODA (OECD, 2016) but are counted as 
domestic transactions (Stallings & Kim, 2016).  
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assistance to its northern counterpart was estimated at approximately USD 13.3 million 
(OECD, 2016). In 2017, the government gave 8 million USD worth of nutrition supplies 
for children and pregnant women in North Korea, channeled through multilateral 
agencies, UNICEF and UN World Food Program (McCurry, 2017). The country gives 
comparatively more to the poorest countries (38.1 %) than many of its bilateral peers 
(Japan gave 18.4 % to Least Developed Countries), and Korea’s aid by sector diverges 
from that its neighboring donors, China and Japan in that its allocation is comparably 
more evenly distributed among education, health, and population (26 %), other social 
infrastructure (24 %), and economic infrastructure (30 %).  
While there are some differences in sectors of investment, Korea’s model of aid 
closely follows that of Japan’s. As Stalling and Kim (2016) note, “although reluctant to 
admit,” Korea’s development trajectory is closely modeled after the experience of Japan 
in terms of development models (p. 130). Later, its aid program also assumed many of 
the characteristics pioneered by Japan. The connection is rooted in economic structures 
that were enforced upon during Japanese colonial rule, which carried over to post-
liberation structure of its public institutions and policies including its aid apparatus. 
Korea’s aid system is separated into grant agency (KOICA), an institutional arm of 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and a concessional loan agency (EDCF) located 
within the Korean Export–Import Bank, which was modeled after that of Japan8.  
Despite the comparably smaller volume of aid, South Korea has sought to amplify 
its voice and representation within the institutional framework of OECD DAC. For 
example, the country hosted the G20 2010 summit in Seoul from which the ‘Seoul 
Development Consensus for Shared Growth’ was generated, which was intended to 
                                                 
8 Since 2008, Japan has undergone restructuring of its foreign aid in a more centralized form (Feasel, 
2014).    
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replace the Washington Consensus (Marx & Soares, 2013). The following year in 2011, 
Korea hosted the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4) in Busan, 
which resulted in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. Since its 
successful hosting of HLF4, Korea has taken part in various global post-2015 fora. The 
former Foreign Minister Sung Hwan Kim was one of the 27 members of the High Level 
Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post- 2015 Development Agenda. More recently, Korea 
hosted a Development Cooperation Forum High-Level Symposium in April 2015.  
As one of the few successful aid stories, the Korean government has promoted its 
development experience as a “uniquely Korean model of development” (Watson, 2012) – 
one that is “evidence-based” and providing an alternative to the “theory-oriented policy 
recommendations from advanced countries” (Korea Development Institute, 2014, p. 7). 
The Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) is an embodiment of such initiative. Launched 
in 2011, this program is run jointly by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, social and 
economic development think tank, Korea Development Institute (KDI), and Export-
Import Bank of Korea, which is responsible for overseas concessional load. Doucette and 
Müller (2016) examine KSP’s activities to ‘modularize’ Korea’s community reform 
movement in the 1970s, Saemaul Undong (translated as New Village Movement). 
Saumaul Undong, an authoritarian-era run rural modernization program from the 1970s, 
has undergone aggressive promotion by Korea. For example, Korea provided USD 5.1 
million to launch a four-year project with the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) under the name, Saemaul Initiative Towards Inclusive and Sustainable New 
Communities project (UNDP, 2013).  
In taking an active part in international discussions of foreign aid and packaging 
its previous experience as a model of development that recipients might follow, For 
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Korea, its accession to DAC was recognized as an evidence of its “arrival” on the global 
stage (Stallings & Kim, 2016, p. 122).   
 Korea’s development aid has been approached as an instrument of foreign policy 
and diplomatic relations at the level of the nation state, but very little has been done from 
the vantage point of development aid as a form of strategic communication toward 
domestic and foreign publics. Scholars are only beginning to recognize the role of 
development cooperation as a form of public communication. For example, Sook Jong 
Lee discusses in passing the role of KOICA’s foreign aid programs as comprising 
Korea’s public diplomacy (Lee, 2015, p. 123). This current lack of studies that integrate 
development aid with communication is an oversight, given that for example, a 
substantial portion of KOICA’s annual budget goes to its volunteer program, World 
Friends Korea. Amounting close to 20 percent (KOICA, 2017a), this proportion indicates 
the importance of communicating with both the domestic public through its citizen 
participatory program and to foreign audiences about the work that Korea is doing as a 
donor country (personal interview, 2018).   
2.2.2.1 World Friends Korea: Government-Sponsored International Development 
Volunteer Program 
Korea’s government-sponsored international development volunteer program was 
established in 1989. Since then, more than 60,000 Koreans have served in 96 countries 
across Asia (24 countries), Africa (33 countries), Latin America (19 countries), Eastern 
Europe (13 countries), and the Middle East (6 countries; World Friends Operation Team, 
2017). Volunteers take part in education, healthcare and medicine, information 
technology, public affairs, agriculture, industrial energy, and environment sectors. A 
large majority of the volunteers are involved in the education sector, instructing host 
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nationals in the areas of Korean language and culture, arts, Taekwondo, and information 
technology. 
In addition to their primary assignment, many volunteers are involved in a 
secondary project during their two-year service. Secondary projects encompass cosmetic 
refurbishing of buildings, expanding infrastructure and developing educational content 
such as storybooks and textbooks (KOICA World Friends Team, 2018). WFK volunteers 
also implement health campaigns to promote awareness of personal hygiene and sexual 
health, and provide medical check-ups together with Korean nurses and doctors 
volunteering in neighboring cities. 
In 2009, Korea’s volunteer program was institutionalized as a public diplomacy 
and nation branding initiative when it was selected, along with King Sejong Institute and 
other national heritage projects, as a means to enhance the country’s cultural 
attractiveness (Hong, 2014). The Presidential Council of Nation Branding (PCNB), an 
institutional body that oversaw nation branding programs, consolidated seven different 
volunteer service programs that were operated by different ministries under one umbrella 
brand called World Friends Korea (WFK). This move was motivated by a number of 
different factors: First, it sought to consolidate a highly fragmented structure of 
international development volunteer program, which was operated independently by 
different ministries (see Appendix 1). In so doing, it sought for more efficient 
management of funds, standardized volunteer training, and most importantly, the Council 
attempted to create a stronger international presence by consolidating the total number of 
volunteers sent abroad by the different ministries (personal interview, 2018). When 
fragmented, the number of volunteers seem small, but when added up, the total size of the 
program is rather formidable, coming second or third among government-sponsored 
international development volunteer programs, after the U.S. Peace Corps and Japan 
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Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV), depending on year. As such, a consolidated 
brand was seen to create stronger representation.  
Within the geography of international aid, what makes volunteers unique is their 
positionality that rests somewhere in between promoting foreign policy goals of the 
government on one end and building cross-cultural and mutual relationship on the other 
(Schech, 2016). Korea’s volunteer program reflects the broader tendency among 
government-sponsored volunteer programs to be instrumentalized for foreign policy 
interests and subjected to neoliberal management structures of the governments that fund 
them (Georgeou & Engel, 2011). Since being identified as a brand, WFK has come to be 
recognized in instrumental terms to enhance the country’s cultural attractiveness 
(Presidential Council of Nation Branding, 2013). 
2.3 Development as a Field of Discursive Practices  
Discourse refers to a way of speaking about and understanding the world around 
us (Foucault, 2013). It provides us with a set of interpretive tools that are used to make 
sense out of things and our own experiences, as well as how we act on the basis of that 
thinking. According to Foucault, discourses are articulated through “dispersed elements,” 
such as specialized forms of knowledge, institutions, subjects, and practices. These 
dispersed elements are said to come together in certain rules of formation to produce 
systems of thought (“epistemes”) and knowledge (“discursive formations”) (2013). In 
that people are “disciplined” or internalized to embody such systems of thought, 
discourse produces permissible modes of being and thinking while disqualifying and 
even making others impossible. 
For critical development scholars, Foucault’s use of discourse in the 
representation of social reality was influential in guiding an understanding development 
  30 
as producing socially constructed reality from which particular sets of logics and 
understandings guiding social relations emerged (Escobar, 1984; Ferguson, 1990; Li, 
2007). The discursive space was interrogated from a critical distance to question who 
produces the knowledge and ways of acting upon constructions such as the “Third 
World,” as well as their origins. Historicizing development, Escobar argued that poverty 
was a “discovery” of the newly established institutional apparatus such as the World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the United Nations (UN), following post-
World War II. (Escobar, 1995). Its problematization, supported by various authoritative 
measurements, gave the U.S.-led intervention only logical, and interventions in 
education, health, hygiene, and morality, among others, “turned the poor as objects of 
knowledge and management” (Escobar, 1995, p. 23). Tanya Li’s (2007) historical 
interrogation of development intervention in Indonesia foregrounded such politics of 
knowledge. Li (2007) suggests that development histories have been “rendered technical” 
into a legible narrative of development. The concept of ‘rendering technical’ has been 
applied to critically examine recent efforts by the Korean government to export its 
development experience by “modularizing” Saemaul Undong, a rural reform movement 
in Korea, through its Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP; Doucette & Müller, 2016). The 
authors state that the spiritual, voluntary, and value-oriented nature of the movement has 
been used to ‘render technical’ the “complex and contested Korean development 
experiences in a series of elite-driven, technical interventions, a move that allows it to 
travel within international policy circuits as a distinct ‘model’” (2016, p. 31).     
While Foucault sees power operating by disciplinary mechanisms that individuals 
internalize and embody, it does not account for the ways in which different conditions 
constrain but also enable actors to contest the dominant regimes of representation. The 
multi-polar structure of development aid and its multi-directional flow of resources show 
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that the dominant paradigm of development co-exists and contends for power with other 
emerging models of development. Here, I find Gramsci’s concept of hegemony (1971) to 
be useful as a theoretical guiding lens. Both Foucault and Gramsci foreground power in 
their analysis and share an understanding of power in terms of acquiescence rather than 
coercion. However, Foucault sees power as being diffused in social relationships and 
disciplinary in practice, while Gramsci’s understanding of power lies in binary relations 
of dominance and subordination. Referring to such relations as hegemony, Gramsci states 
that hegemony works as a way of gaining and maintaining power through consent (1971). 
Consent is produced through the “inter-articulating, mutually reinforcing process of 
ideological influence” (Lull, 1995, p. 34). However, unlike Foucault, Gramsci saw the 
ideology producing institutions in constant struggle over meaning and power (1971).  
Drawing on Gramsci’s idea of hegemony, Pieterse states that development is a 
terrain of struggle in that each development theory can be seen to articulate political 
interests and priorities (2010). As such, Pieterse understands the field of development as 
“a terrain of hegemony and counter-hegemony,” (Pieterse, 2010, p. 9) consisting of 
“many stakeholders and multiple centers of power and influence (Pieterse, 2010, pp. 9-
10). Taking the two theoretical concepts of discourse and hegemony, I understand 
development as a field of discursive practices that operates through representational 
regimes as well as ongoing of contestation and negotiation by actors concerned. Next, I 
consider communication in development.  
2.4. Development Communication  
Development communication, also known as communication for development 
(Servaes, 1999, 2008) or communication for social change (Grumcio-Dagron & Tufte, 
2006), refers to “strategic application of communication technologies and processes to 
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promote social change,” oftentimes “funded through wealthy agencies and implemented 
in nation-states with comparably fewer financial resources” (Wilkins, 2000, p. 197). 
While the origin of the field is traced to post-World War II research on the mass media’s 
effect on experiences of modernity or market-based liberal democracy in Third World 
countries (McAnany, 2012; Shah, 2011), over time, critical approaches to development 
communication have called attention to issues of implicit power relations at play in the 
development landscape (Wilkins, 2000). In this section, I discuss how culture comes into 
play, how it is manifested as emerging donors seek to project their competitiveness in the 
global sphere. I refer to existing literature that address how culture is ‘put into’ 
development discourse.    
2.4.1. DOMINANT PARADIGM OF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATION 
Development communication as a practice and academic discipline emerged from 
early media studies research in the United States in post-WWII period. Media studies 
scholarship in the United States was influenced by cognitive and behavioral psychology 
that was carried over to media studies in the form of effects, such as persuasion, public 
opinion, and attitude change. Early scholarship in development communication 
conceived media as a neutral tool to facilitate U.S.-led move toward modernization of 
Third World countries. A legacy in development communication studies, The passing of 
Traditional Society by Daniel Lerner (1958) well illustrates the set of assumptions and 
logics that came to be known as the dominant paradigm of development communication. 
In the book, Lerner claims that U.S.-led Western values and ideas spread by mass media 
could help transform the Middle East from traditional to modern forms of social, 
economic, and political entities. Lerner juxtaposes tradition and modern through a 
parable of Turkish village grocer and chief. The chief of Balgat is depicted as a parochial 
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character and whose wisdom and loyalty lies within the village. On the other hand, the 
grocer is open to things foreign, is able to think outside the confines of the village. and 
more interested in national than local issues. As exemplified by these two characters, 
Lerner categorized people in the Middle East into traditional, transitional, and modern 
based on their degree of empathy or “psychic mobility.”  
In his critique of the Passing of Traditional Society, Hemant Shah (2011) situates 
the study in three contexts: Cold War geopolitics, the emergence of behavioral sciences, 
and post-war racial liberalism. The geopolitical interest of the U.S. government during 
the Cold War heightened investment in media effects research, mainly propaganda 
research in the government’s effort to “win hearts and minds” from Soviet influence in 
strategic regions around the world (McAnany, 2012). Development was closely 
associated with modernization, which was used to thwart the spread of communism in 
Third World Countries. Modernization as a form of social change was possible by 
embracing Western manufacturing technology, political structures, and values. Such 
dichotomized understanding of modern vs. tradition underscores a linear and hierarchical 
path of development, a reasoning that was supported by many other scholars of 
development during this time (Pye, 1963; Schramm, 1963). In this transition, Lerner 
points to the intervening role of the media as a “mass multiplier”: Being exposed to the 
media develops individuals’ potential for empathy and hence their motivation to embrace 
and embody modern ways of being (Lerner, 1958). As Lerner’s study illustrates, media 
was seen to provoke attitude and behavior change, which in turn, leads to societal change. 
As such, the dominant paradigm of development communication privileged individual 
behavior change as a unit of social change.   
Looking deeper into Lerner’s logic of development is that the Middle East needs 
to emulate the values, lifestyles, and political organization of the U.S. The question of 
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race is inherent here. Racial liberalism, Shah (2011) argues, is one of the main ideas 
behind Lerner’s theory of modernization. Lerner refused the biological argument for 
Western “superiority” and argued that the West is only culturally superior to the rest, and 
that underdeveloped nations could become modern if they took the right steps toward 
modernization. As such, the existence of “Chiefs of Balgat” throughout Third World 
countries justified the West’s intervention, at the same time, promoting American 
exceptionalism.    
Despite much criticism toward early studies on development communication, the 
dominant approach to development communication remains relevant up to the 
contemporary period (Shah, 2010). For example, in a meta-analysis of communication 
and development studies in Asia, Wei (1998) asserts that the 1990s have seen an 
abundance of research on “new” communication technology and development 
undergirded by “old” ideas about modernization and mass media (1998). This trend is 
also confirmed by Ogan and colleagues (2009) who state that studies on development 
communication “continued to embrace a modernization paradigm despite its many 
criticisms” (p. 655).   
2.4.2. CRITICAL APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT COMMUNICATION  
Critical perspectives to development communication examine communication and 
social change in terms of the ways in which structures, ideologies, and power shape 
communication for and about development (Wilkins & Mody, 2001). Karin Wilkins 
noted that communication in development should not only consider its instrumental role 
but also account for the greater power structure in which the communication channel 
serves as a resource. In this regard, Wilkins distinguished communication for 
development and communication about development, where communicating about 
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development engages in “critical approach to understanding the ways in which 
development approaches communicate assumptions about strategic social change” 
(Wilkins & Mody, 2001).  Communication about development foregrounds the 
discursive aspect of power as a “capacity to shape the context in which problems and 
solutions are determined” (Wilkins 2000, p. 198). How substantive issues become 
articulated as problems and potential solutions are identified is shaped according to the 
interests and motivations of those in positions of power. 
Critical scholars of development communication point out that knowledge is 
political. It is political because knowledge guides conceptualization of issues of 
development such as poverty, health, and gender equality. Knowledge is also used to 
represent not only issues but also groups of people, depriving them of self-representation. 
Such representations are used to define problems, beneficiaries, and solutions, from 
which resources are allocated accordingly to programs addressing such issues. In that 
way, knowledge is equivalent to power (Dutta, 2011). Interrogating family planning 
intervention programs in Korea during the 1960s and 70s, Eunjoo Cho (2013) suggests 
that population control was pivotal to internalization of the West as modern, civilized, 
and representing progress, while Korea, particularly its practice of giving multiple births 
while impoverished was perceived as pre-modern, barbaric, and irresponsible. Cho 
(2013) exposes how such binary formations were imposed on the rural population by 
Korea’s urban intellectuals who invoked “internalization of shame” as a form of self-
discipline towards having many children, which served as a basis from which to civilize 
oneself (E. Cho, 2013).  
Internalization of western-imposed frames of knowledge intersects with 
Foucault’s notion of discipline (1995), both demonstrating the ways in which certain 
ways of thinking and doing become accepted as the norm, or hegemonic over time. The 
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binary formations and internalization of shame, self-perception in terms of lack, enforces 
the western gaze upon the native as a form of constant self-discipline.  
In Black skin, white masks, Frantz Fanon ( 1986) engages in explicating the logic 
of internalization. Fanon (1986) points out that the process of internalization is not only a 
political but a psychological process undergirding constant self-consciousness through 
the gaze of the west. Fanon describes this as neurotic behavior, emphasizing as follows.  
[the black man] is constantly pre-occupied with self-evaluation and with the ego-
ideal…The Antilleans have no inherent values of their own, they are always 
contingent on the presence of The Other. The question is always whether he is 
less intelligent than I, blacker than I, less respectable than I.” (Fanon, 1986, pp. 
163-164).  
The constant self-evaluation from the Eurocentric frame of reference, according 
to Fanon, in turn, fosters intra-group rivalries among the blacks, where The Antilles 
blacks perceived themselves to being closer to the white Europeans and more civilized 
than African blacks (Fanon, 1986).  
Sangbok Ha (2012) suggests parallels in Fanon’s formulation of the inferiority 
complex and internalized white superiority in contemporary Korean society. Ha (2012) 
discusses Korea’s racism and xenophobia toward people of darker skin to the 
internalization of white superiority coupled with the myth of pure-bloodism in Korea 
which was deployed by intellectual elites as an ideological tool to reconstruct Korea 
following the devastation of Japanese occupation and the Korean War. However, Ha 
(2012) suggests that Korea’s case is distinct from the case of the black and white 
relations. For Korea, while Japan was an object of resistance, it simultaneously served as 
a model to aspire to become for Koreans in terms of being more civilized. In this respect, 
the relationship between Japan and Korea was solidified to one that consisted of second-
class race but still more civilized than other yellow-skinned or black race (Ha, 2012). The 
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historically-constructed hierarchical rank ordering of race in Korea is the outcome of 
Korea’s Japanese colonization, U.S. imperialism, and the ideology of pure-bloodism 
spread by Korea’s ruling elites.  
Such studies on internalization point towards how intervention programs that are 
implemented in the name of liberation of the recipients may work to sustain “coloniality 
of being and knowledge” through constant self-consciousness of political, psychological, 
and material inferiority imposed onto themselves. Critical development studies have been 
concerned with representations of aid recipients (Harrison, 2013; Orgad & Seu, 2014; 
Wilkins, 2016). These studies have brought to the fore assumptions about recipients of 
aid and their lack of the means to articulate their voices that continue to marginalize their 
existence. More attention is given to communication for development at the recipient end 
(Waisbord, 2008). On the other hand, much less research has examined how donors seek 
to position and represent themselves through overseas development. In the current 
international landscape that privileges the promotional practices of branding as a tool of 
governance and identity politics, critical studies in development communication has 
begun to integrate not only communication about development but how donors publicize 
and promote their “do good-ing” as a tool of legitimacy and articulating a competitive 
national identity (Enghel & Noske-Turner, 2018).  
Globalization in the current era is defined and driven by the logic of 
neoliberalism. Neoliberalism posits that “human well-being can best be advanced by 
liberating individual entrepreneurial practices and freedoms and skills within an 
institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and 
free trade” (Harvey, 2005, p. 2). The primary organizing framework of neoliberal 
development is marked by privatization of aid (Chakravartty, 2009; Enghel & Wilkins, 
2012). The rise of “philanthrocapitalism” is met with concerns in terms of its reliance on 
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market mechanisms, playing by the rules of the existing neoliberal system (Edwards, 
2009; Youde, 2009). They tend to focus on individual empowerment goals that 
emphasize entrepreneurship in market economies as an approach to social change 
(Enghel & Wilkins, 2012). The cause and solution of human suffering is overly 
simplified, promoting “slactivist” or armchair modes of participation from the public that 
ranges anywhere between clicking a button on the computer screen in support of an 
image or consumption of material goods (Richey & Ponte, 2011). Critical work in 
development reveals how such passive forms of action that privilege consumption of 
images and corporate products mask structural issues, collective action, and social justice 
(Richey & Ponte, 2011).  
Referring to the “marketing and stakeholder communication so intrinsic to 
contemporary development practice,” James Pamment (2016, p. 9) suggests that we need 
to consider communication of development as an additional layer to communication for 
and about development. His point has much relevance in an era where countries are 
discussed and presented in ways equivalent to private corporations.  
2.5. National Identity in Transition  
In 2001, an article was published on Foreign Affairs (), entitled “The Rise of the 
Brand State: The Postmodern Politics of Image and Reputation.” In the post-Cold War 
context, it claimed, international peace is sustained by the logic of the market: As 
contenders in the global economy,  nation-states have shed traces of “nationalist 
chauvinism” that tend to be associated with “antagonism” (Van Ham, 2001, para. 5). 
Instead, nation states are turning themselves into brand states, employing “assertive 
branding techniques” to enhance visibility and attractiveness. According to its author, 
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Peter Van Ham, “smart states are building their brands around reputations and attitudes in 
the same way smart companies do” (2001, pp. 3-4).  
Nation branding is a social process by which discourses and practices of 
nationhood are reconstituted following marketing and branding paradigms (Kaneva, 
2011). As a set of practices, nation branding involves strategic management (i.e. 
planning, monitoring, and evaluation) of a nation’s image to stand out in the global 
marketplace of competing nation states. Branding consultant Simon Anholt states that 
nation states will need to focus on competing with each other for their “share of the 
world’s consumers, tourists, investors, students, entrepreneurs, international sporting and 
cultural events; and for the attention and respect of the international media, of other 
governments, and the people of other countries” (2007, p. 72) 
 
Broadly, research on nation branding is categorized into techno-economic, 
political, and cultural approaches (Kaneva, 2011). Techno-economic approaches adopt 
functionalist and instrumentalist perspectives that seek to further develop models and 
measurement tools of nation branding to be employed in more tactical and strategic ways. 
Political approaches are concerned with the conceptual intersections between nation 
branding and public diplomacy, seeking to situate nation branding within the field of 
international relations, particularly under the soft power principle.   Finally, cultural 
approaches focus on critique of nation branding informed by theories of national identity, 
culture, and governance. Studies taking a cultural approach emphasize the importance of 
examining the political implications of nation branding through contextualization of 
nation branding, exposing their connections to relations of social power. This section of 
the literature review further elaborates on research that take a cultural approach, focusing 
on themes of commodification, social justice, and governance.  
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2.5.1. COMMODIFICATION OF CULTURE   
Nation branding is a manifestation of what George Yúdice (2003) refers to as 
“culture as a resource,” in which “culture is increasingly wielded as a resource for both 
sociopolitical and economic amelioration” (p. 9). This includes public goods being 
employed as a symbolic resource by which to perpetuate the national legitimacy. Yúdice 
reconceptualizes culture from a critical political economic perspective – as a capital 
generating resource whose appropriation and distribution is related to power.  
Commodification is “the process of transforming things valued for their use into 
marketable products that are valued for what they can bring in exchange” (Mosco, 2009, 
p. 127). Commodification of culture is not new; the process has been documented even 
before the terminology formally existed (see Strasser, 2013). Artworks by Picasso, 
French wine, and cities like Rome and New York attract great economic advantages 
because of their collective symbolic capital (Harvey, 2001). However, it is the extent to 
which culture as policy, practice, and discourse is subsumed within the market logic, 
deliberately managed as a resource for its capital generating potential and as a “critical 
sphere for investment” by both nation states and global institutions is new (Yúdice, 
2003).  
Branding consultants typically depict national identity and culture as ‘fixed 
assets’ (e.g. Anholt, 2008, p. 34) to be deployed in gaining economic and status benefits. 
Such vocabulary is also adopted by policymakers and political leaders: The term “Korea 
discount”9 in contrast to “Korea premium” is propounded by PCNB to explain why 
                                                 
9 The term Korea discount refers to the devaluation of Korean stocks, attributed to factors such as 
geopolitical instability, corruption, amount of household debt, and Chaebol-led structure of Korea’s 
business market. However, it was brand consultants including Keith Dinnie (2009), who directly linked this 
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Korea needs to put more time and effort to build a stronger nation brand (Korea Brand, 
2009). Culture became increasingly sought after by local and national governments as 
resource to be effectively managed. ‘Hip’ and ‘cool’-ness of locales came to be 
associated with innovativeness and economic output (Florida, 2005).  
According to Mosco, “Communication is taken to be a special and particularly 
powerful commodity because, in addition to its ability to produce surplus value … it 
contains symbols and images whose meaning helps to shape consciousness” (2009, p. 
134). The Korean government’s support for broadcast television dramas and popular 
music through its Hallyu (or Korean Wave) policy over the much more lucrative game 
industries is a case in point. Korea incorporated national image-making as a political 
agenda shortly after the financial crisis in 1997 to increase export in cultural industries. 
According to K. Hong, “it was an open secret that most of the revenue from cultural 
exports was generated by the games industry rather than the so-called Korean Wave 
industries.” (Hong, 2013, p. 74)10. Nevertheless, broadcast content and popular music 
industries were seen as effective carriers of the country’s cultural image and Korean way 
of life. The government’s support of the television dramas and popular music shows that 
nation branding is not only driven by an economic logic, but also by an ideological one. 
Furthermore, the symbolic components depicted in the dramas and popular music 
produced surplus value through inbound tourism revenues among international fans who 
                                                                                                                                                 
term to the country-of-origin effect, claiming that the “Made in Korea” label carries less prestige than other 
countries of origin, such as “Made in Japan,” and a result, Korean producers cannot enjoy the same price 
premium for the same quality goods. Dinnie (2009) pointed to the need for concerted effort in nation 
branding to turn the Korea discount around to Korea premium. This term has since then become commonly 
invoked in public discourse.  
10 According to Hong (2014), television dramas and popular music accounted for 11 percent of the 
revenue for the overseas sales of Korea’s cultural industries. The top three revenue came from the game 
industry, character industry, and publishing industry, none of which were incorporated into the Korean 
Wave discourse.   
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wanted to experience the Korean culture first hand, to attend concerts and fan meetings 
with their favorite celebrities (Garcia, 2017; Irani, 2017; H. J. Kim, Chen, & Su, 2009). 
Many critical studies in nation branding have analyzed how media texts produce 
nation branding discourse and its implications for both domestic and international 
audiences. Examining images of nation branding, studies suggest the notion of diverse 
nations co-existing in marketplace is in the form of “global cultural stereotyping” 
(Jansen, 2008, p. 133). Looking at television programs, scholars have exposed how 
developing countries and non-Western countries have resorted to reproducing orientalist 
imagery that lives up to the desires of international consumers (Baker, 2008; Widler, 
2007). In Korea, as television dramas are increasingly being produced for the 
international market, historical television dramas are being stripped of historical 
complexities that might stir conflict and being retold with appealing aesthetics in ways 
that are easily consumable and appealing to the international audiences (K. S. Lee & 
Kang, 2016).   
The irony here is that nations are encouraged to promote their cultural elements 
and to assert authenticity and uniqueness, and therefore achieve what David Harvey 
refers to as “monopoly rent” (Harvey, 2001). But at the same time, cultural elements need 
to be worked into market logic and to appeal to international audiences, leading to 
inherent contradictions, such that “bland homogeneity that goes with pure 
commodification erases monopoly advantages” (Harvey, 2001, p. 396). As such, place 
branding appeal to a similar note of affect and emotions, as reflected in logos such as 
“100% Pure New Zealand” and “Pure Michigan”; “Cool Britannia” and “Cool Japan”; 
“Incredible India” and “Incredinburgh”; “I feel Slovenia” and “I ‘heart’ NY.”  
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2.5.2. “BRAND NEW JUSTICE”? BRANDING FOR DEVELOPMENT   
In his book, cleverly and ambitiously entitled “Brand new justice: How branding 
places and products can help the developing world,” Simon Anholt (2005) argues that the 
problem of underdevelopment is due to the lack of tools at the disposal of the developing 
world with which to brand their goods and the nation states. Rather, Anholt claims that 
humanitarian aid and development programs from developed world that depict the 
developing world as fraught with poverty, violence, and instability, make it fit for charity 
but not for investment (Anholt, 2005). The solution offered is for the developing world to 
take control of its own image, by engaging in its own representational tactics. For weaker 
nation states, nation branding enhances their capacities to compete on equal terms with 
more powerful nation states. Based on reasoning that symbolic capital is easily 
transferred to economic capital through tourism and foreign direct investment, nation 
branding is said to serve as a tool of “technology leap” (Anholt, 2003, p. 42). In turn, 
branding brings the world closer to enacting social justice by combining capitalism with 
humanism.  
Engaging in a critique of nation branding as an instrument of global justice, 
Browning (2016) raises the question, what is the understanding of development premised 
in these claims? Browning (2016) brings to attention that nation branding ultimately 
upholds the status quo promoting capitalist notions of neoliberal market economics, 
rather than to bring to light structural inequalities. Sue Curry Jansen (2008) offers similar 
criticism, stating that claims of nation branding for development embraces the “language 
and assumptions of modernization theory” (2008, p. 133). There are strong parallels to 
nation branding for development and modernization theory. The source of the problem is 
attributed to individual nation states, rather than the global structure of production, 
ownership, and distribution. Just as exposure to media was claimed to bring about a 
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modern way of life, nation branding is seen by its proponents as the magic bullet to 
attract investors and bring about development. However, taking the example of the World 
Cup in South Africa, Browning draws on Alegi (2008) to point out that such international 
events benefit mostly the big businesses, large construction firms, and already prosperous 
locations in the country, while it neither enhanced the political or economic situation for 
the majority of South Africans and in much needed areas.  Such a commodified and 
linear conception of development provides an overarching understanding of development 
from a framework of nation branding. 
 Furthermore, referring to how South Korea’s foreign aid policy may be co-opted 
in debates over nation branding, Browning (2016) emphasizes that “nation branding 
entails inherently hierarchical and exclusionary modes of governance.” For Korea, 
foreign aid is strategized as symbol of status and prestige (Kapoor, 2013, pp. 64-65). This 
is also evident in Hong’s observation that the PCNB referred to its ODA program as an 
“expansion of the economic Korean Wave.” Aligning its bilateral development program 
with cultural export directs focus of ODA away from its substance to its economic benefit 
for Korea. As such, Browning (2016) suggests that “nation branding strategies are 
actually premised on the preservation of structural inequalities between donor and 
recipient nations” (p. 67)  
 
2.5.3. NATION BRANDING AND CITIZENSHIP: BRAND NATIONALISM  
Reflecting on the relationship of media and national identity, Volcic and 
Andrejevic (2011) explain the trajectory of national identity amidst neoliberal 
globalization marked by a decline in public service and state-supported broadcasting. The 
authors note that the state has responded to such shifts in the ideological apparatus by 
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turning to marketing professionals or seeking partnerships with private-sector 
broadcasters. In a country like South Korea whose government maintains considerable 
influence in the cultural sector, the government has supported commercial broadcasters in 
their efforts to commodify local identity to carve out a distinctive identity for 
increasingly scarce “attention economy” of audiences who seek a culturally unique but at 
the same time, palatable content (Jin, 2014).  
Commercial brands rely on consumption and production practices of consumers 
by passing on information through which shared meanings are forged, and by enacting 
brand identity (Arvidsson, 2005). Nation branding is also both dependent on monitoring 
and mobilizing its citizens to identify with and to “live the brand” (Volcic & Andrejevic, 
2011).  As such, a successful nation branding is said to foster a stronger sense of 
national identity and social solidarity among national constituents. In that nation branding 
enforces social order not through coercion but through disciplinary measures (structuring 
movements and understandings of people), nation branding becomes amenable to 
Foucault’s notion of governmentality (Lemke, 2016).   
Christensen’s study (2013) on Sweden’s branding activities through Twitter 
lucidly illustrates the mediated nature of branding and the role of communication 
technologies. The author identifies the restrictive nature in which Sweden’s branding 
practitioners engage in monitoring and control process as they engage in a narrow 
selection process of participants and by implicitly enforcing self-censorship by setting an 
agenda of what is wanted. Christensen’s study shows the way in which the values 
commonly associated with the Internet and social networking platforms as being 
transparent, open, and democratic, are easily appropriated by the practitioners of branding 
to amplify the value of the nation state. Based on his findings, he presents an expanded 
use of the term “technological nationalism” (p. 43) to go beyond the traditional notion of 
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media as purveyor of national identity. Instead, using Twitter to engage citizens in a 
branding process, according to Christensen, becomes noteworthy not for the content of 
the individual tweets but for the “meta-message” of transparency, flexibility, 
innovativeness and openness as representing the national image. Christensen’s study on 
the mediated nature of nation branding raises questions about the role that 
communications technologies play in nation branding as a discursive practice that has yet 
to be rigorously addressed by critical scholars.  
As studies show, nation branding is less concerned with promotion of 
participatory democracy and respect for multiplicity of voice than with the creation of 
stable and secure environment for capital investment. In this perspective, Browning’s 
(2016) claim that nation branding entails inherently hierarchical and exclusionary modes 
of governance extends to governance of its own citizens. Iwabuchi’s (2013) also points 
out that while Japan has proactively sought to enhance its national image to the 
international audience, its exclusionary domestic practices that marginalizes ethnic 
minorities in the country stands in sharp contrast to this narrative. Under nation branding 
there leaves very little room for co-existence of multiplicity of voices and cultural 
identities.  
The nature of nationalism has been defined along the lines of identification with 
such state-marketed commodification of both tangible and intangible cultural, economic, 
and political aspects that the national elites (guided by international marketing 
consultants) perceive to be competitive advantage of the nation. Terms such as 
commercial nationalism (Volcic & Andrejevic, 2016a), brand nationalism (Iwabuchi, 
2015) and global nationalism (Sklair, 1997) intersect in this aspect. Patriotic emotional 
ideas are combined with marketing goals of the country where nationalism is directly 
reflected as marketing success and economic profit (Volcic & Andrejevic, 2016). In this 
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vein, citizenship is displaced as consumerism (Volcic & Andrejevic, 2016), and those 
groups of people who are perceived to be detrimental to the nation’s marketability are 
further marginalized and oppressed (Kaneva & Popescu, 2014).    
A second thread of argument commonly made through these terms is the 
relationship between the national and the global. According to Sklair (1997), global 
nationalism is “characterized as the view that the best interests of the country lie in its 
rapid integration with the global capitalist system while maintaining its national identity 
by marketing national competitive advantages of various types through its own global 
brands and tourism” (Sklair, 1997, p. 528). Sklair’s conception of global nationalism 
understands the global as being constituted by a marketplace where nation states exist 
alongside one another. Looking at cross-border movement of people and media culture, 
Iwabuchi (2015) uses the terms banal internationalism and brand nationalism to 
demonstrate how intensified cross-border flows of people and media reinforces, not 
displace, national cultural borders. Banal internationalism refers to nation-based cultural 
diversity that ignores difference within the nation and brand nationalism, the 
development of cultural policies to advance narrow international interests work together 
to create a global imaginary where cultural boundaries are demarcated within global 
market. Despite the mundaneness of boundary crossing, these studies suggest that nation 
branding has further distanced the understanding of globalization as cosmopolitanism.    
 
2.5.4. DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL NARRATIVE 
Within the development industry, culture is discussed in two ways, distinguished 
based on whether we are speaking about culture as belonging to the donor or the 
beneficiary: First, culture of the beneficiary is defined as a bounded management tool that 
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can be deployed to do development better (Li, 2011). As such, it is understood as 
necessary and promising area of investment. The Expedience of Culture, Yúdice (2003) 
emphasizes how supranational development organizations such as the World Bank, the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and major international foundations have 
contributed to such understanding of the notion of culture. Yúdice refers to the keynote 
address of former president of the World Bank, James D. Wolfensohn, who states: “There 
are development dimensions of culture. Physical and expressive culture is an undervalued 
resource in developing countries. It can earn income, through tourism, crafts, and other 
cultural enterprises” (World Bank, 1999, p. 11) and “Heritage gives value. Part of our 
joint challenge is to analyze the local and national returns on investments which restore 
and draw value from cultural heritage—whether it is built or living cultural expression, 
such as indigenous music, theater, crafts” (World Bank, 1999, p. 13, cited in Yudice, p. 
13). 
The second way in which the field of development understands culture is from the 
donor’s perspective. Studies have illustrated the ways in which the U.S. Peace Corps 
volunteers instrumentalize the idea of Western superiority in their relationships with the 
host (Cobbs-Hoffman, 1998; Fischer, 1998; Hanchey, 2015). While not representative of 
all development actors, international volunteers are seen as reinforcing such dominant 
imaginaries of development. In her study of Australian volunteers, Nicole Georgeou 
(2012) finds that the host tends to embrace the notion of the Westerner as a development 
actor, which encapsulates assumptions of white masculinity as a marker of authority 
(Georgeou 2012). In such ways, scholars have pointed to the persistence of colonial and 
imperialistic power dynamics in volunteer–host relations (Grusky 2000; McBride and 
Draftary 2005) which are shaped by multiple aspects of representation.  
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As emerging donors push alternative paradigms of development cooperation, 
donors strategically project a cultural narrative in their transnational encounters. In 
referring to Asian donors’ tendency to draw on cultural justification in their development 
cooperation, Chika Watanabe (2018) uses the concept of “instrumental culturalism.” The 
concept closely echoes Yúdice’s culture as a resource claim in that both seek to illustrate 
the logic of appropriating culture to serve political interests.  
However, Watanabe (2018) goes beyond Yudice’s claim when the author 
identifies the implications of instrumental culturalism employed by emerging donors – 
essentializes culture as bounded to a particular group of people, timeless, and 
uncontested. Watanabe shows how Asian donors frequently employ the narrative of 
“common culture” or common roots in their justification for aid. Second, she draws on 
the concept of orientalism (Said, 1978) to argue that by objectifying one’s own cultural 
uniqueness leads to “self-orientalization” as a way to use it to advance certain political 
and economic ends. The culturalist views obscure political intentions and in attributing 
certain tendencies to culture, it curtails possibility of public debate (2018). 
Watanabe and Yudice’s conceptualizations demonstrate how culture becomes an 
instrument of Foucault’s notion of governmentality. As Pieterse (2010) puts forth, 
communication and development  
may offer relief from development steeped in Eurocentrism, occidental narcissism 
or trilateralist arrogance, but the remedy against the chauvisim of ‘great 
traditions’ is not to adopt the inverse missionary position and the chauvinism of 
‘little tradition’... [Communication and development] is not simply a matter of 
including culture but also of interrogating culture as a terrain of power, culture as 
ideology” (p. 77).  
Building on this scholarship, I explore how development becomes appropriated as 
cultural resource to be worked into nation branding policy as a part of nation-building 
agenda in the age of globalization.  
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this study is to better understand how development aid is 
envisioned, understood, and employed by donor nation states in articulating desired 
national identity. I look at this process as historically and socially contingent and 
involving different actors, each driven by their own set of interests. Specifically, I focus 
on the emergence of former Third World countries that have transitioned from recipients 
to providers of aid. As these countries are actively partaking in global development, are 
they re-shaping the knowledge structures that shape the understanding and practice of 
development?  
Grounded in critical studies of development communication, I understand 
development to be a field of discursive practice, run by a set of specialized knowledge, 
institutions, and practices. Like many former Third World countries, in Korea, 
development has long constituted a primary nation building strategy, legitimizing the 
nation state while producing developmental subjects defined by its obligation to capital 
accumulation. While the country is now actively promoting its development aid overseas, 
development continues to serve an ongoing national project. By interrogating Korea’s 
discursive practice of development through historical contextualization, representational 
strategies, and practice, this study seeks to unravel how an emerging development actor 
situates in, negotiates, and complicates the dominant discursive practice of development.     
3.2. Research Questions   
The overarching question guiding this study is, can the so-called South-South 
development cooperation subvert the dominant paradigm of development? I approach this 
question deductively, situating Korea’s development discourse and practice within the 
global context (chapter 4), and then looking at how the structural conditions influence 
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how development is imagined (chapter 5) and practiced on the ground (chapter 6). While 
the overarching question was formulated based on theoretical discussions in concerned 
fields of study, the research questions stated below are outcomes of reformulation and 
refinement based on cycles of deductive and inductive observation of academic literature 
and data. In the field of development, this process is the more essential as the field is 
oftentimes criticized for its disconnect from the actual practice (Enghel & Noske-Turner, 
2018). The set of questions posed below provide an analytical framework for 
understanding how global conditions of power relations shape an emerging donor’s 
engagement in development.  
 
RQ1. How is the notion of development articulated by Korea’s popular press?  
   RQ1a. How does this vary over time?  
   RQ1b. How do the ideas associated with development serve as a nation building  
         strategy?  
   RQ1c. How does this relate to the global development discourse? 
 
RQ2. How are understandings about citizenship articulated by Korea’s popular press?  
   RQ2a. How are citizens defined?  
   RQ2b. What roles and responsibilities are they associated with?  
   RQ2c. How are citizens mobilized to engage in nation building?  
    
RQ3. How does the international development volunteer program serve Korea’s  
     development strategies? 
 
RQ4. What visual images are used to inform Koreans about KOICA’s development aid  
     abroad?   
    RQ4a. How do the visual images come about? 
    RQ4b. What visual imagery of the volunteer program’s development work is  
          presented?  
             
RQ5. What do the visual images say about KOICA’s role as a humanitarian agency?    
   RQ5a. What volunteer-host activities do the photos depict? 
   RQ5b. Who is present in the photos?  
   RQ5c. What setting is represented in the photos?  
 
RQ6. How do the visual images convey about Korea as a country?   
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   RQ6a. What kinds of images are associated with Korea?    
   RQ6b. What kinds of images are associated with the host?  
 
RQ7. How do volunteers in Korea’s international development volunteer program  
     articulate their role as development actors?  
   RQ7a. How are they trained to prepare for their volunteer work?  
   RQ7b. What kinds of volunteer-related work do they volunteers undertake on          
       ground?   
 
RQ8. How do volunteers understand their encounters in the host country?      
RQ8a. What frames of reference do volunteers draw on to make sense of their   
   encounters?  
   RQ8b. How do the frames of reference relate to how the volunteers navigate  
       their everyday encounters?   
In order to explore Korea’s engagement in development from a communication 
perspective, I divide my analytical framework into communication about development, 
communication of development, and development communication as practice. RQ1 and 
RQ2 question how the hegemonic understanding of development in Korea has come to 
be. In order to address RQ1, I conduct a discourse analysis of news coverage on three 
keywords, geundaehwa (modernization), segyehwa (globalization), and seonjinhwa 
(making advanced), which constitute strategic terms used in Korean national 
policymaking from 1960 to 2013. I draw on news coverage of the three keywords from 
the beginning of 1960 to the end of 2013 in three newspapers, Kyunghyang Shinmun, 
Dong-A Ilbo, and Maeil Business Newspaper. These three newspapers were chosen 
because they have been in operation since 1960, and they provide a balance in political 
orientation: Kyunghyang Shinmun is progressive-leaning and Dong-A Ilbo leans toward 
conservative orientation. The search was conducted through an online search engine, Big 
Kinds, and an online newspaper archive, Naver News Library. The online newspaper 
archive was consulted to retrieve news articles that were published between 1960 and 
1989, as Big Kinds provides news articles only from 1990 onwards. However, because 
Big Kinds database does not offer access to Dong-A Ilbo’s news articles, I had to refer 
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directly to the newspaper’s website to collect relevant articles published between 1990 to 
2013. Although the data collection process turned out to be rather complicated, working 
around the limitation of each online search engine ensured that there was consistency in 
news data collected for the time frame of the study. The frequency of the three terms 
appearing in news articles, and how these articles cover issues and perspectives 
surrounding the terms were analyzed to understand how the public discourse of 
development becomes constructed over time.   
RQs 3 - 6 address communication of development (Pamment, 2016), or how 
Korea’s development agency seeks to inform the public about its engagement in 
development aid. In order to address the research questions, I analyzed award winning 
photos in annual KOICA volunteering photo competition from 2009 to 2013. These 
photos were treated as discursive text which “makes certain things visible in particular 
ways, and other things unseeable … and subjects will be produced and act within that 
field of vision” (Rose, 2016, p. 137). To address RQ4a, I conducted interviews with two 
former WFK-Korea University Council for Social Service (KUCSS) volunteers whose 
role was to record volunteer activities through photos and blog posts and upload them 
periodically to WFK social media sites. Analysis of interview data interrogates the 
discursive practices surrounding representational construction of volunteer experiences to 
inform and promote Korea’ development work to its citizens, which works to produce 
certain imaginaries of development. As such, the photos are treated as discursive text that 
together create regimes of representation about developing countries and Korea’s position 
in relation to the host as a basis for projecting its national identity.  
RQs 7 and 8 address the question (albeit implicitly) raised by studies that examine 
flows of volunteers from non-Western countries, “Are non-Western volunteers better 
equipped to undertake development work?” (Balie Smith et al., forthcoming; Raymond & 
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Hall, 2008). In this chapter, I look as development communication as practice. The 
chapter is based on interviews with 15 volunteers, three volunteer coordinators, and one 
WFK staff. To address RQ 7, I analyzed the interview data broadly by interview 
participants’ accounts of their pre-departure training, their everyday work, their 
secondary projects, and activities outside of their place of assignment. These included 
cultural exchanges, invitations from people in the town, and visits to capital cities. To 
address RQ7a, I referred to KOICA training manuals, evaluation reports of the training 
program, and textbooks used during certain modules. WFK pre-departure training varies 
according to the specific volunteer program. For example, the duration of KUCSS pre-
departure training program is half the length of KOICA Overseas Volunteer (KOV) 
training program, which lasts eight weeks11. Given that 12 of my interview participants 
were KOV volunteers, I specifically referred to KOV training here. RQ 8 involved 
listening for the deeper meanings that would come up during any of the volunteer 
activities. I frequently asked questions about their relationship with the host, their 
relationship with other volunteers around the area, and asked volunteers to further explain 
when they spoke about positive or negative emotions, such as moments of frustrations, 
excitement, anger, and happiness. The RQs enabled me to approach volunteer 
experiences as both enabled and constrained by sociopolitical, cultural, and institutional 
contingencies.    
                                                 
11 Volunteer training varies in terms of length, content, and location in which they are held by specific 
program and the hosting government institution. However, efforts to standardize pre-departure training is 
evidence in recent development of standardized textbooks in areas of development cooperation, health and 
safety, corruption and ethics, and sex education (M. Lee, 2018). 
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3.3. Research Approach: Reflexive Case Study  
This study takes a case study approach to examine an emerging donor country’s 
foreign aid initiative, particularly the international development volunteer program. A 
case study approach is defined as an empirical inquiry that uses multiple sources of 
evidence to ask “how” and “why” questions about a contemporary set of events in which 
the boundary between the phenomenon and context are not clearly defined (Yin, 2003, 
pp. 5-13). A case study therefore aims to use as many sources of data as possible to 
investigate a phenomenon systematically. Data across the range of documents, 
interviews, and observations are used to establish chain of evidence, identify patterns, 
and build explanations (Yin, 2003).  
A case study approach is useful to examine a phenomenon from multiple 
contextual angles.  For this study, I examine the case of Korea’s development against 
temporal and spatial contexts. In this respect, Burawoy’s conception of extended as 
method, which “extract[s] the general from the unique, to move from the ‘micro’ to 
‘macro’ and to connect the present to the past in anticipation of the future” (Burawoy, 
1998) is useful to consider. Within this process, I foregrounded what Burawoy refers to 
as “reflexive science,” explained below.   
[Reflexive science is] a model of science that embraces not detachment but 
engagement as the road to knowledge. Premised upon our own participation in the 
world we study, reflexive science deploys multiple dialogues to reach 
explanations of empirical phenomena (p. 5).  
While Burawoy (1998) is specifically referring to ethnographic research, I used 
this as a way to approach my own data, whether they may be a news article, observation 
in a volunteer recruitment information session, or interviews with former volunteers. In 
conducting this research, I had to constantly engage with and question my own 
assumptions, assumptions which were an outgrowth of my own identity as an English-
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speaking, U.S.-educated female who had spent her adolescent and post-graduate years in 
the U.S. It also brought to the fore the motivation for this study, which was driven by my 
own previous experience as an international volunteer at an NGO. Conducting this 
research about Korea’s past and how it is reflected in contemporary discursive practices 
of development in Korea involved challenging and questioning my own socially 
constructed perspectives. Most of all, I constantly asked whether I was approaching my 
data with the very lens that I sought to deconstruct and critique. In this dialogic process, I 
refined the way I approach and analyzed my data as well as the guiding questions. As 
such, I am in agreement with, and this study is an outcome of Coffey’s (1999) claim that 
the self is engaged in the field at various levels and that fieldwork is an embodied 
experience that involves emotional and ethical, as well as scholarly concerns.  
 
3.4. Data Collection  
3.4.1. OBSERVATION 
During my field research, I visited multiple venues organized or set up by 
KOICA. These included 1) Public outreach campaigns; 2) Recruitment information 
sessions; 3) ODA lectures; 4) International Conferences; 5) World Friends Village. I 
attended two public outreach campaigns. The first was a public outreach campaign 
directed at the Korean public, entitled, “Into the World Off the Road” held in Mapo Oil 
Tank Culture Park in Seoul. The campaign featured photos taken by a professional 
photographer, Kim Myeong Joong, of KOICA’s projects around the world. The second 
public campaign I attended was called KOICA Bus Concert, which was implemented to 
provide information on and support overseas travel for young people who live outside of 
the capital city of Seoul. The campaign site consisted of recruitment consultation booths, 
  57 
KOICA ODA-project related booths, photo exhibit, and briefing sessions on KOICA and 
volunteer recruitment information session. The campaign also featured a talk given by a 
director of a citizen diplomacy group in Korea, VANC, as well as presentation given by 
former volunteers on their experiences. During the presentations, I took notes on how the 
staff and the volunteers talk about their work, the audiovisual materials shown, and their 
strategies for attracting audience interest in the field of development. These venues were 
also good opportunities to engage in casual conversations with the staff and ask quick  
questions. In one instance, a conversation with a staff member led to a formal 
interview.  
The campaigns also directed my attention to certain audiovisual data, leading to 
in-depth analysis. It was during this time that opened my eyes to these photos and to 
engage with these images and to analyze these visual representations systematically as 
discursive text. Visiting various sites, I also came across visual material that were used 
repeatedly across multiple sites, such as a promotional video that was played during an 
ODA education lecture and in World Friends Village publicity center. Such repeated 
exposure enabled me to identify the material that were of greater strategic relevance to 
KOICA over others in projecting a desired narrative of the institution. Based on such 
observations, I narrowed down the range of material to prioritize upon undertaking data 
analysis, and to use the less frequently appearing text as a point of comparison.    
3.4.2. INTERVIEWS  
For the purpose of this study I conducted 19 semi-structured, in-depth interviews 
in Korea (see table 1). These individuals were recruited through purposive snowball 
sampling. The interviews lasted between one to two hours in length. All interviews were 
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conducted in Korean, transcribed in Korean, and then translated to English by the 
researcher.  
My interview participants consisted of 15 returned WFK volunteers, three 
returned WFK volunteer coordinators, and one WFK staff in KOICA. The WFK staff 
whom I interviewed had been with KOICA for close to eight years and were 
knowledgeable about the volunteer selection process, training, monitoring, and 
evaluation. Volunteer coordinators are contract-based employees of KOICA and are 
stationed in KOICA’s overseas offices. Their responsibility is to monitor volunteers, 
maintain connection with the headquarters, and to conduct needs research among local 
host institutions, based on which volunteers with the requested expertise are placed. 
Depending on the particular program, the volunteers stayed abroad for a period of six 
months to two years, undertaking a wide range of work in the areas of social work, 
library sciences, and education in art, physical education, the Korean language, and 
taekwondo. 
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Table 2. Interview Participant Profile12 
In the beginning of my field research, contacts from friends and acquaintances 
helped me to recruit interview participants. I interviewed a personal acquaintance who 
had spent two years abroad as a volunteer coordinator and a former volunteer to whom I 
was introduced through a friend’s friend. In addition to personal contacts, I located 
                                                 
12 All three coordinators had previous experience volunteering with KOICA. However, here, only their 
experience as coordinator is included as the interviews were mostly about the interview participants’ 
experience as coordinators.     
Name Program Gender Age 
group 
Assignment Country Duration 
of stay 
Cheon KOV  Female 25-30 Social service Ecuador 2 yrs. 
Oh KOV Male 25-30 Sports ed. Rwanda 2 yrs. 
Park KOV Female 20-25 Library Sri Lanka 2 yrs. 
Hwan KOV Male 25-30 Primary ed. Paraguay 2 yrs. 
Lee KOV (Senior) Male 65+ Korean lang. ed. Morocco 2 yrs. 
Kim KOV (Senior)  Female 65+ Culinary ed. Morocco 2 yrs. 
Min KOV Female 20-25 Korean lang. ed. Peru 2 yrs. 
Sohn KOV Female 25-30 Social service  Bolivia 2 yrs. 
Choo KOV Female 25-30 Korean lang. ed. Uzbekistan 2 yrs. 
Han KUCSS Female 20-25 Culture ed. Myanmar 2 yrs. 
Soh KUCSS Male 20-25 Sports ed. Sri Lanka 6 mo.  
Choi Taekwondo 
Peace Corps 
Female 20-25 Taekwondo ed. Tanzania 6 mo.  
Lim KUCSS Male 20-25 Sports ed. Vietnam 6 mo. 
Joon KOV Male 25-30 Science ed. Tanzania 2 yrs. 
Kang KOV Male 25-30 Computer ed. Ethiopia 2 yrs. 
Hyun Coordinator Female 25-30 Coordinator Sri Lanka 2yrs. 
Oh Coordinator Male 25-30 Coordinator Morocco 2 yrs. 
Paik Coordinator Female 25-30 Coordinator Columbia  2 yrs.  
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potential interview participants by accessing WFK blogs and social media sites where 
former volunteers were active members. Facebook messages or e-mails were sent out to 
these individuals, inviting them for interviews. I also referred to memoirs written by 
former volunteers and recruited one volunteer who had published a book based on his 
volunteer experience. Additional interview participants were recruited through snowball 
sampling method by asking interviewees to provide contacts who might be interested in 
the interview.  
To briefly describe the interview participants, out of a total of 18 informants, 56 
percent were female, and 44 percent were male participants. This proportion in gender is 
similar to the actual WFK (KOV) gender composition, which is around 60 percent female 
and 40 percent male volunteers (KOICA, 2016).  The interviews were purposively 
selected to speak with volunteers who had served in different parts of the world. My 
interview participants had served in South/Southeast Asia (28%), Central Asia (5%), 
Africa (39%; three from North Africa and four from Sub-Saharan Africa), and 
Central/South America (28%). The countries represented here are given much more 
weight towards African and Central/South American countries than the actual percentage 
of volunteers deployed to these regions13. In terms of jobs, a large majority of the work 
undertaken by volunteers involved some kind of teaching (67%). In fact, KOV volunteers 
assigned to teaching positions far outweigh any other types of jobs on the ground14. 
Nonetheless, a limitation in my pool of interview participants may be that it does not 
reflect the diverse range of work undertaken during volunteer service. For example, none 
of the interview participants served as medical professionals. However, given the 
                                                 
13 A majority of WFK-KOV volunteering takes place in Asian countries (56.8%), followed by Africa 
(22%), Central/South America (14.3%), Central Asia/CIS (6.2%), and the Middle East (0.8%; KOICA, 
2016).  
14 KOV volunteers work in teaching (54.8%), health and medicine (13.4%), public administration (8.9%), 
industrial energy (9.1%), agriculture and fishery (13.3%) sectors, among others (KOICA, 2016).  
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limitation in my contacts, I could not account for the diversity of assignments as I had 
hoped. I tried to cover for the lack of representativeness in the volunteers’ work by 
referring to written texts by previous volunteers. The memoirs that I have included in my 
analysis therefore are as follows: Falling into Furaha, Tanzania (2013) – A memoir 
written by a nurse; Beautiful life, beautiful birth (2014) – A memoir written by a doctor;  
Story of a couple’s love for KOICA  – A memoir written by senior volunteer couple; 
Traces of passion: In the equator of Ecuador (2013) – A memoir written by a WFK 
Senior Advisor.  
This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board (Study number 2015-
02-0098). Prior to the interview, I explained about the purpose of the research, 
description of the procedures for the interview questions, and concerns about the risks of 
participating in the research. I asked for permission to audio record the conversation and 
reference the person in my study.  I also let the interview participants know that they 
could opt out at any time during the interview. Following human subject protection in 
qualitative research (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011), interview participants’ names have been 
replaced with pseudonyms in order to protect the confidentiality of the research 
participants.  
3.4.3. DOCUMENTS 
Documents are important sources for supporting the arguments made through 
interviews and media texts (Yin, 2003). The range of documents collected were: News 
reports related to the volunteer program; memoirs written by volunteers; volunteer pre-
departure training material; commissioned reports on WFK; annual reports and statistics. 
I’ve also collected pamphlets, brochures, a world map and a map of Korea that marks the 
territorially disputed island in its Korean name, “Dokdo.”  
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I visited the ODA library in KOICA to gather administrative documents such as 
reports, evaluations, White Papers, and project proposals. These documents were used to 
corroborate findings, to cross-check information given by volunteers during interviews. 
At times, my interview participants directed me to news articles and commentaries that 
supported how they felt about the volunteer program. Such documents were used as a 
point of reference when interviewing subsequent volunteers. Usually, my interview 
participants had differing opinions and perspectives, which enabled me to look at a 
certain issue from multiple angles and to define a certain phenomenon in different ways.  
Documents came into much use when I could not get an interview. The greatest 
challenge was in finding previous employees of the Presidential Council of Nation 
branding. Because the organization was shut down before this research was undertaken, I 
could not locate any of the previous staff. As such, I had to rely on documents produced 
by the PCNB to get an idea of the work that the organization did in relation to the 
volunteer program. Through the National Open Information System, I requested a list of 
all documents produced by PCNB that included the world “volunteer program.” I was 
given a list of 95 documents, of which 70 were open for public view. The documents 
gave me a broad understanding of the nature of activities undertaken by PCNB between 
2009 and 2013, and based on this, how PCNB envisioned the volunteer program. These 
data were used to examine how development within a nation branding framework 
becomes interpreted and exercised.  
3.4.4. MEDIA TEXTS  
For this study media texts were used as main sources of analysis or to triangulate 
findings from other documents and interviews. Media texts were gathered from multiple 
channels.  
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• Newspaper articles I consulted the Naver News Library, a newspaper archive, and 
Big Kinds, an online a news search engine, to collect news articles mentioning the 
terms geundaehwa (modernization), segyehwa (globalization), and seonjinhwa 
(making advanced) over the period of 1960 to 2013. In total, 68,761 articles were 
retrieved coverage from three newspapers, Kyunghyang Shinmun, Dong-A Ilbo, 
and Maeil Business Newspaper. I arranged these articles by year to examine the 
trends in the frequency of news articles over time.  
 
• Photos of volunteer experiences I collected award winning photos taken by 
volunteers during their volunteering abroad. These photos were included in photo 
books published by KOICA each year. I analyzed a total of 115 photos published 
between 2009 and 2013. The analysis focused on identifying their location, 
theme, and image composition. I look for signs of not only the country or the city 
in which the photo is based but also whether the photo takes place in an indoors 
(classroom, medical facility, library, etc.) or outdoors (school field, farmland, 
etc.) venue. I paid attention to the background composition of the photos. I also 
identified the people who were present, what they were wearing, and what they 
were doing. In particular, I looked for whether there were mediating objects, 
which were wide ranging, from toothbrushes and balloons to laptop computers 
and water pumps. I looked at their position in relation to one another, and the 
direction of their gaze. I compared these components over time and by themes.  
 
• Social media Social media data were comprised of volunteer blog postings in their 
private blogs, volunteer blog postings in official WFK blogs, and blog postings by 
the WFK staff. These media texts were useful to triangulate information provided 
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by volunteers during interviews. My analysis of these media text led me to 
question who the target audience was. The interview participants all responded 
that these media texts were geared towards the Korean public, namely, potential 
volunteers and friends and family members of volunteers. On the other hand, 
promotional videos of WFK and KOICA uploaded on Youtube had versions in 
different languages, which signaled that these videos were intended for 
international audiences. As I approached social media texts as strategic 
communicative forms, knowing the target audience helped to guide my analysis 
of these media texts.  
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CHAPTER 4. THE PRODUCTION OF DEVELOPMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENTAL CITIZENS IN KOREA 
4.1. The narrative of past and present 
 In 2017, as part of my field research, I attended an Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) education program, organized by a regional affiliate of KOICA. 
During a lecture on Korea’s ODA, a promotional video presented by the lecturer, who 
happened to be a staff from KOICA, caught my eye. Later in my field research, I 
encountered this video again during a visit to WFK publicity center. The narrative 
presented in the video encapsulated the dominant discourse of Korea’s development 
history. A brief description of the video is worth mentioning here.  
The video clip opens with a heavy tune playing from the background. Soon, 
black-and-white grainy images of helpless faces of children appear amidst rubbles of 
broken down homes. On the bottom of the screen appears the words: “The devastation in 
the aftermaths of the Korean War left us scarred and hungry,” and the image transitions 
to show the words: “The members of the U.S. Peace Corps reached out to heal the pain.” 
The video then goes on to show images of the U.S. Peace Corps’ arrival in Korea 
followed by a series of images depicting the Peace Corps volunteers at work, teaching in 
classrooms, vaccinating a Korean girl, and mingling with Korean villagers. Then 
suddenly, the screen abruptly transitions to a “modernized” Korea, brimming with 
colorful lights, fast-moving cars on highways and bridges, skyscrapers, scenes from the 
World Cup, and images of famous celebrities and athletes. Written on the bottom of the 
screen are the words, Korea is the first country that has received help from the U.S. Peace 
Corps to create its own (government-sponsored) international development volunteer 
program. It states: “Now, our heart goes out to those who need us.” The rest of the video 
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goes onto show the activities Korean volunteers undertake in schools, medical facilities, 
and in technical training centers.  
There are different versions of promotional videos on KOICA and WFK. While 
some are geared more to presenting large-scale ODA programs and others more about 
volunteering, the narrative remains consistent across all of the videos. Korea places itself 
in relation to other countries to signal its position within the world order. The video states 
that Korea was in need of help from U.S.-led international aid. During this time, Korea 
was one of the poorest countries in the world, depicted in some videos that show aid 
packages coming from Liberia. Then using the Peace Corps as representing the US, the 
video claims that Korea was able to modernize, conveyed through a mixture of visual 
images depicting the strength of the country’s infrastructure (highways, bridges, lights), 
industry (shipping and automobile factories), cultural assets (palaces, K-pop stars, 
traditional dance), and international events (1988 Olympics and 2002 World Cup). By 
associating WFK as an outgrowth of the U.S. Peace Corps, the narrative legitimizes the 
work of Korea’s volunteers. As this narrative indicates, Korea’s understanding of 
development relies as much as on the country’s past as well as its present and is deeply 
embedded in the global context of development. In this chapter, I deconstruct the 
discursive space of development that makes narratives such as the one presented by 
KOICA an unquestioned national identity of Korea shared by many of its people.       
4.2. Situating the Study: A Taxonomy of Korea’s Development 
Research 
Current research on Korea’s development can be divided into three groups, which 
I identify as instrumental, analytical, and critical. The first group of research is led by 
government affiliated think tanks and university-based research centers that maintain 
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close relationships with the government. KDI’s Knowledge Sharing Program is a 
representative case.  As discussed in the literature review, reports produced by the 
Knowledge Sharing Program package Korea’s development experiences into commodity 
forms for export by “rendering technical” the complexities of the political-ideological 
context to a formulaic set of intervention strategies that can be modeled by developing 
countries. These studies work to reinforce the current structure and policy of ODA by 
offering recommendations to manage efficiently and to strengthen practices of 
development. Others (Choi, Choi, & Kim, 2011; Yoon & Jeon, 2009) also partake in 
producing knowledge to support and depoliticize development by engaging in empirical 
research and employing scientific methods.  
The second group of studies offers analytical frameworks to investigate 
systematically the politics of Korea’s development aid policy. These studies mostly take 
a constructivist approach to understand how policies come to be and offer frames of 
analysis on Korea’s aid management system (Jerve & Selbervik, 2009; E. M. Kim & Oh, 
2012; Eun Mee Kim, Kim, & Kim, 2013; J. Kim, 2018; S. Kim, 2011; Watson, 2012). 
Studies in this group pay attention to policymaking as an area of contention, competition 
and collaboration among actors concerned, foregrounding politics operating within the 
structure of ODA and its ideas. As such, for these studies, it is not the understanding of 
development that is inherently problematic; rather, it is the politics and mode of 
organizing and managing that brings about unintended consequences of development 
projects. Alternative models, outlooks, and policy (such as private-public partnership or 
centralization) are suggested to bring about a more democratic space of development.  
A large majority of research on Korea’s development belong to the second group. 
Far less research belongs to the third group, which approach Korea’s development from a 
vantage point outside of development. The aim of these studies is not to find ways to do 
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development better. Rather, these studies examine how development is implicated in 
broader relations of power. Rather, grounded in critical tradition, studies belonging to the 
third group analyze development in its relation to the greater historical and social context 
in which discourses that shape social relations are produced. The small number of studies 
in this group is evidenced in a recent book published by Jongtae Kim (2018), entitled 
Eurocentrism and development in Korea, which states that this book is the first 
sociological inquiry into the Eurocentric discourses in Korea from the late 19th century to 
the present. As the book indicates, more active scholarly attention to a critical approach 
in Korea’s development is needed. Following the third group of research, in this chapter, 
I deconstruct the relations of power and ideology surrounding Korea’s discourse of 
development.  
Jongtae Kim’s (2014) study shows the ways in which the discourse of 
development is manifested in Korea across time. He identifies the discursive structure of 
Korea’s developmentalism through the discourses of modernization (geundaehwa), 
globalization (segyehwa), and becoming advanced (seonjinhwa). Drawing on presidential 
addresses, he finds that developmentalism in Korea consists of goal setting, 
problematization, crisis construction, reminding of national potential, and strategies. This 
chapter builds on J. Kim’s study to interrogate Korea’s historicized discourse of 
development. I pay particular attention to the disjuncture and consistencies in the three 
discourses in relation to the characteristic features of the discourses, their representational 
strategies, and how dispersed elements are mobilized to legitimize and sustain 
developmentalist ideology. As such, in analyzing communication about development in 
Korea, I situate the country’s volunteer program against the broader historically produced 
“regime of representation” associated with development (Escobar, 1995, p. 6) .  
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I draw on news coverage of the three keywords from the beginning of 1960 to the 
end of 2013. The three newspapers that I consulted are Kyunghyang Shinmun, Dong-A 
Ilbo, and Maeil Business Newspaper. Kyunghyang Shinmun and Dong-A Ilbo are 
progressive and conservative in orientation. The three newspapers have all been in 
operation since 1960. I searched for articles in which the terms geundaehwa 
(modernization), segyehwa (globalization), and seonjinhwa (making advanced) appear 
through an online search engine, Big Kinds and a newspaper archive, Naver News 
Library. Although Big Kinds is commonly used when conducting newspaper analysis, the 
search engine retrieved news articles going back no more than 1990. For news coverage 
between the periods 1960 to the end of 1989, I used the Naver News Library. The search 
yielded 24,789 news articles that mention the word geundaehwa (modernization), 17,928 
news articles with the word seonjinhwa (making advanced), and 26,044 news articles in 
which the term segyehwa (globalization), appears. I begin my analysis by showing the 
frequency of these terms appearing in news coverage over time.  
4.3. Manifestation of Developmental Understanding Across Time 
Distributed across time, we can see that the frequency in which each term appears 
in news coverage are marked by points of take-off, peak, and decline. The term 
seonjinhwa (making advanced) was rarely mentioned in the press prior to 1960. But in 
the early 1960s, the use of the term gained currency and increased sharply, reaching its 
peak in the years 1970 and 1971. After the early 1970s, although the term is still invoked 
in popular press, it declined in frequency throughout the 1980s. During this time, the term 
seonjinhwa (making advanced) is introduced into the popular press.  Seonjinhwa 
(making advanced) takes over geundaehwa (modernization) in the early 1990s and from 
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then, it is frequently invoked in the media throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s. 
Between 1996 and 1997, the number of news articles using the term segyehwa 
(globalization), peaked sharply. Although the peak declined rapidly as fast as its rate of 
increase, the segyehwa (globalization) remained commonly invoked in the popular press 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s. In 2008, the number of news articles mentioning the 
term seonjinhwa (making advanced) overtook the frequency of articles in which 
segyehwa (globalization) appeared. On the other hand, use of the term geundaehwa 
(modernization) in news coverage gradually decreased through the 1990s. 
Table 3. Frequency of the terms modernization, making advanced, and globalization 
appearing in the Korean press (1960 – 2013) 
 
The graph, which traces the frequency of news articles that mention the terms 
geundaehwa (modernization), segyehwa (globalization), and seonjinhwa (making 
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advanced), visualizes the shifting nature of discourse over time. According to Foucault 
(2013), discourse is a historically contingent system of knowledge. The graph indicates 
that discourse is constructed by relations of power in specific historical circumstances. 
The pattern shown in the graph, where the use of the three terms do not completely 
overlap but rather replace one over the other indicate that the terms represent relations of 
power against changing historical circumstances. These three terms can be considered 
historically constructed knowledge systems that provide interpretive frameworks of 
national identities and worldviews in the country’s developmental processes. As such, a 
closer look into how these three terms are used would give us a glimpse into Korea’s 
developmental historical conditions. The following sections will show how the discourse 
of development works by examining news articles and comparing them with key 
economic and political moments in Korea as well as the global context of development.   
4.3.1. GEUNDAEHWA: MODERNIZING THE FATHERLAND 
We are going through a period of turbulence, standing at a crossroads of transition. In 
order to unbridle ourselves from the constraints of indignity and backwardness, we need 
to be prepared to sacrifice our everything, or the dark clouds of stagnation looming over 
our people’s history will forever stay.   
Inaugural address, Park Chung Hee, Dec. 17, 1963 
 
Geundaehwa (modernization, hereafter) was a term that gained currency with the 
coming of former military dictator, Park Chung Hee, in power. Prior to the 1960s, the 
term was rarely used in the popular press. In 1961, modernization appeared in 51 news 
articles. This number increased by twofold each subsequent year, to 103 in 1962 and 226 
in 1963. By 1970, 1393 news articles mentioned the term modernization.  
It was Park Chung Hee who ingrained the understanding of modernization in 
multiple aspects of the Korean society. His inaugural address as quoted above marked the 
modernization period of Korea. Korea’s modernization period, typically the years that 
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Park Chung Hee was in power from 1961-1979, is characterized by maximal state 
intervention and authoritarian integration of society (H. Cho, 2000). Park’s use of 
modernization boiled down to economic growth by way of industrialization through 
infrastructure development and export of heavy industries manufacturing.  
Park widely spread the slogan, “modernization of the fatherland” through growth 
in Gross National Product (GNP). Mobilizing the populace was crucial to push its 
modernization project forward. Korea’s precarious geopolitical position and few natural 
resources made it difficult to attract foreign investment (Woo, 1991). As such, managing 
human capital was seen as imperative in order to promote economic growth. Park put 
much emphasis on the educational institution, stating “modernization of the fatherland 
cannot be achieved without development of human resource through education” 
(“Developing human resource,” 1966). Another characteristic feature of modernization 
was spiritual values, or adoption of certain cultural values. Although Park introduced the 
term modernization as a national slogan, it also symbolized the U.S.-led global 
development intervention in the Third World. In the early years, modernization was 
discussed in the popular press in conjunction with aid received from the West. Also, news 
articles sought to make sense out of notions that were unfamiliar and to which there was 
not yet a direct translation. For example, one article introduced the notion of the global 
South in this way.  
[The terms North and South] cannot be thought about in terms of territorial 
boundaries like North and South Korea… nor does it refer to political dissension 
and division in Laos. It refers to polarization in economy among advanced and 
backward countries. It must have been named so because aid-giving countries like 
the U.S. and Russia are located in the north of the in latitude (1960, Oct. 29).     
In turn, such socially produced understandings of space were used to position 
Korea within the global order gauged by degree of modernization.  News articles 
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introduced interpretive frameworks of organizing and classifying the world drawing on 
diverse range of ideas coming from the Western elites, such as the American economist 
Walt Rostow. News articles also compared Korea with other aid-receiving countries, like 
Indonesia and Burma. They explored referential terms, such as “newly rising least-
developed country,” (“Commentary,” 1960) as Korea’s national identity. During this 
time, modernization was mostly discussed as an exogenous force that was brought in 
from the West, part and parcel of the intense U.S.-led development intervention in Korea.   
Throughout the 1960s, Park Chung Hee emphasized ownership of “modernization 
of the fatherland.” He frequently used slogans that made concepts easy to grasp and 
follow. Park would say “Nowadays, level of culture is measured by the amount of cement 
used.” (“Contributing to Agricultural and Fishery Modernization,” 1966). Comparing 
Korea to Japan and China, he said that Korea used much less cement.     
 
By the 1970s, use of modernization became ingrained as commonplace language 
in the popular press. The term permeated into the social, political, and economic fabric of 
the Korean society. It was used in many different contexts and situations, in some cases, 
in ways that transcended its dominant definition of economic growth and spiritual reform. 
Modernization came to signify improvement for some kind of deficiency within 
institutions, systems, and practices. News articles addressed a need for modernization of 
education, modernization of investigation technology, and modernization of the social 
structure. Modernization of the education system pointed to the need for less corruptive 
behavior of schools and criticized the uncivilized attitude of mothers for their selfishness 
that placed their child’s interest above others (Noh, 1970).  
Modernization was also frequently associated with science. An article, pointing to 
many failed attempts to capture criminals, contended that modernization of the police 
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investigation system is needed. The article alternated between using the phrase 
“modernization of the investigation system” and “scientific approach toward 
investigation system,” thereby equating the modern as scientific and the Korean 
investigation system as haphazard and done more for show (“Modernizing police 
investigation technology,” 1970).   
Associating modernization to technological and scientific authority was also 
evident in news coverage on the census. It indicated the superiority of professional 
knowledge coming from modern methods of measurement and assessment. Published 
under the headline, “Census, a blueprint of modernization,” a news article from 1970 
reported on census gathering, undertaken under the support of the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization. The news coverage focused on the large scale of the project 
that was facilitated by hiring school teachers to collect census data, and in using a high-
performance digital calculator to come up with rapid analysis. Such a state-of-art method 
is said to do the job of creating a concrete roadmap for policymaking in the agriculture 
and fisheries sector.  The professionality of the census takers, the elementary school 
teachers, added authority to the program. Rural regions were seen as place in need of 
monitoring and management by the government, professionals, and through modern 
devices.   
While popular press coverage in the early 1970s indicated a wide range of context 
in which modernization came to be used, it was discussed most frequently in relation to 
agricultural development. By 1970, rural exodus and overcrowding of urban centers 
surfaced as national exigency. One article stated in 1970 that within 10 years, 65 percent 
of the rural population had migrated to urban cities (“Claims to modernization,” 1970). 
What is noteworthy is that rather than considering the mass migration to urban centers as 
a manifestation of industrialization, the emptying out of rural areas was attributed to 
  75 
deficiencies inherent in the rural areas. The need for reforms of both agricultural 
infrastructure as well as the mind of the farmers appeared frequently in the popular press. 
News coverage reported on opinion polls indicating a large majority of people saying that 
modernization of rural areas was the most pressing social issue. Others drew on 
Eurocentric perspectives of Third World countries and directed such a colonial gaze at 
rural areas. Interestingly, it was the director of the National Agricultural Cooperative 
Federation who wrote,  
Gunnar Myrdal says that poverty in Asia is not due to the lack of its history of 
resource, or capital. It is due to the people’s irrational attitude and a stagnant 
social system. His viewpoint can be applied effectively to our rural regions (Suh, 
1970a).    
The director authored few other opinion pieces as well during this period, all of 
which emphasize the need for farmers and rural people to embody self-reliance, self-help, 
and diligence (Suh, 1970b; Suh, 1970c). Coming from a person who worked the most 
closely with farmers, we can see how paternalistic assumptions have come to dominate 
the modernization discourse. The fact that such modes of interpretation takes hold even 
without direct intervention coming from Western development actors who produced these 
discourses constitutes what Foucault refers to as discipline (Foucault, 1977) through 
internalization. The press, along with other state apparatuses like schools, help to self-
sustain the colonial discourse by making vernacular these regimes of representations. 
4.3.1.1. Saemaul Undong: Modernizing the Rural 
Saemaul Undong is the driving force of national development. Putting it into practice is, 
therefore, what constitutes an act of nationalism.  
 “Keynote on Saemaul Administration,” 1972   
Saemaul Undong, which translates to “New Village Movement,” was a rural 
reform movement initiated by the Park regime in the 1970s. It remains one of the most 
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ideologically influential state-led movements in Korea and it continues to be ingrained in 
the memory of older Korean generation as a symbol of national growth and collective 
consciousness.   
The reform movement came about as a result of widening urban and rural 
economic divide throughout the 1960s and the dwindling support of the rural residents, 
who comprised a majority of the working population,15 toward Park Chung Hee. Park 
responded by initiating a community-based reform movement in rural villages. Inspired 
by villagers in Gyeongbuk Province engaging in collaborative work to restore the village 
appearance after a flood, Park distributed 300 bags of cement to 35,000 villages. Each 
village was to choose its own project, such as widening streets, constructing bridges, 
creating irrigation, and building community centers, among others. The overall project, 
which gained enormous popularity among rural villages, expanded in scope to include 
income generation and productivity, and in scale, expanding nationally over the 
following decade.  
Within this perspective, the government constructed a particular vision of the 
village. Park lamented that “farmers have lived a thousand years of wretched poverty in 
despair and resignation,” stressing that it was because of the “lack of the will and 
confidence of farmers to lead a better way of life” (Lee, 2011, p. 76). By employing a 
rhetoric of “lack,” Park brought attention to the villages’ helplessness and incompetence.  
The ways in which the village was constructed contributed to how the Park 
regime identified and defined the problem of urban-rural divide (stagnant mindset and 
behavior of individuals), which, in turn, shaped the potential solution (hard work, 
cooperation, and self-help). Such discursive construction echoes what Arturo Escobar 
                                                 
15 In 1963, 63 percent of the total working population was engaged in farming and fisheries (Han, 2004). 
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(1995) refers to as the invention of “the village.” Drawing on Pigg’s study of Nepalese 
communities, Escobar points out that the trope of the village is promoted as a particular 
contribution through development discourse. Pigg observes that the villagers and their 
routines could not be translated easily into the modernization language and, therefore, 
were interpreted as being ‘ignorant’ and people who “don’t understand things” (p. 49). 
Similarly, in the case of the Korean context, the fact that prior to the 1950s, there was no 
disparity in income between the rural and the urban areas, or that Saemaul Undong co-
opted agrarian reform movements that were being ignited by the farmers, remains hidden 
from the dominant discourse (Y. M. Kim, 2009).  
Saemaul Undong further engaged in “inventing” the village as a construct by 
categorizing them according to their level of performance based on their economic 
productivity. Each village was placed into basic, self-help, and self-reliant categories, 
with resources distributed differently according to the performance of each village, as a 
way to encourage “friendly competition.”  
News coverage during this time emphasized the importance of vertical ties linking 
national, provincial, municipal, and village level administrations equally committed to 
achieving diligence, self-help, and cooperation. Park frequently referred to this link as a 
“holy trinity” of the central, regional, and village-level administration (“Saemaul Undong 
for all Farmers,” 1972; “President Park Urges Expansion,” 1972). In addition to 
vertically-flowing coordination, in an ethnographic study of Saemaul Undong, Young-Mi 
Kim (2009) suggests that the institutionalization of Saemaul Undong involved a network 
of zealous men at the forefront who frequently initiated the removal of sacred and 
traditional artifacts to promote efficiency and material wealth. Moreover, they installed 
modernization as a new religion, transferring from rural farmers’ subservience toward 
gods toward national allegiance. Kim’s study indicates that modernization and 
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nationalization processes were mutually reinforcing through government policies and 
public discourse. 
Along with slate roofs and widened roads, amplifiers became another visible 
symbol of modernization in rural villages. Latched high atop on a pole or on a tree near 
the center of the village (usually nearby village anchor institutions such as schools), 
amplifiers were used for all sorts of announcements, from administrative issues, tax 
payment, cost of crops to information regarding cattle subsidy, and to call on villagers to 
join different village projects. According to a news report (“New Landscape of a Farming 
Village,” 1977), “amp broadcast” began every morning at six o’clock (or even five, 
depending on the village) with the national anthem, followed by the voice of the village 
leader, who would say something similar to, “Today is a village clean-up day, so let’s 
bring out our brooms and take part in cleaning the village.” The announcements were 
followed by playing of Saemaul songs, “Let’s live well,” “My Fatherland,” lasting for 
well over an hour. The news article goes onto say:  
No longer do we hear our traditional tunes sung by village grandmothers. These 
age-old melodies have been replaced by Saemaul campaign songs commonly 
heard during village gatherings. This is because all villagers have unconsciously 
taken in the lyrics as they listen to the songs every day through the amplifier. So, 
those Saemaul campaign songs became the go-to songs that all villagers can sing 
together (para. 14-15).   
As the news article illustrates, amplifiers, despite their intrusive quality, served to 
construct the village as not only a material unit but also as a unit of collective 
consciousness achieved through listening together. The amplifier linked the village to the 
national, cultivating people to think of themselves as national subjects. The amplifier can 
be seen as a powerful state apparatus that forged a strong national consciousness among 
the rural population.  
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The Saemaul Undong was claimed to be successful as a spiritual revolution that 
eradicated the stagnant, irrational, and immoral minds of the villagers, generating a “can 
do” mindset befitting modern, liberal individuals. However, the significance of the 
movement lies in changing the rural population from organically performing units with 
historically shaped ways of doing and thinking to being co-opted as national subjects in 
the modernization project. As citizens, people were expected to give up their land 
voluntarily as new roads were built or expanded. In addition, the villagers provided 
unpaid labor working in communal projects. Instead of monetary compensation for the 
villagers, these projects recognized individual work as contributing to the social well-
being of the village. Saemaul Undong did provide resources, such as concrete, 
construction machinery, and financing to the village as collective units. Through this 
work, married women, who had lived their lives as wives or mothers, experienced 
empowerment and achievement for being recognized for their work (Y.M. Kim, 2011).  
This recognition was awarded through the state, privileging citizenship more in 
terms of norms and identity than through rights, supporting the project of national 
modernization. As such, citizenship became tied to nationalism. In such ways, Saemaul 
Undong, as state-led mass mobilization of its people, shows how in Korea, “nationalism 
has become the religious surrogate of modernity” (Smith, 1999, p.100). However, this 
construction of nationalism also established a very narrow understanding of citizenship as 
developmental subjects, setting in place a path that defines development as a necessary 
race from being a “backward” nation to the status of an “advanced” nation.  
4.3.2 SEONJINHWA DISCOURSE IN THE 1980S: DISCIPLINING THE MIND AND BODY  
As Korea became rapidly industrialized in the 1970s, the use of modernization 
discourse slowly declined. Along with economic indicators such as the growth in GNP, 
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reports produced by the UN stating that Korea was leading Third World countries in 
economic and social indicators (market size, life expectancy, literacy, etc.) served as a 
source of confidence that Korea had overcome a backward status and is moving closer 
toward modernization. In 1983, then-president Chun Doo Hwan, the successor of Park 
Chung Hee, proposed “creating advanced (seonjin) fatherland” as a part of the New Year 
national address (1983).  
During this time, promotion of popular culture and leisure became visible in 
public discourse. Newspapers covered the president’s emphasis on making advanced the 
sports sector (“Sports Seonjinhwa”, 1983). The previous regime was openly critical of 
leisure activities, linking them with moral degeneration (oftentimes bringing up 
gambling) or connecting them with extravagance. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the 
Park Chung Hee regime promoted “thrift and savings” as a nationwide campaign. 
Nonetheless, economic growth and spread of private ownership during this time saw 
popularization of outdoor-oriented leisure, picnics, and weekend getaway trips. As leisure 
culture led to increased mass consumption, contributing to domestic economy, however, 
the government reacted with intentional oversight or tried to co-opt it for national growth 
(Song, 2013). As such, although leisure and sports did not feature prominently in news 
media during this time, there was already an established leisure and sports culture set in 
place in the Korean society by the early 1980s.  
The Chun regime saw this as an opportunity to further encourage consumption 
around sports, first, as a way to use the positive emotions gained from consuming 
sporting events, such as self-efficacy, solidarity, and catharsis to bleed into the people’s 
everyday work. For example, Chun told the Korean youth soccer team that had returned 
after unprecedentedly taking fourth place in the Asian Games, “Due to the great 
performance you have shown us, the citizens have gained confidence not only in soccer 
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but in every aspect of our country’s undertaking” (“President Chun, Creation of Seonjin,” 
1983).  
Second, consumption and production of sports and leisure was seen as a cultural 
apparatus by which to discipline the body and the mind. As a part of the seonjinhwa 
(national advancement) policy, Chun set up a nationwide campaign to eliminate the three 
negative emotions, comprised of corruption, inflation, and chaos. The government set up 
call centers to report anyone who breaks these principles. People were placed under 
constant surveillance and this was Chun’s signaling that no dissidence will be tolerated, 
just as he had led the Gwangju Massacre16 three years ahead. He exhorted creative 
values, self-sacrifice, and self-reliant capability on the national elite (“Seonjinhwa and 
the role of the elite,” 1983). During this time, numerous propagandistic news stories were 
produced as well. One article justified the “public relations of the government to its 
people” by using advanced industrial nation states as a reference point. The article 
constructs the west as “advanced industrial states where democracy is firmly established, 
the civil consciousness of its citizens is well developed and the government satisfies the 
people’s right to know” (“seonjinhwa of the consciousness,” 2984, para. 5) to perceive 
itself as deficient of all things, which serves as a reason for the need to cultivate its 
people to take ownership of the country. Chun also ordered concerned government 
officials to monitor people’s behavior. In this context, sports promotion is seen as a way 
to distract people from political dissonance and to discipline the self. With the hosting of 
the Korean Olympics, consideration of tourism and publicity also became frequently 
discussed. For the first time, Korea’s national identity became widely discussed in terms 
of its cultural attractiveness to foreign people.   
                                                 
16 In 1980, the military dictatorship of Chun Doo Hwan killed nearly 200 people who were in pro-
democratic protest by declaring martial law across the country, shutting down universities and the 
Parliament, and arresting opposition leaders.  
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Unlike modernization, “making advanced” was Korea’s own construction that 
produced its national identity through the image of the Western world. Like 
modernization, the discourse of making advanced permeated all sectors of the society as a 
master narrative. However, what was different was that while modernization was a 
guided development, “making advanced” remained vague without clear guidelines of 
how to enact this as a process. The public discourse surrounding “seonjinhwa” was the 
desire to achieve it (e.g. “Let’s pull seonjinhwa forward by 10 years”) but at the same 
time, news coverage showed uncertainties of what the term actually entailed and lack of 
directionality three years after the national goal was proclaimed. The abstractness of it, 
however, rendered it easy to be idealized as something that everyone and all sectors of 
the society need to aspire to achieve. The ruling party manipulated the discourse as a 
justification for suppressing the growing pro-democracy movement, stating that such 
movements were only creating chaos and division, obstructing the country’s move toward 
an advanced country.  
Seonjinhwa discourse was also easily appropriated as a tool of legitimation by the 
Chun regime to remain in power. It was seen as a glue to keep the Korean people together 
under control in spite of the atrocities committed by the military dictator during his time 
in office. Chun was quoted in a news report stating, 
We are in a good position to take a big leap in national growth now as we have 
established the foundations to move forward to becoming an advanced country 
and we will be hosting the Seoul Olympics next year. But as we are now at the 
cusp of the road to becoming an advanced nation since the second World War, we 
need to reflect carefully by looking at other countries that have fallen through the 
cracks back to its backward state through neglect and chaos, and use it as an 
example to save the spirit of advancement (“Let’s keep seonjinwha alive,” 1984).  
After the close of Chun’s military rule, seonjinhwa (making advanced) discourse 
gave way to globalization, which reflected the shifting global structure following 
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neoliberalization of the global political economy (Harvey, 2005). However, seonjinhwa 
as an ideology stayed, working to legitimize the segyehwa (globalization) policy 
discourse.     
4.3.3. GLOBALIZATION PERIOD AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE SEGYE SHIMIN (GLOBAL 
CITIZEN)  
We are now standing at a crossroad of whether to prevail or fail in an era of globalization, 
and our only choice is to tear down the wall inside us and to be born again as ethically 
and culturally confident Koreans in this world.   
Kim Youngsam, Into the Sea of Segyehwa, New Year Speech, Jan. 1, 1994 
The segyehwa (globalization) initiative began in 1994, launched by former 
President Kim Youngsam, the country’s first civilian leader following the military 
dictatorship. Kim first announced segyehwa (globalization) as a national policy on New 
Year’s day, 1995. In the speech presented by Kim, he conveys a sense of exigency in 
Korea against the rising tide of globalization. He expresses the vulnerability and 
disempowerment of the Korean people as they are watching the unfolding of free-market 
capitalism. However, while such external forces are treated as a threat to national 
survival, Kim also sees it as a challenge to be embraced, which Koreans could use to 
boost their move toward becoming an advanced country. The sense of imminent threat is 
mobilized to highlight the need for the Korean people to ride along with, not against, the 
wave of globalization. He uses Korea’s past as an example to make the point that “if we 
cower and close the door before us, history shows us that our society will fall into the 
abyss. We can see such sad state in late Joseon dynasty and in North Korea today.” 
(“New Year speech,” para. 2). As such, Kim problematizes the domestic society. He 
states that it is the political and social divisions that separate the Korean people along 
many lines that are truly holding this country back. While distancing himself from 
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resistant nationalism in the 1970s, he states that Koreans need to unite, and to do that, 
what is needed is “globalization of the consciousness.”  
Between Park Chung Hee and Kim Yongsam’s speeches, we can see a continuity 
in the ways that globalization and modernization are discussed. In particular, I point to 
the resemblance in the ways in which the discourses of globalization and modernization 
construct the object and the subject of knowledge. Both drew on a “crossroad” imagery to 
represent the exigency of the current socioeconomic position of Korea. The term 
crossroad also produces knowledge about Korea in relation to the world order. The 
crossroad leads to either an advanced or backward state, and both leaders of Korea state 
that Korean people have only one choice, to move forward. This obligates the people to 
act on behalf of the nation for national survival. Here, survival of the people is equated 
with survival of the nation.  
Both modernization and globalization foregrounded the sociopolitical conditions 
within Korea as problematic. What is interesting is that Kim used the term gukjehwa 
(translated as internationalization) to refer to globalization in terms of spread of free-
market capitalism. On the other hand, when talking about how to push the country 
forward along with the external force, Kim uses segyehwa (translated as globalization). 
This is carried on in the government opting to use the romanized spelling, “segyehwa” 
rather than its English translation, globalization, when speaking or writing about the 
segyehwa policy in English. A news article states, “the English term globalization does 
not fully convey the authentic Korean strategic concept.” According to the government, 
segyehwa is a “total policy.” The news article likened the government’s decision to 
common use of the term “Chaebol” rather than using the English translation, 
“conglomerate.” (Huh,1995).  
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During 1994 and 1995, news coverage that mention globalization mostly 
discussed its policy aspect, identifying the people in the forefront (“diplomats are on the 
forefront of globalization”), defining the role of state apparatuses (if economics or 
foreign relations are at the forefront of globalization, the press is a pillar supporting 
globalization).  
What is interesting is that the public discourse of globalization took rather 
different perspectives when discussing globalization as policy on the one hand and as a 
logic of organizing the world order on the other: The first approached globalization as a 
set of measures consisting of deregulation of state protective measures shaping the global 
structure. Within this first aspect, globalization was frequently critiqued through 
editorials and commentaries. This perspective became prominent especially following 
Korea’s financial crisis in 1997. Editorials and commentaries drew on growing inequality 
by bringing up aggravating rates of unemployment, polarization of wealth throughout the 
world, subsuming of state economies (for those states having undergone financial crisis) 
to the peripheries of U.S.-led capitalist market system (Cho, 1997, “few winners, many 
losers,” “Globalization is a fiction,” “The fetters of globalization,” 1999). The sharp 
increase in news coverage that expressed critical perspectives of globalization also 
reflected the greater anti-globalization movements at the turn of the millennium. Books 
on anti-globalization during this time, such as Global Trap: Civilization and the assault 
on democracy and prosperity, made their way up to the best seller list17.  
At the same time, popular press was supportive of exporting Korean culture 
abroad and making the Korean population global minded. References to the term “global 
citizen” appeared frequently. In a study that examined media coverage of the term 
                                                 
17 This particular book recently became popular again when news spread that it was labeled as “dangerous 
literature” along with other 23 books by the Ministry of National Defense (Kim, 2018).  
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“global citizen” Schattle (2015) found that the media engaged in exhorting the Korean 
people “to overcome numerous liabilities seen as impeding the country’s advancement” 
(p. 53).  
Like modernization discourse, segyehwa (globalization) discourse emphasized 
spiritual reform as a key component. Editorials and commentaries oftentimes expressed 
critical perspectives toward the closed-off attitude of the Korean people who were 
dogmatic in maintaining “our culture.” (Lee, 1995)  
The impact of the financial crisis during this time and the integration of neoliberal 
ideology into Korea contributed to shaping the ideas and visions driving global 
citizenship as a state-led mobilization of its populace. 
In contrast with countries in North America and western Europe, where appeals to 
global citizenship in civil society, academia, and the corporate sector often signify 
a departure from expressly nationalist sentiments by evoking moral 
responsibilities to humanity and the planet, global citizenship discourse in South 
Korea fits seamlessly into a larger pattern of government-driven rhetoric aimed at 
raising the country's global stature and prestige (Schattle, 2015, p. 54). 
Reflecting on the public discourse of global citizenship, Schattle (2015) claims, 
“Global citizenship [in Korea] is primarily about national advancement rather than any 
sort of transcendence of national identity into cosmopolitan ideals of universal belonging 
and obligation” (p. 54). The logic of global citizenship is consistent with developmental 
citizenship during the authoritarian era.  
During this phase, the country embraced globalization as a foreign policy, and 
foreign aid was discussed as a primary tool by which to legitimize the work of the 
government’s continued race to move towards an advanced status. As the financial crisis 
drove the state to attach global citizenship to economic competence of individuals, global 
citizenship rested on the narrative that economic recuperation of the country rested on a 
self-governing individual, who exerts competence in the global arena. And one of the 
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ways to instill a global citizenship mindset for the younger generation was in becoming 
involved in moral obligation toward transnational and humanitarian issues like poverty 
and environment.  
4.3.3.1. Global Citizen as a National Subject 
During this phase of globalization, mobilizing citizens rested on both individual 
sacrifice and individual achievement in the name of the nation. For example, citizens 
were exhorted to donate their personal savings of gold to help pull the country out of 
financial crisis. Public figures including politicians, television celebrities, corporate 
heads, and countless numbers of ordinary people donated their own money during this 
time. On the other hand, discourses of global citizenship emphasized the importance of 
self-governing individuals, by focusing on sports stars, celebrities, and people who made 
it on their own and became successful abroad. Cho Young-Ahn (2008) states that 
citizenship became defined along the lines of “a national individual,” (p. 82) represented 
by the media as a self-governing individual who is also invested with responsibility for 
both family and nation-state. One such individual was Han Biya, who became famous in 
the late 1990s for her four series of travelogues reflecting on the adventures of her seven-
year backpacking trip to remote parts of the world. At a time when free travel had only 
become legalized a decade before, Han Biya arose as a national celebrity and a role 
model for the younger generation of Koreans.  
Han Biya began her backpacking travels in her 30s, giving up a manager position 
in an international public relations company. Through her travels she became a strong 
advocate for humanitarian causes, especially human rights and refugees. After her 
backpacking trip, she found a career as leading the Emergency Relief Team for World 
Vision Korea, attracting unprecedented public attention to humanitarian issues.  
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Han Biya is an interesting case because her travels around the world and her 
support to humanitarian causes opened space for her to be imagined as cosmopolitan 
rather than along the lines of global citizen as envisioned within the dominant discourse 
of globalization in Korea. In fact, she is introduced in the media as a “true cosmopolitan” 
(1999.06. 22). However, in examining her discursive strategy, we can see how her 
narrative is situated within the same development discourse to which Korea was once 
(and still is) subjected. Her discursive strategy reinforces compassionate cosmopolitanism 
that foregrounds a hierarchical relationship between “us” and “them.” Furthermore, her 
accounts draw on copious amounts of signifiers that romanticize people she has 
encountered during her travels.   
Han Biya wrote a series of commentary for Dong-A Ilbo in the newspaper’s 
Lifestyles section in 1996. The 17 commentaries discuss her experiences traveling around 
the world and reflections from the perspective of a “global citizen.” Her commentaries 
provided first-hand accounts of her experiences while traveling abroad in remote parts of 
the world. In some commentaries, she urged her readers to become more aware of 
transnational problems inflicting the world, and in others, she gave advice on how to 
become an individual befit to survive in a globalized world. 
In general, Han’s writings reflect an extension of the discourse of the global 
citizen as a national subject. She displayed strong attachment to her national identity 
throughout her commentaries, commenting that her backpacking experience has 
strengthened her Korean affiliation to her motherland (Han, 1996a). She is critical of 
immigrant mothers who boastfully mention that their children cannot speak Korean, just 
as she finds it problematic to see Korean children learning English even before they can 
speak proper Korean. The popular discourse surrounding Korean capability of English is 
contradictory for it calls for increased capability of individuals, commenting that the lack 
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of English competency is shameful (W. Kim, 2002) but at the same time, the national 
obsession with teaching children English is also seen as foolishly chasing the American 
way of life over and losing sight of what is truly important (Han, 1996a). In engaging in 
such discourse of the global citizen, she reproduces the national subject who is exhorted 
to embody nationalistic values and global competence, which may be in contradiction to 
one another.  
Furthermore, Han engaged in romanticized accounts of people she had met; those 
who are poor but happy, conversing with ordinary people in third class trains, people who 
do not earn much but have integrity and pride in what they do. Comparing herself to her 
hosts, she expressed admiration of their sense of modesty, integrity, and pride (Han, 
1996). Han’s first-hand accounts of people she met in “poor and dangerous” parts of the 
world are powerful for their strong imagery that works to reaffirm rather than subvert the 
scattered images people have of distant others. In one commentary, she called for greater 
awareness of the lack of water in Africa (Han, 1996c). She recounted her encounter with 
five women who were married to a same man. Telling the story of their daily two-hour 
travel on foot to fetch water that was to her dismay, quite dirty, Han states that the wives 
remarked, “We can share a husband, but we cannot share our water.” (Han, 1996, para. 7) 
While Han is genuinely concerned of the dire situation, her accounts position the Korean 
readers as part of the developed countries in the West, to which the society has long 
aspired.  In her travelogue, Han frequently drew on memories of the times when Korea 
was poor. By placing Korea against the image of poor places she visited, it works to 
historicize Korea’s past as a poor, underdeveloped country.  Her humanitarian spirit 
works to create epistemic binaries between Koreans as living a modern lifestyle 
characterized by material abundance but less time to be with families or reach into our 
inner selves, and her hosts as being stuck in time, spiritual, appreciating small things, and 
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being happy with what they have rather than demonstrating greed. As such, Korean 
readers engage in nostalgic reminders of Korea’s past. 
4.3.4 MAKING ADVANCED AND NATION BRANDING  
We are now at the footsteps of becoming an advanced country. We have experiences of 
both a developing country and an emerging economy, based on which we can act as a 
bridging country in G20 Summit. Thank you for enduring through the difficult times. 
Please bear up just a bit more.  
Lee Myung-bak, Press Conference, 2009  
 
The frequency of the term “making advanced” appearing in news coverage 
peaked in 2008, when it was announced by former President Lee Myung-bak in his 
presidential speech. Although previous governments have engaged in national image 
making, nation branding was formally adopted into state policy in 2008, with former 
president Lee Myung-bak’s inauguration.  
The logic of discourse concerning seonjinhwa diverges from the way it was used 
in the 1980s, as an ideological tool to discipline the mind and body of its people to which 
popular culture like sports and leisure were seen as governing devices. Diverging from 
this earlier conception, sports came to be discussed primarily as an investment. The term 
“gugwiseonyang” (translated as upholding the nation) was seen as cliché; it was argued 
that good performance in sports brings along with an attractive national image, tangible 
economic profit (“sports is an investment,” 2008). In the social construction of space 
predominating the worldview of Korean popular discourse, sports had been envisioned as 
a way to push Korea to the center of the world order. The news article comments, 
“Korea, a small country in Asia, caught the attention of people around the world as a 
strong sports nation ahead of Japan and France…” When the Korean soccer team 
advanced to the second round in the World Cup, the team remarked, “We can now shed 
the sorrow of being soccer periphery” (Choi, 2010). Both news articles state that there is 
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no better way to spread a national brand worldwide as effectively as through sports. 
Advancing to the second round of the World Cup was measured by monetary value, 
including direct economic value, brand publicity value, and corporate image 
enhancement. Such understanding that reflected a collapse in the relationship between 
nation, culture, and capital became prevalent as a guiding rational for seonjinhwa 
(advancement) in news coverage from 2008.    
Nation branding gained currency shortly after former President Lee Myung-bak’s 
speech celebrating the 60th anniversary of Korea. The popular press covered his speech, 
which described, “public opinion and conflict, violent protests, antagonistic labor 
disputes, highest suicide rate among OECD countries, and foremost cause of death being 
from automobile accidents” as the current state of Korea. However, after listing these 
social problems, Lee problematizes such social problems along the lines of misbehavior 
that paints a negative image of Korea. As such, the solution is presented as effective 
nation branding. Nation branding, according to Lee, will guide Korea to become a truly 
advanced country.  
Subsequent news coverage in the latter part of 2008 to 2009 discussed how to 
implement nation branding. News articles reported on a diverse range of cultural forms 
and practices that may help enhance the country’s nation brand. Saemaul Undong was 
brought up as a national brand that can be transferred to developing countries. The 
President of Saemaul Undong Center was quoted as saying: “I will bolster the 
organizational structure and system of Saemaul Undong to one that befits the 21st 
century” (“Saemaul Undong, becoming advanced,” 2008) The haenyeo, or the female 
divers in Korean island of Jeju, were recognized as representing the national brand. 
Korea’s cheering culture, mainly used to refer to the support towards the national soccer 
team, is interpreted in the popular press as a tourism resource. Quoting a foreign resident 
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in Korea, “When I go out into the streets to cheer [during soccer games], I don’t feel like 
an outsider. We all become one and enjoy the game together” (Lee & Koh, 2010, para. 
9). The cheer culture was given significance for giving tourists and foreigners an 
authentic experience of Korea.  
On the other hand, analysis of news coverage also found that the discourse of 
nation branding was adopted by institutions to attract government attention. An interview 
with the director of Korea Aerospace Research Institute, Lee Joo Jin, shows the ways in 
which Lee maneuvers in and outside of the dominant discursive space of development to 
quell the negative public opinion towards the Korea Space Center’s inequitable 
relationship with Russia, while legitimizing the importance of the space center’s work for 
the country. He takes the readers outside of Korea’s dominant narrative of development 
aid by telling that neither Japan nor the US were willing to assist Korea in developing this 
technology because of its similarity to missile technology. However, Russia accepted 
Korea’s request. According to Lee, Korea was able to save decades of time by 
collaborating with Russian scientists. Lee goes on to state: “Space technology constitutes 
one of the major indicators of national competency. In that it enhances the national brand, 
it is more powerful than any other technology sector” (W. Cho, 2009). As illustrated in 
this quote, Lee adopted the language of the government, thus aligning the work of the 
space center with the government agenda as a way to attract government support.  
Korea’s admission to the OECD DAC was closely associated with moving to the 
footsteps of seonjinhwa (advanced state). News headlines referred to the DAC as 
seonjinguk club, (or the club of advanced countries). In the run-up to assuming the G20 
presidency in December 2009, Korea’s former president, Lee Myung Bak, announced 
that “Korea will come into global focus as a host of the G20 summit and by taking on that 
responsibility, will become a truly advanced nation.” In a press conference following 
  93 
Korea’s successful bid to host the G20 Summit, Lee gave a speech, entitled “Change in 
perception, from periphery to the center.” He began by saying:  
Just a century ago, our people could not even enter the door of the Hague 
International Peace Conference. Lee Joon, the secret envoy of Emperor Ko 
Chong, gave his life in protest to the international order. We, who have heretofore 
assumed passive roles within the frame of world order created by others, are now 
a country creating the frame and the game (2009, para. 6) 
The G20 Summit is used as symbolic evidence to indicate how far Korea has 
come, to a point where it finds itself at the doorsteps of advanced countries. However, it 
is not yet there, because Korea still lacked cultural attractiveness. As such, press coverage 
on nation branding explored ways to enhance Korea’s national brand value.  
In its constant race to become an “advanced nation,” Lee Myung Bak’s 
administration put into action managing public goods as resources, recognizing that being 
seonjinguk (advanced country) entails more than the size of the economy. The 
administration began to use the term “mature nation” to encompass not only the country’s 
GDP, but also its cultural attractiveness through its practices of nation branding.  
Korea’s nation branding strategy embraced essentializing the nation by defining it 
through set markers that were perceived to be authentically Korean. An example is a 
government initiative, a nation-wide branding campaign named, “In Search of Korea’s 
DNA.” The campaign recruited people, both Korean citizens and foreigners, to post 
photos or videos of what they thought represents the essence of Korea. The government 
also came up with a national logo, called creative Korea, which eventually led to much 
criticism for its close resemblance to France’s national brand slogan.   
As the above example indicates, since 2008, the South Korean government has 
allocated substantial budgetary and political resources to its nation branding strategy. 
From cosmetic work (e.g. presidential aircraft carrier design) to cultural policy (spreading 
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cultural heritage through UNESCO) and political issues (multicultural society), the 
Presidential Council of Nation Branding, launched by then-president Lee Myung-bak, 
served as a state apparatus whose work of knowledge production worked to legitimize 
and sustain nation branding discourse. Among this range of projects, the overseas 
volunteer program was the first project undertaken by PCNB. The following section 
illustrates how the volunteer program became defined as a cultural resource by the 
government.   
4.3.4.1. World Friends Korea 
Before proceeding to analysis of this program, I consider how the volunteer 
program became prioritized in the government’s nation branding initiative. First, it 
should be noted that the structure to initiate this program was in place. There were 
already several ministries and agencies, including KOICA and PCNB, with established 
volunteer programs. As the Nation Branding White Paper (2012) points out: 
With KOICA volunteers, Ministry of the Interior and Safety’s overseas Internet 
youth volunteers, Ministry of Science, Education, and Technology University Volunteers 
and Techno Peace Corps, among others, 4,230 volunteers deployed to 57 countries Korea 
already possessed the potential to establish an image of ‘South Korea contributing to the 
international society’ (p. 105).  
The program required “systematization” and “management” across these many 
projects. Further, the government welcomed the consolidation of the volunteer programs 
under one name as an opportunity to address ongoing criticism regarding the highly 
fragmented structure of Korea’s ODA system.     
Second, the sizable number of volunteers were seen to be potential “ambassadors” 
to spread Korea’s culture abroad. Pointing out that the number of volunteers sent abroad 
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each year was the third highest among other government volunteer programs, behind the 
U.S. Peace Corps and JICA, the Nation Branding White Paper continues: “The current 
volunteer system in Korea is highly fragmented, all functioning under different names by 
different government branches, diffusing the brand effect of the nation brand brought 
about by volunteer programs” (p. 105). Growing critiques of this fragmentation in foreign 
aid escalated over the years raising concerns with aid effectiveness. Some concerns 
included transaction costs in recipient areas, (Archarya, de Lima, & Moore, 2006), 
overlapping initiatives (Accra Agenda for Action, 2008, p. 17), and increased aid delivery 
costs (Easterly & Williamson, 2011, p. 27).  This rhetoric emphasized an interest in 
maximizing aid effectiveness on the part of Korea as a donor, rather than potential effect 
for its beneficiaries. As evident in the Council’s interest in coordinating the fragmented 
structure of its volunteer program, we witness again an agenda that promotes national 
development as a mobilization toward global status. 
Furthermore, the volunteer program is integrated into Lee Myung-bak’s Global 
Youth Leadership Program, which was a government initiative designed to tackle 
growing domestic unemployment by leveraging the international market. The project’s 
goal was to send 100,000 youth to work, learn, and volunteer abroad. Consequently, this 
Leadership Program co-opted the volunteer program, by promoting state interests in 
making citizens more globally employable.      
Finally, the moral value of volunteering or doing good, was perceived to be 
favorable to absorb as part of asserting the nation brand. As such, the volunteer program 
was envisioned strictly in terms of a national agenda to survive in the market-based 
globalization.  
Such training conveys a mechanism of regulating and governing the citizenry 
under the framework of nation branding. This approach is distinguished from the 
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previous years, focusing on the self-governing individual, through promoting volunteers 
as embodying essentialized repertoires of commodified cultural traits.    
In all three periods, nationalism in practice is equated with ways of 
conceptualizing Korea’s status as a nation.  The notions of citizenship and nationalism, 
therefore, are in close proximity across the three periods of Korea’s recent history. In that 
sense, Korea’s nationalism is based on institutionalized developmental practices. These 
discourses share a vision that the state has a role in motivating national development and 
in improving Korea’s position in the global hierarchy of nation states. As citizens, 
Koreans are encouraged to practice self-discipline according to the state developmental 
agenda. 
PCNB’s work reflects a new vision of the volunteer program as a cultural practice 
engaged to promote national interests. As such, volunteer work sits at the forefront of re-
constructing the nation in terms of cultural essentialization. Further, the volunteer 
program becomes a product to be managed and systematized by training volunteers to 
perform their national identity. The moral and normative definition given to the volunteer 
program avoids a potentially humanitarian or social justice mission, resonating instead 
with the strategic goals of the national government.   
4.4. There’s No There There. 
If the modernization period emphasized self-help and diligence as the road to 
development, the globalization period repeatedly stressed resilience and competence 
backed by a global mindset. The discourse of development manifested in notions of 
geundaehwa (modernization), segyehwa (globalization), and seonjinhwa (making 
advanced) continues to exhort its people toward disciplinary measures to sustain the 
ideology of development. In this process, the Korean population are produced as national 
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subjects constrained in the choice and freedom to act outside of the hegemonic 
understanding of the path toward development.      
The socially constructed understanding of the global space in the imagination of 
the Korean public discourse resembles a step pyramid. At the bottom are the peripheral 
nations who also exist at the edge of the international network of nation states. The 
Korean people were reminded frequently that these nation states have very little power 
over transnational issues, not even to choose their own destinies. Also, they are at the 
bottom of the stage in economic development and have weak economies. In the discourse 
of development, this socially constructed understanding of global space and hierarchy 
prevails. It is ingrained in the mindset of the Korean people as both a source of national 
pride and of disappointing history, but most of all, it provides a blueprint of progress that 
they constantly need to move towards.  
The Korean government, from the 1960s to our current stage, has presented the 
same narrative to its people as a national project. Those countries at the bottom, or the 
periphery were oftentimes invoked as examples by the elite, warning the Korean people 
of what may become of us if we do not commit ourselves to discipline and growth. But 
what lies at the top of the ladder, or in the center? The press used political economic 
symbols such as the G20 and DAC, referring to them as “The seonjinguk club” to 
describe elite status. However, even as Korea gained a seat as a member in this group, it 
was still not quite enough to be accepted by the Korean public (nor in the eyes of other 
nations) as a fully advanced country. The historically constructed discourse created an 
idealized imaginary of an entity that is a composite of everything that Korea is not. The 
discourse works to problematize what Korea as a nation and Koreans lack, to identify 
deficiencies, by using the object, seonjinguk, as the opposing mirror. As the discourse of 
“seonjinwha” indicates, many times, the characteristic feature, the policy direction, 
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remains vague and abstract. Furthermore, the imaginary of the stepped pyramid is not just 
economic. It is also culturally constructed. Although not directly discussed in the press, 
there is a prevalent assumption in the discourse of seonjinguk that grounds assumptions 
of racial superiority of the West. The lack of discussion on this is most likely because 
whiteness is not something that Koreans can embody. As such, to use the words of 
Gertrude Stein (1937), “There’s no there there.” The discourse of developmentalism that 
is still prevalent today serves as a force to govern the people, its power demonstrated in 
the fact that tens of millions of people join together as national subjects into in a single 
goal to become advanced, but with no clear imagination of what that may be or how to 
get there. Nonetheless, the Korean government continues to use development as a 
discourse to articulate a competitive national identity. In the following chapter, I focus on 
branding practices of Korea’s development aid program, World Friends Korea.     
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CHAPTER 5. “FRIENDSHIP, HARMONY, AND HAPPINESS FOR 
ALL”: BRANDING WFK AND THE VISUAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
THE (INTER)NATIONAL  
Referring to World Friends Korea (WFK) as a “brand” represents a deep 
penetration of a market-oriented worldview in public institutions and services. In this 
chapter, I examine the visual representational practices surrounding WFK by employing 
Foucault’s analytical concept of discursive practices. The first part of the chapter 
illustrates the social processes and practices by which a set of discursive markers 
associated with WFK becomes normalized. This is coterminous with what Arvidsson 
refers to as brand management, which is about “managing the affective dimension of 
social interaction, making sure that a desired modality of interacting and relating arises” 
(2007, p. 10). Using interview material and visual texts, I look at how institutionalization 
of WFK as a brand involves enlisting and managing the volunteers to partake in 
imagining the national.  
The second part of the chapter engages in a close reading of the visual imagery 
captured by the volunteers during their service abroad. I look at how imaginaries of 
humanitarianism, such as aesthetized images and the appearance of children, works to 
depoliticize and domesticate difference. Furthermore, I demonstrate how the volunteers 
are made into “model citizens” as ambassadors that uphold the national image through 
“politics of pity” (Boltanski, 1999). Finally, I close the chapter by discussing the 
problematic of treating public service as a brand where development becomes more 
valued for its representative power over substance. 
5.1. World Friends Korea as the Public Face of Development Aid 
Every year, Korea Overseas International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) hosts a 
photography competition open to former and current WFK volunteers who wish to 
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showcase their experiences volunteering abroad. An average of 2,000 photos are entered 
each year, and the handful selected for awards are exhibited via various outlets, including 
KOICA events and publicity spots. Furthermore, these photos appear in the official WFK 
website and blog as well as the agency’s promotional products, such as pamphlets and 
calendars. The photo competitions are said to be a part of the agency’s public outreach 
campaign to foster public awareness of international development cooperation, to 
motivate “Korean citizens to consider the meaning of sharing and volunteering” and 
encourage their “contribution to the progress of the international society” (Photo book, 
2011).  
As a government institution, KOICA regularly holds campaigns to reach out to 
the public to inform them how their tax money is being used to help improve the world 
and to facilitate consciousness toward global issues. Such public communication venues 
also work to publicize KOICA, in particular, its volunteer program. The volunteer 
program is a widely publicized program of KOICA; while the notion of development 
cooperation remains abstract and elusive to many, volunteering abroad is much more 
familiar and accessible. Second, volunteering abroad tends to garner more interest among 
the public as it is participatory in nature. For this reason, it makes a much more 
persuasive case for the public, to invest in “our people” to become globally competent 
citizens while helping to improve the conditions of people in developing countries. 
Finally, the volunteer program has a strong visual quality. Images of young Koreans 
bonding with people in developing countries and spreading their home culture is very 
appealing to display to the Korean public.  
This chapter delves into precisely this: Why WFK is so actively publicized by 
KOICA. What is the symbolic value of the volunteer program? Particularly, in that the 
photos are replete with displays of Korea’s national culture, they need to be approached 
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as not only a brand of a development institution but as a national form. I wanted to better 
understand how these images that adorn KOICA’s official documents, reports, publicity 
spots, online sites, and promotional materials came to be and what their implications 
might be in terms of shaping the public imaginary of development and the national in 
relation to the international. In turn, this chapter dissects the visuality of WFK that goes 
beyond raising awareness of Korea’s volunteer work but rather, as “a set of value-based 
system of meanings” of development and the (inter)national.  
Drawing on a range of texts, including interviews with former volunteers, 
volunteer training material, field notes from volunteer recruitment sessions and publicity 
sites, and volunteer photos, I illustrate how the visuality surrounding WFK conveys 
affective moments more so than other projects. Such affective moments, in turn, inscribe 
affective attachments toward the “distant other.” This symbolic mechanism works to 
construct an image of Korea as a nation that is fulfilling its moral obligation to reach out 
to the developing world as others, commonly understood to constitute the U.S. and the 
UN18, have once willingly done for Korea.  
Using Malkki’s conceptualization of “romantic internationalism” (Malkki, 1994, 
p. 49), I demonstrate how the visuality of WFK projects a sentimentalized imaginary of a 
common humanity. I first examine how certain iconic images depicting common 
humanity become attached to WFK. This involves tracing practices through which a 
range of signifying vocabularies, images, and feelings associated with WFK becomes 
normalized and sustained over time. I draw on Foucault’s concept of discipline (1977) to 
illustrate how the producers of the visual images, the volunteers, familiarize with and 
naturalize this repertoire of representative signifiers to convey their experiences abroad. 
                                                 
18 Although much of post-WWII foreign aid to Korea came from the U.S., in fact, many countries that had 
once come to Korea’s aid remain outside of public discourse. These countries include Tanzania and 
Ethiopia but are left out as they do not neatly fit into Korea’s dominant narrative of development.   
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Then I engage in a close reading of the photos themselves, illustrating how the 
visual practices of WFK construct romanticized internationalism that evokes the value of 
common humanity. Immaterial qualities of friendship, sharing, and happiness are 
embodied as a value for which the nation stands and promotes. Such imagery of common 
humanity goes hand-in-hand with representation of the national through profuse 
appearance of national cultural symbols. The volunteers are portrayed as ambassadors of 
the nation, spreading the values and culture of Korea to the world. The chapter goes onto 
discuss the conflicting nature and the limitation of visualizing such idealized imaginary 
of internationalism, which celebrates difference as constituting parts of humanity as a 
whole (“difference is nothing”), while engaging in hierarchical ordering. Furthermore, in 
engaging in “politics of pity,” the national subject is made into a model citizen who is 
globally competent and at the same time, grateful toward her/his country. 
5.2. Internationalism as a Cultural Construct 
In Citizens of humanity, Lisa Malkki (1994) provides a multifaceted illustration 
of internationalism as a cultural form for imagining a World Community of Nations 
where globality is understood as being organized by “interrelationship among discrete 
nations” (p. 41). Drawing on Anderson’s imagined community, Malkki traces the 
processes and practices that celebrates an “egalitarian brotherhood or sisterhood of 
nations” based on a discourse of common humanity, creating an idea of “romantic 
internationalism.” Taking a variety of examples, such as the United Nations, the Olympic 
Games, Miss Universe beauty pageants, and the Disneyland ride, “It’s a Small World 
After All,” Malkki illustrates how they are based on “stage-managing” human diversity 
as a category that creates a shared vision of humanity. Amidst the celebration of 
diversity, unequal relations of power are erased and differences are domesticated 
  103 
according to the rules of the powerful. In this vein, internationalism is a “transnational 
cultural form for imagining and ordering difference among people” (p. 41).  
Nation branding can be fruitfully seen as a continuation of such global social 
organization of cultural internationalism, fueled by market-driven globalization. 
Globalization has been accompanied by a resurgence in nationalism and a reconfiguration 
of national identity (Iwabuchi, 2015; Volcic & Andrejevic, 2016b). The market-driven 
characteristic of globalization “makes the nation function as one of the most marketable 
localities of globalization, a unit of commercialized and standardized cultural diversity 
that is to be promoted” (Iwabuchi, 2015, p. 4). In nation branding, the nation is 
approached as an equivalent of a brand, and a range of cultural meanings, together which 
constitute a coherent national brand, are inscribed into a variegated range of public forms. 
As a form of cultural internationalism, nation branding assumes an equal status for each 
country. In fact, nation branding is seen to be “democratic” in that it places each nation 
with a similar narrative, as competing over who claims the most compelling story. In fact, 
nation branding professionals assert that “problems of underdevelopment, especially in 
Africa, are in part caused by the negative branding of the developing world by the 
developed world whereby the developing world is depicted as a hopeless basket case, fit 
for charity but not for investment” (Browning, 2016, p. 51). To resolve this problem, the 
developing world needs to take control of its own image through concerted efforts of 
nation and regional branding. What is noteworthy about this claim is that in positing 
narrative construction as a form of technical expertise to facilitate development, cultural 
mediation is foregrounded as having material impact in development. In the case of 
Korea, the negative image associated with its geopolitical insecurity and domestic labor 
protests were strategized to be offset by an enhanced international moral standing of the 
country.  
  104 
I argue that branding WFK draws on the discourse of romanticized 
internationalism that involves aestheticization through the use of bright colors, 
depoliticization through the appearance of children (over adults) as the main figurative, 
and decontextualization of the host’s social and cultural background that reduces 
differences to skin tones and symbolic varieties such as dress codes, flags, and food. Such 
associations position Korea as a culturally rich country whose cultural elements transcend 
national borders to connect people together. However, within the discourse of common 
humanity surfaces steep hierarchical categorizations. This takes place by leaving out any 
other possibilities of expressing the international and the national.   
5.3. Visuality as Discourse  
If discourse is a particular arrangement of language and text with its own rules 
and conventions that shape how we make sense of the world around us and our subject 
positions in society, then visuality as a discourse involves articulation of such language 
through visual means. Visuality plays a powerful role in shaping the public imaginary. As 
a cultural product, visuality involves practices that set the parameters of “how we see, 
how we are able, allowed, or made to see” (Rose, 2016, p. 136). Therefore, a specific 
visuality will “make certain things visible in particular ways, and other things 
unseeable…” (Rose, p. 137).  
According to Foucault who has informed an understanding of how discourse 
works, discourse consists of “practices that systematically form the objects of which we 
speak” (1972, p. 49). Foucault’s work enables us to examine the rules of formation, the 
rituals, and the procedures which enable and limit practices of meaning making. 
This chapter begins by looking at how the volunteers are cultivated and socialized 
to the rules and conventions of the photographic elements and learn to evaluate the 
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overall composition of images that are considered worthy of being captured and those 
that do not “quite fit.” I include a range of practices that produce the particular visuality, 
from coming to recognize the rules and conventions to cultivating the habit of how to 
take and what to capture in the images. I also look at the mechanisms through which 
production of such visuality is encouraged and reinforced.  
The practice of producing the images are analyzed through interviews with two 
previous university volunteers who were in charge of publicity as well as based on my 
field notes from WFK public campaigns and volunteer recruitment sessions. Documents 
such as pre-departure training materials were also consulted as supplementary material. 
The photos that are examined consist of those that have been selected for awards in the 
annual KOICA photo competition from 2009, the year that WFK was launched, through 
2013. These photos have been compiled and published into a collection of books over the 
years. The time frame of study is selected because these are the years during which the 
photos were published in book forms. Having the photos available as a compilation by 
year, I avoided having to scavenge for the photos from different channels, thereby 
eliminating the possibility of leaving some out. While the time frame is limited to five 
years, it should be pointed out that the representational conventions and the dominant 
narratives of the photos have remained consistent even in subsequent years.        
5.3.1. PHOTOS AS TEXT  
The main text under analysis consist of a collection of award-winning photos in 
the annual photo contest hosted by KOICA. These photos are taken by volunteers during 
their services abroad and depict their experiences on the field. Once awarded, these 
photos are considered as the intellectual property of KOICA and are used a source of 
public images in various outlets, including the agency’s official website, and are 
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exhibited in publicity spots and campaigns. For example, the photo below, selected for a 
top photo award in 2013, appears in the WFK website below.   
 Figure 1. What is happiness in Korean? (Park, 2013) 
The same photo can be found in World Friends Village publicity hall located in 
the WFK pre-departure training center, shown below (top row, third from the left).      
Figure 2. World Friends Korea Official Website (2017) 
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Figure 3. World Friends Korea Publicity Center, World Friends Village, Korea. (Taken 
by author, 2017) 
I analyzed a total of 115 photos awarded in the annual KOICA photo contest 
between 2009 and 2013. Table 1 shows the number of photos broken down by year (20 
photos from 2009, 31 photos from 2010, 17 photos in 2011, 21 photos in 2012, and 23 
photos in 2013). 
Table 4. Number of photos by year 
Year Photos 
2009 20 
2010 31 
2011 17 
2012 21 
2013 23 
Total 115 
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Next, I consider photos by their location, theme, and image composition. The 
photos were taken across 32 different countries, with Cambodia (n=15), Senegal (n=11), 
Laos (n=11), and Ethiopia (n=8) appearing the most frequently. These four countries 
constitute the setting of 40 percent of the photos. The themes of the photos were coded by 
identifying the activities in which the volunteers and the host nationals were engaged, and 
they were then grouped into categories.  The themes listed below constitute 80 percent 
of the photos under analysis. A brief description of eight most prominent themes is 
provided below.   
• Group photo (14%) 
By far, the most frequently appearing theme is the group photo, in which host 
country children and volunteers are posing in front of the camera. Mostly taken in school 
settings, these photos frequently depict children holding up and displaying their arts and 
crafts. The expressions of the volunteers and the host, comprised of school children in all 
of the photos, reflect joy and happiness as they are caught in the photo amidst playful 
gestures and expressions. The WFK logo features prominently in these photos. In many, 
children are holding up pieces of papers together which read “World Friends Korea.” In 
some, children have paintings on their faces and bodies. The staging of bright colors and 
props that convey cheerfulness are juxtaposed against markers of difference in the 
background such as the red earth and the stone wall, as well as the skin color of children. 
These images convey volunteering as an adventurous but a “safe” venturing that involves 
working with “poor but happy” host rather than those who are suffering or potentially 
dangerous.    
• Class instruction (11%) 
Class instruction consists of images of classroom teaching and learning. Photos 
within this theme address interventions in lack of educational hardware and software. 
  109 
These scenes depict students engaged in learning with educational tools, including 
textbooks, desks, and computers provided by WFK. Photos also visualize pedagogy, 
where volunteers are teaching the Korean alphabet, art classes or dances from Korean 
children’s songs. The frequency of which classroom education is featured reflects the 
high percentage of volunteers assigned to primary and secondary educational facilities. 
However, in foregrounding the universal right to learn as well as the performative aspects 
of these photos depicted in interaction and bonding among volunteers and students, 
moments engrossed in teaching and learning, highlight seemingly innocent nature of the 
intervention taking place. It diverts attention from considering the ideology behind the 
intervention rooted in national interests.    
• Promotion of hygiene (9%) 
Photos that belong to the theme of hygiene consist of volunteers teaching host 
country children about cleanliness, personal hygiene, and health. Some examples include 
a photo of a volunteer and host children brushing their teeth, a volunteer helping children 
wash their hair and hands, and a volunteer holding up a hand-drawn poster that illustrates 
germs inside a mouth and talking to a class of students about the importance of brushing 
their teeth. Health promotion education is frequently undertaken by volunteers because 
the generic information provided related to basic sanitation does not require professional 
skills or knowledge in health. Along with the education theme, health campaigns 
comprise a commonly depicted communication for development project. At times, 
sanitation and health campaigns are held in conjunction with medical check-ups provided 
by KOICA medical volunteers.   
• Medical care (10%) 
Images of medical care depict a doctor giving a medical checkup or treating 
patients. What is noteworthy about images of medical care is that many of these photos 
  110 
use the words “serve,” “compassion,” “willingly give,” or “heal” in their title, alluding to 
self-sacrifice that invoke the imagery of a religious figure such as Mother Theresa, or 
more recently, Father Lee Tae-seok, a Korean priest who is revered by the Korean public  
for his devotion to caring for the victims of leprosy and street children in Sudan before 
passing away from cancer. Photos depicting medical care draw on such selflessness and 
sacrifice of humanitarianism.  
• Sports activities (10%) 
Sports activities include photos in which volunteers and the host are engaged in 
various sporting games, such as the tug-of-war, the three legged-race, and hurdling. A 
photo appearing frequently in WFK’s various promotional material entitled “Difference 
is nothing” (2010) depicts a Korean volunteer sprinting side-by-side with a host national 
who is without both legs pushing himself on a wheelchair across a track field. This photo 
conveys a powerful narrative about common humanity through the use of sports. In 
engaging rhetorical tools of cooperation, teamwork, and the spirit of sportsmanship, these 
photos depoliticize development and difference.    
• Taekwondo Training (11%) 
Scenes of Taekwondo are distinguished from sports activity theme because of the 
difference in symbolic meaning associated with Taekwondo, a Korean martial art. 
Officially introduced as an Olympic sport in the 1988 Olympics hosted by Korea, 
Taekwondo has gained traction globally and continues to be a key cultural element 
instrumentalized to promote the country’s national image. The images include a Korean 
Taekwondo volunteer demonstrating moves to a group of students. Photos commonly 
discuss Taekwondo as an embodiment of Korean spirit. A photo depicting a Taekwondo 
training session is described as, “To Taekwondo master’s question, “What is most 
important in Taekwondo?” athletes respond, “Etiquette!” Volunteer Kim Byung Eun was 
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not only teaching the students Taekwondo but about being Korean that is melted into 
Taekwondo” (Taekwondo Fever in Vietnam’s Tỉnh Thanh Hóa Sports Center, 2010). 
Scenes depicting Taekwondo not only take an overtly nationalistic narrative but it is 
depicted as a vehicle by which to bring together people across the world. A photo entitled 
“KOICA, transcending difference, spreading Taekwondo to the world” depicts an 
Egyptian girl wearing a hijab and a taekwondo uniform doing a split on the grass against 
the setting sun. Like this photo, images oftentimes draw on stereotypical markers of 
difference such as the hijab in juxtaposition to Korea’s cultural commodity, which serve 
as rhetorical tools in narratives of globalization.   
• Promotion of tradition (8%) 
Photos categorized in the promotion of tradition theme depict scenes where the 
volunteer and host are experiencing Korea’s traditional customs, such as wearing a 
hanbok, traditional Korean attire, and doing jeol19. Other photos depict host people 
having a taste of kimchi, a side dish made from salted and fermented cabbage, and 
playing Korean musical instruments. Cultural promotion of visually oriented and 
commodifiable elements in fact, echoes the broader nation branding strategy of the 
government. Cultural training that orients volunteers to their role as cultural mediators is 
given emphasis throughout volunteer pre-departure training and it is carried out by 
volunteers during their service abroad. 
• Transfer of resources (9%) 
Volunteering in itself is a form of transfer of resources in the form of human, 
social, and cultural capital. Therefore, while all photos involve transfer of some kind of 
resource, here I am specifically referring  to those photos whose focal point is an 
                                                 
19 Jeol, which represents a Confucian ritual of honoring one’s ancestors, consists of a process of getting 
down on both knees and lowering one’s head toward the floor. 
  112 
infrastructural facility such as the water pump or a computer lab that is installed with 
financial support of KOICA. Included in this theme is a photo of a volunteer with her 
hands around a little boy smiling caringly in a playground while the little boy is rocking 
intently on a spring rider horse, whose rather awkward gesture signals that it is his first 
time on such a ride. Painted on the surface is the sign KOICA. Another example is a 
Bangladeshi girl intently stitching fabric on a sewing machine patched with the sign 
KOICA. The photo entitled “Tomorrow will be Sunny,” inscribes a sense of hope, which, 
as will be further discussed, comes up over and over again in the photos. These photos 
invoke gratification on the part of the viewer and work as an accountability to the citizens 
of the country, as they leave clear and tangible evidence of KOICA’s work.     
Upon identifying the themes, I paid close attention to the image composition, 
coding for who serves as the central figure, what they are doing in relation to one another, 
and objects of emphasis. I identified the focal point and the background, or the setting of 
the photo. A close reading of the composition enabled me to read beyond what volunteer 
activities are being presented to read into how certain figures, objects, the gaze, and the 
expression of the subjects reveal about relationships between the volunteers and the host. 
The analysis is supplemented by captions when available, as well as other volunteer texts 
such as essays written by volunteers. 
5.4. Cultivating Ways of Seeing  
In this section, I explicate how the volunteers come to recognize and naturalize 
the conventions and language of volunteer photos, and how a range of practices work to 
sustain immaterial qualities that form the basis of the value of WFK. This includes 
volunteer training and photo award ceremonies, through which the organization manages 
and steers how meaning is produced.  
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All volunteers are obligated to undergo pre-departure training. Although the 
courses offered in the training differs depending on the particular program to which the 
volunteers belong, most are given some kind of publicity training, whether it may be 
“Capturing Images on Mobile Device,” “Video Production,” or “Blogging” (2017 
Training Plan, 2017). University volunteers under the name of WFK KUCSS20 undertake 
volunteer work in teams of four to five members. In each team, one volunteer is given the 
responsibility of publicity, which includes uploading photos and postings on Facebook 
and the WFK blog each month. These volunteers undergo job training specific to 
publicity during which they are provided with technical guidance on photography and 
blogging as well as instructions on the content of the photos. Han, a former university 
volunteer who spent six months in Myanmar, describes her role in publicity.  
We take photos and write articles everyday about the things we do on the field, 
the kinds of activities we engage in with the children … and these are the kinds of 
things we capture in photos. [During training], the instructor tells us what kind of 
photos are appropriate (interviewee quickly changes her word to), recommended, 
recommended poses, things like that. We are even taught about grammar. 
Apparently, there are many people with poor command of grammar. They instruct 
us on things like that. But there is no set frame. It’s pretty much up to us to decide 
what we write or how to write.  
When I asked further about the kinds of images that were recommended by the 
instructors, it became apparent that certain elements were circumscribed in relation to the 
content of the photos that were to be shared publicly on the agency’s channels of 
communication.  
Our t-shirt has a KOICA logo here (pointing to the left arm) and KUCSS  here 
(pointing to the right arm) and on our vests, there is the Korean flag on it … 
When we’re commuting to work or when taking photos, we’re advised to have the 
proper attire on … and in all photos, to show the Korean flag on the vest. Photos 
of activities where we’re not wearing the uniform, those photos are not 
                                                 
20 World Friends Korea-Korea University Council for Social Service 
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recommended to be posted online. So basically, if the uniform is visible and the 
flag is clear, and on top of that, if the picture reflects a moment of bonding 
between the volunteer and the children, now that is the best picture.  
In being instructed to always capture the Korean flag in the photo, the volunteers 
are from the outset explicitly taught that the photos are to be representative articulations 
of the nation. Symbols of the nation and the agency constitute the most important element 
in these photos. Soh, a former university volunteer who had served in Bangladesh, 
pointed out that he received guidelines on the kinds of photos that are to be shared. He 
told that on condition that the volunteers adhere to a code of conduct, they received a 
certificate recognizing their service as blog reporters after completing their volunteer 
work. According to Soh, the volunteers are specifically asked to post photos that display 
institutional logos and to prioritize in the order of the Korean flag, WFK, KOICA, and 
KUCSS. Furthermore, photos need to show volunteers wearing their vests distributed by 
the agency during pre-departure training. The organizational and national symbols 
attached to their attire are a constant reminder that the volunteer are, more than anything 
else, national constituents.   
What is also noteworthy is Han’s emphasis on the “moment of bonding” as her 
definition of what counts as an ideal photo. As such, volunteers were cultivated to 
recognize and understand what visual composition “counts” as being picture worthy. In 
addition to pre-departure training, such norms and language of an ideal imagery were 
reinforced through award ceremonies of the photos. When I asked Han if she can give me 
an example of the “best picture,” she referenced a photo that had won an award among 
her year of volunteers.  
The photo that won first place was by a girl who was in Myanmar, too. Towards 
the end of her service, she had an exhibition showcasing activities she did with 
her students in the pre-school where she worked. On one side of the wall, there 
were rows of photos of her students, and as she was reaching out to take the photo 
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as a keepsake of her memory with her students, the moment was captured in the 
photo. The photo came out really nice and so did the logos. The lighting effect 
was good, too. These photos are awarded during the closing ceremony and they 
are used as ads in the KUCSS website and posters.  
In selecting and awarding the best photos, the recommended composition of the 
images became conventions and the norm. Volunteers learned to “read” these affective 
moments, identifying the contrast in light and darkness, expressions of the figures, and 
non-verbal cues such as eye contact and bodily contact that comprised “moments of 
bonding.” As these award-winning photos were circulated through various channels of 
communication, they became normalized.     
Recruiting volunteers to partake in such promotional initiatives aligns well with 
nation branding’s reliance on enlisting citizen population to create and publicize the 
nation (Volcic & Andrejevic, 2011). By consolidating nation branding interests with the 
international volunteering program positions, Korean volunteers are not only positioned 
as change agents but also cultural intermediaries. Among supporters of nation branding, 
mobilizing ordinary citizens is upheld to be participatory and democratic in that it lives 
out the public sphere thesis by taking account of a plurality of voices about nationhood 
(Anholt, 2007).  However, critical engagement with nation branding projects have 
demonstrated the restrictive nature of the management and control process through a 
narrow selection process of participants and enforcement of self-censorship by the 
participants (Christensen, 2011). Likewise, exposure to the training and code of conduct, 
awards ceremonies, and publicly available photos serve to shape the ways in which the 
volunteers engage in capturing scenes of their volunteer activities.   
The material outcome of such a disciplining mechanism is evident in the shifting 
narrative of the photos from 2009 to those from 2010 and onwards. The following section 
conducts an analysis comparing images of photos from 2009 and those from subsequent 
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years. It should be noted that the selection of photos published in the 2009 photo book 
were actually submitted in 2008, meaning that these photos were taken during or prior to 
2008, before WFK was launched. I intend to demonstrate the contrast in the narratives of 
photos taken before and after the founding of WFK. In so doing, I show how construction 
of particular visuality works to institutionalize WFK as a brand identity.  
5.5. Deconstructing brand WFK 
Looking at the imagery captured in the photos in this time period, the difference 
in content and form of the photos published in 2009 to those from subsequent years was 
substantial. The most noteworthy is that the volunteer program is less associated as a 
national form in photos from the 2009 publication. National or institutional logos did not 
constitute a focal point in the photos. In nine out of 20 photos (45%), there was no 
presence of any markers of the nation, and even when national symbols appear, they 
remain outside the focal point or parts of the logo are hidden from view. This is a stark 
contrast from images from subsequent years (2010-2013), in which national and 
institutional logos appear across the majority of the photos (n=92). Moreover, the 
volunteers are less likely to constitute a central figure in photos from the 2009 photo 
collection. In only six photos (30%), a full figure of the volunteer is present. Volunteers 
are left outside of the frame in many of the photos (n=8, 40%) or they are hidden from 
direct view where their backside or only parts of their body appear in the photos.      
5.5.1. IN WHOSE WORDS? VOICE IN VISUALITY 
What is shown in the focal point and what constitutes the background says much 
about the visual rhetoric. Figures 4 and 5 show photos that were taken during recovery 
work in the aftermath of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, whose enormous magnitude led to 
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about 70,000 people killed and over 18,000 missing (Taylor, 2013). Figure 4 was taken 
by a KOICA employee who led the International Rescue Team to the affected area. It 
shows two crying women whose expression captures anguish and hopelessness from their 
loss. The hand of the Korean volunteer reaching out to the victim in the photo is that of 
an interpreter. Figure 5 was taken about a year later, during which a volunteer 
participated in a house-building project for the people who lost homes to the earthquake. 
Figure 4 is powerful for its ability to convey powerful emotions. Here, the focal point is 
the victims of the earthquake. The light shining on the women personalizes human 
suffering and loss in the face of natural disaster. Although we do not see the actual 
physical damages caused by the earthquake nor the chaos and casualty shortly after a 
deadly natural disaster, the photo is powerful for its ability to connect with the viewers 
the human grief and loss that the victims face. While the face of the Korean volunteer is 
not visible, the nation’s presence is nonetheless emphasized by the light shining down on 
the arm reaching out to the victims, which leads the eye of the gazer to the Korean flag. 
Here, we see that by the way that the volunteer’s hand is placed on the arm of the local, is 
consoling the pain.  
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Figure 4. Anguish. (Lee, 2008) 
 
Figure 5 takes place slightly more than a year after the earthquake, when a 
volunteer took part on a construction project that involved building homes for the victims 
of the earthquake. In this photo, the focal point is the three volunteers, set against a brick 
wall. There are no local residents present in the photo. The only other person is in the 
background, presumably a professional bricklayer at work, but his face is hidden from 
view. The volunteers’ white t-shirts with the WFK logo stand out against a background of 
red bricks. The description of the photo states, “The future residents of the home came by 
and spoke with us smiling. At that moment, I was touched, realizing that our small 
gesture of love can give them hope. The work was physically exhausting but the 
volunteers all wore smiles as they moved the bricks and cements.”  
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Figure 5. Building a home of happiness. (Chung, 2010) 
 
The narrative presented in the description is consistent with the photo in that it 
tells a story from the perspective of the volunteer. She states that building this house was 
exhausting, but her hard work gave the residents hope and happiness. Was this house 
indeed a source of hope and happiness for the residents? We do not know. The focal 
point here is not the victims’ experience of being presented with a home, but the 
volunteer’s sense of gratification and empowerment. The notions of hope and happiness  
serve to highlight and justify the volunteers’ commitment toward the greater good. The 
spreading of hope and happiness, in turn, becomes associated with WFK. Of course, it 
should be acknowledged that the different nature of the activities engaged by the 
volunteers is the result of the point of time in which the volunteers were on the affected 
site. Still, comparing the focal points and the emotions inscribed demonstrate a shift in 
the narrative of the photos.  
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As such, joy, happiness, and hope comprise prominent discursive tools from 2010 
and onwards. In fact, not a single photo from 2010 to 2013 portrays a negative mood or 
emotion. Figure 6 appears in the 2012 photo book of a Korean Peacekeeping operations 
soldier in Haiti. In the photo, he is locking hands with a little boy.  
 
Figure 6. Operation Danbi. (2012) 
The boy’s back is turned toward the camera, face invisible. However, from the 
outline of the boy’s face slightly to the side, we can see that the soldier and the boy are 
looking at each other and smiling. The caption reads, “Our soldier, deployed in UN PKO 
peacekeeping mission for the reconstruction of the Haiti government, defends human 
rights, fights against poverty and crime, and creates a safe environment. The photo 
depicts our military, ‘Operation Danbi,’ and its commitment to the mission.” (photobook, 
2012). Figure 6 erases from its frame not only the people who are affected by the natural 
disaster but also what the reconstruction efforts involve. We do not see depictions of 
human loss, sorrow, or danger, as the caption connotes in the kind of work the soldier 
undertakes. Instead, the photo depicts a sentimentalized imagery that foregrounds the 
innocence and helplessness of a child and friendly paternalism of the soldier. Such 
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imagery strips the political, and many times, the violent nature of reconstruction work. A 
primary way in which aid work is sentimentalized is in using children as the main 
figurative.  
 In fact, appearance of children is nearly ubiquitous in the photos from 
2010 onwards, while in 2009, 6 photos (30%) feature an adult(s) as the main subject. In 
photos from 2010 to 2013, adults are present in only 4 photos (4%). Out of the four 
photos, three are comprised of scenes where adults appear in the background, for 
example, mothers queuing in a temporary medical clinic as a KOICA medical worker is 
administering a check-up on a child. During this time period, only one photo (1%) centers 
on adults, depicting four farmers and a Korean volunteer proudly displaying mushrooms 
that they had grown (“Come to Fruition,” 2013). All others feature infants, children, 
youth, and to a much lesser extent, young adults as main subjects.    
It should be pointed out that by comparing the photos from 2009 to those included 
in photo collections of subsequent years, I am not trying to say that the photos from 2009 
subvert the dominant imagery of development that pervades in visual imagery. Rather, 
what I have tried to convey is the institutionalization process through which WFK 
becomes identified with a brand, through shifts in the visual language of award-winning 
photos selected before and after the launching of brand WFK. Photos from the 2009 
collection do not necessarily seek to subvert the dominant imaginary of development. 
However, they do diverge from photos from subsequent years in the way that the host 
comprises the main subject of the photos, less emphasis on cultural promotion, 
appearance of adults as well as children, and affective discourse that is more diverse than 
consistent.    
In the following section, I conduct a close reading of the visual imagery captured 
by the volunteers during their service abroad. I illuminate how the national and 
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international constitute one another in the imagery of the photos that while celebrating 
common humanity through messages like happiness, friendship, and hope, these photos, 
at the same time, render visible hierarchical categories drawn along lines of nation, skin 
color, and culture.   
5.5.2. “THE COLOR OF US”: PERFORMING BRAND WORLD FRIENDS KOREA   
The differences in language and skin color was not a problem for us. After all, we are all 
people inhabiting the planet earth, our red blood with warmth and love. … The 
expression of the children is naturally full of innocence and goodness that I did not need 
to ask for any staged poses for the photo. ...  The world may still be at war, people 
killing each other due to religious and ideological difference. But in the moment that we 
were hand-in-hand, the world was filled with peace. Even though we are now far apart in 
distance, we still sing the song of love and peace, our hands holding tight  
Smile, laughter, and tears, 2010   
 
I’d like to buy the world a home and furnish it with love, 
Grow apple trees and honey bees, and snow white turtle doves.  
I’d like to teach the world to sing in perfect harmony,  
I’d like to buy the world a Coke and keep it company.  
It’s the real thing, Coke is what the world wants today.  
“I’d like to buy the world a Coke,”, 1971 
 
The first quote above is a description of a photo that was taken by a former 
volunteer in Nepal. Cultural difference and geographical distance between the people are 
seen to be something trivial and insignificant, overridden by shared humanity. The 
caption illustrates co-existence based on love and peace, and in depicting Korean 
volunteers hand-in-hand with the host people, the ability to create connections and 
friendship in and through Korea’s commitment to make the world a better place. I find 
the description of the photo to be strikingly similar to the second quote, the lyrics to a 
famous Coca-Cola commercial. Just as a bottle of Coke is envisioned to bring peace and 
harmony by connecting the world, which is depicted by young people of different race 
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wearing traditional attire, the volunteer photos show the country’s cultural elements as a 
source of bringing the volunteer and the host people together. The similarity in the 
metaphorical allegory points to the consistency in the logic of the two narratives. Both 
Coca-Cola and WFK are envisioned as vehicles through which to bring people together 
under the name of common humanity. And both Coca-Cola and WFK become embodied 
forms of such symbols, over and above their substance. The value of WFK as a brand lies 
not so much in the kinds of development practices volunteers engage in and how they 
bring about change, but in managing the symbolic associations, which forms a basis to 
sustain a relationship with the wider Korean public.   
In this section, I illustrate how the volunteer photos present a depoliticized and 
domesticated understanding and logic of the international. I do so by looking at the use of 
colors as symbolic representation of internationalism, children as the main figurative, and 
decontextualization of the setting.  
In particular, I look at how the discursive tools of internationalism gain capital in 
a way that a brand becomes a product of certain embedded emotions and values. 
Particularly useful is looking at photos that have gained more traction by being advertised 
on various publicity outlets of KOICA. They perform the same function as the logo of 
WFK, which is embedded with certain meanings and emotions. These photos, in essence, 
are enacting brand “World Friends Korea,” or Korea making friends with the world. The 
WFK logo depicts a flower with five petals in different color and the center that is a 
circular shape of red and blue (figure 7). The petals are said to symbolize “the five 
continents surrounding the world in the middle” (WFK website, 2014). However, the 
petals can also be interpreted as people from the five different continents holding hands, 
and although the center allegedly represents “the world,” the center circle, which depicts 
the yin and yang, closely resembles the center of the Korean flag. The logo’s connotation 
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of a common humanity and egalitarian diversity represented through different colors of 
the petals/people evokes a version of internationalism that is akin to what Malkki (1994) 
calls romantic internationalism.  
 
Figure 7. WFK Logo 
In WFK, Korea is situated at the center, making friends with the world. Figures 8 
and 9 perform the logo of WFK, depicting the flower or a circle of students hand-in-hand.  
For example, the caption of the photo below reads, “Even though we are from different 
backgrounds and there is a language barrier, bonding is simple. All we need is the heart 
to embrace one another and smile together, cheek-to-cheek” (The Most Beautiful Flower 
in the World, 2011). Such messages work to reinforce the kind of egalitarian 
internationalism of common humanity premised in WFK brand.   
 
Figure 8. The Most Beautiful Flower in the World (Noh, 2011) 
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The photos depict playful, smiling faces of children, volunteers and children 
chatting and laughing together, volunteers painting the faces of children, students locking 
hands walking in circles, and children and volunteers holding up letter-sized papers that 
together, make up the words “World Friends Korea.” The photos are very colorful, as 
they frequently include artworks and logos related to WFK and Korea’s cultural 
elements. In many of the photos, the agency’s logo stands out visibly, as the bodies of the 
volunteers and host children are used as advertising and branding devices. Oftentimes, 
the bright colors of the WFK logo stand out in contrast to the darker skin tones of host 
children as the children are “branded” with WFK logo in its most literal definition, their 
bodies colored with face paint. While this problematic in many ways, the smiles and 
playfulness of the children make it a seemingly innocent and compassionate act.   
 
Figure 9. Hello friends, we are pleasant children in Ethiopia (Park, 2010) 
In the following section, I will illustrate how internationalism is further 
romanticized created through domestication of differences. Specifically, I look at the use 
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of children as the main figurative and decontextualization of the host country in the 
images. Such domestication works to gloss over the political nature of development 
volunteering leaving unquestioned the structural forces at play behind inequality and 
human suffering.   
 
5.5.3. DOMESTICATING DIFFERENCE  
It should be acknowledged that an overwhelming majority of the photos featuring 
children as comprising the host is due to the large proportion of volunteers being assigned 
to schools. However, even taking this factor into consideration, the overall percentage of 
photos that feature children as the central figure far outweighs the percentage of 
volunteers assigned to schools. While volunteers are sent to municipal centers, 
agricultural facilities, libraries, and universities, these scenes hardly ever appear in the 
photos. These settings are featured in only five out of 95 photos between 2010 and 2013.   
Numerous studies on representations of humanitarian aid have critically engaged 
with representations of children (Abidin, 2017; Fehrenbach & Rodogno, 2015a; Manzo, 
2008; Moeller, 2002; Seu, 2015). Children are seen as an embodiment of purity, 
innocence, and human goodness (Mallkki, 2015). In making a persuasive case for 
humanity, children tend to evoke sympathy rather than active, political action (Manzo, 
2008). In this way, the sentimental response neutralizes the political response that the 
amelioration of poverty and structural violence against the poor necessitates. In turn, the 
child is often made to appear as the exemplary human, and as politically harmless and 
neutral. In the following section, I will analyze the following in depth: Children as being 
close to nature, and second, children as embodiment of innocence and human goodness. 
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In many volunteer photos, children were placed against pristine nature. The 
pristine nature is depicted in the greenery of the land and the blueness of the sky. The 
background emphasizes the innocence and the natural state of the children. At the same 
time, depicting children as a part of nature places them outside of specific political or 
cultural context. There is an absence of specificity in the photos.  Other than certain 
markers such as hints of tropical vegetation (palm trees) or the rusty red of the African 
soil, it is very difficult to differentiate the location of one photo from another.  
Although brief descriptions of the photos indicate the country and in some photo 
books, the precise location in which the photo was taken, the visual information in the 
imagery foregrounds Korea in the international in and through decontextualization of the 
host. The host is reducing to imagery of a distant place, marked by darker skin tones of 
the children, pristine nature, and a few symbolic markers that work to exoticize the other, 
such as a girl wearing a hijab.  
Noteworthy here is that the children in these photos are all smiling or immersed in 
some kind of activity. Rarely are there any signs of suffering or poverty other than babies 
being treated by Korean doctors or nurses. This stands in contrast to analysis of visual 
imagery of children in humanitarian NGO campaigns. This can be thought of in relation 
to the purpose and goal of the photos. WFK photos target the Korean public whose tax 
money goes to development aid. Therefore, the agency is accountable to the public to 
deliver the outcomes of public funds as well as to foster awareness and interest in 
development. As such, the photos tend to depict outcome-oriented scenes to illustrate 
how foreign aid was used.  
Here, a point to note is that as constituents of a state-sponsored program, 
volunteers represent not only development actors but also beneficiaries of Korea’s public 
diplomacy. Therefore, the photos show how volunteers themselves benefitted from this 
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experience, which is mostly visualized in terms of gratification expressed by volunteers 
in bonding with the host and in learning the values of compassion and altruism. On the 
other hand, NGO images tend to draw on human suffering in a way that appeals to the 
moral consciousness of people to mobilize action through donation and volunteering, 
among other commitments (Fehrenbach & Rodogno, 2015b). The contrast demonstrates 
the ways in which children are appropriated as rhetorical tools in a way that serves the 
interests of the respective institutions.    
The lack of context in the background works to create the image of the host as 
being a “tabula rasa”; unspoiled, innocent, and at the same time, absent of local history, 
politics, and culture. Decontextualization of place results in depoliticization of the 
development volunteer work. When a place is perceived to be empty of any kind of 
cultural or political context, such lack, in turn, legitimizes the work of the Korean 
volunteers, and makes the imposition of national symbols less invasive. In the photos, 
these children are happily engaged in playing Korean games, learning Korean, painting 
WFK logo, and immersed in learning Taekwondo. Their inviting smiles make the cultural 
project of Korea invisible not only in terms of the conditions of human suffering, but also 
the unequal flows of cultural exchange.  
For the very few photos where the local cultural elements are featured, what is 
interesting is that their “otherness” is seen to be overcome through the spreading and 
sharing of Korean culture. For example, figure 11 shows a girl wearing a hijab and a 
Taekwondo uniform stretching her legs. The description reads, “I look at the girls always 
wearing the hijab even as they are covered in sweat, and I cannot but realize the cultural 
difference. But that day, as I stood there taking pictures, the sounds of ‘hana! Tul!’ [one, 
two, in Korean] coming from these students made me feel closer to them, transcending 
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those differences…” It is not through mutual understanding, but through imposition of 
the Korean culture that connection and bonding take place.    
 
Figure 10. KOICA, transcending difference, spreading Taekwondo to the world (Cho,  
2010) 
Although the images erase political interest and exclude structural forces of 
inequality in order to project a version of internationalism as egalitarian and humanistic, 
they paradoxically end up re-creating hierarchies and an ordered worldview. The host is 
infantilized, and therefore in need of paternal or maternal care. Second, the host is 
presented as culturally lacking or irrational while Korea is conceived as a culturally rich 
and attractive. Thus, although the WFK brand embodies values of egalitarianism, the 
contradictions within are not ruled out and they surface in the photos. 
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5.6. Cultivating Model Citizens  
To maintain its legitimacy, the neoliberal nation-state must produce a particular 
type of national subject (Lemke, 2016). With the high rate of unemployment among 
university students, social expressions such as ingyeoingan, directly translated into 
English as surplus human21, and “hell Joseon” pervade the social sentiment of Korea in 
contemporary times. It is reflective of the argument posed by Zygmunt Bauman (2013), 
who in his work, Wasted Lives: Modernity and its outcasts, discusses the redundant 
population who are no longer considered necessary as consumers or producers. In order 
to deal with the aggravating social conditions for the youth population, the government 
has been pushing young people to enhance their “global competency” to find work 
abroad. KOICA, in university publicity campaigns, introduces it as a “stepping stone to 
reach out to the world,” and publicizes how it opens opportunity for jobs abroad. In line 
with this discourse, the photos feature Korean youth who are engaged in IT training, 
engineering (job training), teaching Taekwondo, conducting a science experiment, and 
teaching English and Korean language. They are creative and resourceful in terms of 
working with limited material and resilient in terms of being flexible in unexpected 
situations that frequently arise on the field. Depicting volunteers as youthful, resilient, 
compassionate, and exuding positive energy fit well into what Korea as a nation aspires 
to be identified with: culturally attractive, non-threatening, and with youthful energy. The 
photos also work to create a sense of the youthful subject as a forward-looking individual 
who not only helps to make the future for the host but also is in charge of making a future 
for her/himself.  
                                                 
21 The term surplus human first appeared through a fiction written by Sohn Changsub entitled ingyeoingan 
(Surplus human). Written in the 1950s against the backdrop of the societal chaos following the Korean 
War, the story explores different characters who fail to adjust to the realities of life and are alienated and 
disempowered.    
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These youth, along with the children in host countries, work to construct an 
understanding of internationalism as a youthful phenomenon, that embodies innovative, 
resilient, and driven – characteristics commonly associated with of the image of the 
youth, in contrast to the older generation as dogmatic and backward-looking. What is 
noteworthy is that since the launching of WFK, the program as a whole has been 
substantially increasing the number of senior volunteers for their expertise in various 
sectors. However, senior volunteers are hardly featured in any of the photos, other than 
one photo that features two senior volunteers posing with children behind what is seen as 
a newly installed water pump. In fact, many nations foreground its “youthfulness” as the 
main slogan of its nation branding campaign. Kosovo’s “Kosovo: The Young Europeans” 
campaign places at the forefront the youthfulness of the country as the main tagline. The 
positive emotions associated with youth formed the key strategic insight that gave focus 
to the entire campaign (Wählisch & Xharra, 2010, cited in Kaneva, 2018). Thus, along 
with the children of the host countries, the Korean youth volunteers constitute a subject in 
the narrative of romanticized internationalism.   
What is noteworthy is how youth volunteers not only form a part of this 
romanticized internationalism, but also how their romanticized nationalism becomes 
inscribed in volunteer-related texts. Essays written by volunteers oftentimes express pity 
towards the social and economic conditions of the host and conclude with appreciation 
for the conveniences of the everyday and gratitude towards their home country. Such 
discourse can be seen in line with a “politics of pity” which, according to Boltanski 
(1999), works to highlight the fortunate through the power of observation by those who 
do not share the suffering.  
Such engagement in a rhetoric of pity works in two ways. First, it veils the 
economic and social conditions beneath the surface of smiling children through which 
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human suffering persists among the host. The volunteers, long after returning home, may 
reminisce over their experience abroad, romanticizing the other and human suffering. 
Along with reinforcing an image of the international, the visual text also cultivates 
volunteers as model citizens, who are empowered to take charge of their own future. 
These volunteers not only are successful in self-growth, but at the same time, they are 
grateful toward their home country. Complaining about one’s personal situation is framed 
as being immature and spoiled. As volunteers remark that their misfortunes are “nothing 
compared to what they saw on the field,” this politics of pity works to deny the social 
hardship that continues to inflict youth in Korea. This leads to the second effect of the 
rhetoric of pity, which works to construct a national subject, who is both committed to 
the advancement of the nation by spreading Korea’s culture and knowledge abroad and, 
at the same time, grateful to the nation and for the fortunate position in which the 
individual finds her/himself. Hence, the model citizen is produced.   
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CHAPTER 6. PRODUCING AND CONSUMING DEVELOPMENT: 
VOLUNTEER ACCOUNTS ON THE GROUND22 
Korea’s volunteer program represents a steady increase in the number of 
volunteers coming from countries outside of the West. In 2012, 81 percent of volunteers 
in the United Nations Volunteers Program came from the global South, and Chinese 
volunteering is also growing rapidly in sub-Saharan Africa (Ceccagno & Graziani, 2016). 
The increase in non-Western volunteer exchange aligns with growing engagement in 
foreign aid and development cooperation by countries outside of North America and 
Western Europe.  
Volunteering and development share histories and trajectories. In response to 
volunteering that takes place within the uneven patterns of power in the broader field of 
development, critiques about the colonial legacies underpinning international 
volunteering (Perold et al., 2013), the ways that benefits are more often oriented toward 
the volunteer (Jones, 2011), and the lack of critical pedagogies of development in 
volunteering (Diprose, 2012) have appeared in recent years.  
However, scholarship in non-Western voluntary action has attracted considerably 
less academic attention, and scholars are only beginning to look into non-Western 
volunteer exchanges (Balie Smith et al., forthcoming; Butcher & Einolf, 2016). In a study 
that looks at volunteer exchanges among non-Western countries, Baillie Smith and 
colleagues consider the potential of the dominant ideology to be dismantled with the 
increase in non-Western volunteers (Smith et al., forthcoming) to forge a more equitable 
relationship between volunteer and host. They imply that Southern volunteers may realize 
                                                 
22 Parts of this chapter appear in a previous publication, referenced below:  
K. S. Lee. (2018). Entitled to benevolence? South Korea’s government-sponsored volunteers as actors of 
public diplomacy and development. In J. Pamment & K. Wilkins (Eds.), New Dimensions in the Politics of 
National Image and Foreign Aid: Communicating Development and Diplomacy (pp. 123-141). London: 
Palgrave Macmillan.   
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partnership in its true sense (rather than the term being co-opted by international 
organizations like the World Bank) based on their cultural, historical, and economic 
identification with the host. I argue that such questions may have the effect of simplifying 
volunteer-host relations and essentializing the notion of the “South” as a unitary entity. In 
turn, questions driven by the assumption that Southern volunteers are more fit to engage 
in development volunteering (compared to their Northern counterparts) furthers the 
binary of North vs. South. Rather, I argue that the volunteer-host relationship needs to be 
situated in the greater structure if we want to understand the conditions under which a 
volunteer-host relationship is formed. Structural conditions work to constrain and at the 
same time enable a volunteer-host relationship. Taking the perspective of volunteering as 
development communication praxis enables us to identify volunteer-host relationships as 
multi-faceted and harboring different conflicts and tensions, rather than determined by 
either the dominant ideology of development at one end or volunteer agency on the other. 
Considering development communication in practice opens room to examine a 
multiplicity of structural conditions while also opening space to explore how volunteers 
enact agency to navigate the different structures. In such ways, this chapter explores how 
a volunteer-host relationship is both enabled and constrained by different structural 
conditions in which the volunteers are embedded.   
This chapter looks at volunteer experiences in the field. How do volunteers in this 
program articulate their role as development agents? How do they understand their 
encounters in the host country? In order to address this question, I interrogate multiple 
structural spaces, including the Korean government’s nation branding discourse, the 
enduring colonial legacy of development, and the financial resources available to 
volunteers. How do volunteers interpret and discuss encounters in relation to their 
identities? Specifically, I focus on volunteer narratives about national, racial/ethnic, and 
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gender identities. In so doing, I illustrate how Korean volunteers navigate with the 
dominant understanding surrounding nation, race, and gender in development.  
This chapter is organized as follows. I first examine Korea’s nation branding 
ideology as a structural condition. Specifically, I analyze how the Korean government 
articulates national identity through promotion of cultural commodities and show how 
volunteers become both ambassadors and targets of such cultural ideology. The chapter 
also examines the greater dominant ideology of development as a structural condition that 
internalizes certain preconceived assumptions of development actors. I look at how 
volunteers understand national, racial, and gender identities in development and 
interrogate how volunteers navigate within the dominant imaginary of development. 
Finally, I look at the structural condition of volunteer status that is created in their ability 
to channel funding to the host institution and explore how their positionality both enables 
and constrains relationships with the host. These themes will be examined in the 
following sections. 
 
6.1. Sociopolitical Conditions 
6.1.1. AMBASSADORS AND CONSUMERS OF BRAND NATIONAL IDENTITY 
Prior to being sent abroad to their country of service, WFK-KOICA volunteers 
undergo pre-departure training, which involves eight weeks, or 310 hours of a diverse 
range of programs designed to prepare the volunteers for their assignment. The pre-
departure training is designed to facilitate the vision of WFK volunteers, to “engage in 
service activities through which they can directly share their knowledge and experience 
to help accelerate progress in local communities while also serving as a bridge 
connecting the cultures of the host country with Korea” (World Friends Korea, 2013). 
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The training takes place in World Friends Korea Training Center, located in 
Yeongwol, Gangwon Province, where volunteers are housed for the duration of the 
program. Each day, the training program begins around 7 a.m. with daily morning 
exercises followed by a rigid schedule that continues on until nightfall. While the training 
curriculum varies by generational factor (youth vs. senior) and types of jobs that will be 
performed on site, a report on WFK domestic training (KOICA, 2017) indicates that pre-
departure training is broadly categorized into four areas: Development cooperation; 
health and safety; cultural relations; and job-related knowledge. Development 
cooperation introduces volunteers to the history of international aid, Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDG), and Korea’s history of receiving and giving aid. Health and 
safety programs prepare volunteers for possible emergency situations, such as natural 
disasters, health complications, and self-defense strategies through hands-on emergency 
management training. Job-related training offers a variety of exercises and lessons that 
help volunteers to plan out and discuss with other volunteers job-related activities to be 
undertaken on the field. Finally, cultural training consists of culture-learning topics to 
help volunteers acquire intercultural competence in bridging the sending and host 
cultures. 
Cultural training includes language courses, area studies (learning about the 
particular country to which the volunteer is assigned), and Korean culture. Language 
course is given the greatest importance. The volunteers undergo an average of three-
hours of language training each day, and at the end of the course, are administered an 
examination to test their language acquisition. 
Cultural activities consist of visits to cultural heritage sites and museums. This 
included orienting with host culture in the World Friends Village, which is an extension 
of the volunteer training center that displays cultural artifacts and information of 
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countries to which WFK volunteers are deployed. A WFK blog posting showed images 
of volunteers visiting the Museum of Musical Instruments of the World and African 
Museum of Art. The objective of the field trip was to encourage volunteers to “learn 
about the lives of the people in their respective countries through traditional musical 
instruments” and to “learn about the diverse cultures of Africa” (“KOICA volunteers visit 
Korea’s cultural sites,” 2014). In addition to field trips, the training program consist of 
modules in which volunteers formed study groups according to their country of service 
and conducted research on the history, customs, demography, geography, food, and arts 
of the host country (WFK Training Center, 2017). 
Out of the range of culture-learning modules offered, the most noteworthy is 
hands-on training of a diverse range of Korean cultural repertoires. During training, 
volunteers are taught to perform various cultural activities. Blog postings in the WFK 
official blog and a blog run by the volunteer training center feature images of volunteers 
fast at work, practicing traditional Korean calligraphy, making traditional masks (tal), 
practicing Ganggangsullae and samullori, designing traditional Korean fans, and making 
kimchi (salted and fermented cabbage). Volunteers are encouraged to introduce and 
promote traditional cultural elements during their service abroad through cultural 
exchange events and by integrating cultural elements into their educational programs. 
According to Park, a WFK staff, they try a lot of different cultural skill-learning, at times, 
inviting master craftsmen and artists who have been inscribed as intangible cultural 
heritage (muhyeong munhwajae) to teach certain traditional arts. As will be further 
discussed, the interviewees commented that such skills come in use for volunteers on the 
field, when many volunteers either assist in various cultural events hosted by the Korean 
embassy in the host country or organize cultural events hosting Korean language 
proficiency contests or K-pop performances. 
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The kinds of activities that are taken up in pre-departure training set the context 
for the topics and issues that the volunteers should be aware of and be concerned about 
before embarking on their assignments. The repertoire of their performative training – 
dance, music, and art – aligns with the broader cultural diplomacy policy of Korea that 
centers around Hallyu, or export of domestic popular and traditional culture to foreign 
countries. The performative repertoire in which the volunteers engage consists of the 
“explicit” side of culture, composed of cultural forms endorsed by the government to be 
exported abroad (Presidential Council of Nation Branding, 2013). Examining cultural 
policy of the Korean government from the early 2000s to present, Kang (2015) suggests 
that adverse reactions to the government’s explicit promotion of Korean Wave abroad has 
brought about a decentralized exercise in cultural exchange programs. And against 
shifting international sentiments, people-to-people relations were perceived to be much 
more credible and less interest-driven than mass mediated cultural projection. The 
influence of concepts of soft power, public diplomacy, and nation branding coalesced 
into the promotion of Hallyu through various decentralized channels, which “mutually 
reinforced both organizational interests and national agenda” (Kang, 2015, p. 441). 
Culture training of volunteers can be seen as a corollary to the decentralized exercise in 
the government’s promotion of culture.  
The training program sets the parameters of cultural relations and mobilizes 
volunteers to enact the government vision of appropriating cultural content as a strategic 
tool for improving cultural attractiveness of the nation through mediated forms of cultural 
spectacle. In that such performative activities set the parameter of cultural exchange, the 
volunteer program can be understood as an extension of the government to manage and 
control Korea’s national image.  
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In addition to hands-on learning of Korean traditional culture, cultural-learning 
included visits to Korea’s heritage sites as well as visits to museums displaying artifacts 
from the host country. Cultural understanding as something that is fostered by exposure 
to displays of cultural artifacts reflects a very passive understanding of cultural mindset. 
Culture is essentialized as a collection of explicit tangible, visible, elements “that people 
can observe, listen to, or talk openly about (Zaharna, 2012). Essentialization has the 
effect of detaching culture from the political and social context, making it a form of 
consumable product.  
Such assumptions of culture as an essentialized repertoire of traditional 
performances constrain the potential of the volunteers and encourage a very limited 
understanding of cultural relations as exchange of traditional markers rather than 
substantive exchange. This is in line with Koichi Iwabuchi’s argument that drawing on 
such cultural forms may carry over to a trivial identification with the idea of the nation, 
which while facilitating some understanding and intercultural exchange, fails to seriously 
engage with and promote cross-border dialogue (2015). 
As a whole, the training modules may be interpreted as a narrative of how Korea 
seeks to present itself as a donor to their hosts. Of course, eight weeks of training is not 
sufficient time to cultivate volunteers to certain ways of thinking. During my interviews, 
very few volunteers were able to recall what they learned during their training. When 
asked whether they felt that they represent the nation, most were in agreement that they 
represented Korea in taking part in a government-sponsored program. Still, very few of 
my interview participants overtly expressed national consciousness in undertaking 
volunteer work. In fact, it was only the senior volunteers who expressed nationalistic 
motivation in their decision to pursue volunteering, to which I will come back later. 
When I asked a WFK staff whether nationalism was one of the driving factors in why the 
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younger generation of applicants pursue volunteering, her answer was simply “no.” There 
are numerous reasons why applicants decide to commit to two years of going abroad, but 
they are not driven by national sentiments, she said. It was clear in my interviews that the 
younger generation did not associate volunteering with a nationalistic act. However, as 
one volunteer commented, “When we are abroad, whether we like it or not, we are 
constantly reminded of our nationality. I don’t believe that I am doing this for my 
country, but I do admit that my identity as a Korean becomes foregrounded in everything 
I do.”  For volunteers in their 20s and 30s, national consciousness is something that is 
evoked in the randomness of their everyday encounters in a host setting. A former 
volunteer who spent six months in Sri Lanka spoke about his surprising encounter with a 
bakery tuk tuk, also known as bakery three-wheelers that make daily rounds in the streets 
throughout Sri Lanka selling bread and baked goods. Soh said, “These bakery three-
wheelers all play the same tune, Beethoven’s Für Elise. But it was in my town, two hours 
away from Batticaloa, that I heard a bakery three-wheeler making rounds to the tune 
Gangnam Style.” For Soh, in a small, remote town that is a two-hour drive from the 
nearest Internet cafe, it was the most unlikely place to come across Korean pop, no matter 
how famous the song had become. “Every time people hear the sound of Gangnam Style 
approaching, they would run outside and line up to buy bread” Soh went onto say, “I felt 
wow, this is kind of interesting. I mean, I don’t know if the people knew this was a 
Korean song but…”  
While younger volunteers in their 20s and 30s were not consciously aware nor felt 
loyalty towards their nation of origin, it was in such moments of unlikely encounter with 
what they associated as being Korean that they felt an affective surge of national pride. 
Here, I use the term affective over emotional because of the sensuality of the encounter. 
The auditory experience of hearing Psy’s Gangnam Style stands in sharp contrast to the 
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sight of the dusty road, rusty tuk-tuk, and a middle-aged Sri Lankan pastry vendor. Such 
contrast in senses create a strong feeling of affective national consciousness on the part of 
the volunteers. On one hand, for Soh and other volunteers, such an encounter is indicative 
of Korea’s ascent internationally, more so because the encounter took place not in a 
cosmopolitan center like New York or Hong Kong, but in a place that they feel is distant 
not only in terms of physical distance from Korea but more so in terms of structural 
distance. To the volunteers, the center-periphery relationship between Korea and the host 
becomes more pronounced in these moments.   
Such a narrative of national consciousness is also witnessed in volunteer accounts 
of watching taekwonmu, which is a performance-based taekwondo that combines martial 
art with dance choreography. Many of my interview participants mentioned watching 
taegwonmu performance during Korean festivals held in their country of service, an 
experience that is frequently associated with feelings of awe. Koichi Iwabuchi cautions 
that such an encounter more often than not, “engenders banal inter-nationalism as it 
prompts people to implicitly comprehend cross-cultural encounters as those among 
mutually exclusive national cultures with delimited boundaries” (Iwabuchi, 2015).  
The global flow of this media and technology infrastructure along with the 
Korean government’s active push to spread the ideology of cultural nationalism to a 
global level has brought Korea’s pop culture to even remote parts of the world. 
Volunteers, in this process, are implicated as both ambassadors and targets of the national 
project. Volunteers play a part in circulating the cultural products promoted by the 
government as representing Korea’s national identity through cultural exchange events 
where cultural forms are performed, displayed, and distributed. For example, the 
interview participants mentioned how happy and excited host students are to receive K-
pop paraphernalia, such as posters, pamphlets, and stationary, which volunteers bring 
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from the Korean embassy and KOICA office in their host country and are distributed 
during various occasions. At a different level, when volunteers unexpectedly encounter 
such cultural moments which they associate with the idea of Korea, the sense of national 
consciousness evoked works to further solidify the idea of a nation as constituted by a set 
of cultural commodities.    
It seems that national consciousness, however, takes different forms by the nature 
of volunteer work and by generation. Volunteers who were involved in cultural education 
such as Korean language or taekwondo education tended to be more consciously aware of 
their status as representing the nation. Such consciousness was particularly strong among 
senior volunteers. Lee, a senior volunteer who worked as a Korean language instructor in 
a Moroccan university was very clear from the beginning that in volunteering abroad, he 
was determined to serve the nation. A retired principal in a middle school, Lee spoke 
about his experience being invited to a Confucius Institute conference in China as a 
motivation for his own work as a “citizen diplomat.”  
I listened to the organizers of the Confucius Institute express great pride for their 
Chinese language. Being there with other Korean members, it made me think, we 
have this great language, it’s a world-class language. And what are we doing? I 
made up my mind to teach Korean for our country after retirement. From 2011, I 
prepared to spread Korean to the world. I retired in 2013 and applied for KOICA 
volunteer program in 2014. I left for Morocco towards the end of 2014 and came 
back to Korea at the end of 2016. I feel that it was a worthwhile experience. Apart 
from my own interest, I am proud of having served as a citizen diplomat for two 
years to uphold our country and that I was able to teach others about Korea.  
Lee’s participation in the Confucius Institute made him realize that the Institute 
was not an academic entity but closer to a publicity organization. He was impressed with 
the scale of the Institute and its work in making foreigners develop a positive image of 
the country. When I asked him about what he means by upholding the country, he 
explained: 
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I heard that in order for a country to survive in this world and to be strong, there 
needs to be at least one hundred million people using the native language. This is 
just a story I heard. But if we count the population of North and South Korea, 
there are only 70 million. That means 30 million foreigners need to be using 
Korean. That was what I thought. And I took the initiative to take a part. I became 
certified in teaching Korean even as an old age, and had the opportunity to go 
abroad to volunteer. 
Lee’s nationalistic narrative caught me by surprise because it was unprecedented 
among the younger volunteers in their 20s and 30s. His perspectives most likely reflect 
his social position as a long-time educator. Articulation of nationhood has traditionally 
been the project of intellectual elites (Gellner, 2006). In that public institutions, namely 
schools, are noted for their social reproduction of hegemonic understandings of nation, 
class, and culture (Bourdieu, 1973; Foucault, 2008), Lee’s pride toward Korean culture 
and his sense of obligation to his country may be a reflection of his social position.     
It was common to come across national sentiments among senior volunteers like 
Lee. Having gone through the developmentalist age of Korea, senior volunteers above the 
age of 65 years tend to share strong emotionally-laden pride at having taken part in 
Korea’s rapid transition from a poor country to one with a strong economy. The senior 
volunteers tended to draw on a historical narrative of KOICA, bringing in the U.S. Peace 
Corps as a frame of reference for Korea’s growth in influence. Kim’s response to my 
question, “How did you find out about KOICA?” was illustrative of KOICA’s dominant 
narrative.   
I had known about KOICA for a long time now. When we were young, we had 
the Peace Corps, which was a volunteer group from the U.S. I heard a while back 
that our country now has a volunteer group like the U.S. Peace Corps. too. We 
had become that much stronger.  
Although Kim is a devout Christian, she chose to volunteer with KOICA rather 
than committing herself to Christian missionary volunteering. This was due to a number 
of reasons. First, it was because of the financial support provided by KOICA that would 
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give her the opportunity to try different things during her volunteering. Second, it was the 
narrative link to the U.S. Peace Corps that had imprinted a strong image in her head. The 
symbolic story of the U.S. Peace Corps and WFK takes currency for the senior 
volunteers, invoking feelings where personal achievement and national achievement 
becomes overlapped. 
6.1.2. EMBODYING THE NATION AND CLAIMING LEGITIMACY 
In this section, I discuss how the nation figures in the development imaginary as 
invoked by volunteers in their accounts of their experiences. First, in line with the 
broader institutional narrative of sharing and respect, volunteers distinguished Korea’s 
program as offering service 
based on its experience of development and with a less imperialistic interest in 
mind. Studies on Korea’s development cooperation projects have also indicated that 
countries like Cambodia are dissatisfied with social sector projects provided by western 
donors and would rather focus on economic growth. The Cambodian government is 
grateful for development projects offered by East Asian donors that are largely 
infrastructure-related, following their own development experiences (Sato et al., 2010). 
This was evident, for example, in the following exchange where Kim, a volunteer 
coordinator from North Africa, explained his work in placing volunteers with host 
institutions.  
There was an agricultural research center that wanted to export their products 
under their own brand and requested our field office to send an expert in product 
packaging and branding. I found this to be a just demand, and a meaningful 
demand, it enables the host to be independent. This is not something that Western 
donors would do, because they would rather buy the products at a cheaper cost 
and brand it themselves. We have volunteers in the Senior Advisors Program who 
are retired from companies like Samsung and CJ with capacity to deliver the 
service. 
  145 
In the above passage, Kim distinguishes Korea’s volunteer intervention from 
imperialistic interests of western donors, and at the same time positions Korea as being 
more economically advanced than the host. However, Kim goes on to express his surprise 
when many such placements end up with very few positive outcomes. Volunteer 
coordinators frequently referred to frustrations expressed by senior experts upon their 
placement in the host institution. As retired experts, senior advisors have access to a 
privileged position in Korean society. They are treated with respect as a professional and 
as an elder and are conferred authority. For Korean senior advisors, rigorous time 
management, efficiency, and prompt feedback are just a few of the basic tenets of 
professionalism, a value considered to be central to productivity. However, their 
expectations were rarely reciprocated by the co-workers of the host institution. Kim 
talked of frequent complaints by senior experts that they were not treated with respect 
and would oftentimes draw on the stereotypical trope of the laziness of the local co-
workers for being economically backward. 
What is noteworthy is Kim’s explanation of such relational tensions. Kim points 
to the inferior position of Korea and the lack of political economic influence in 
comparison to other volunteer-sending states as having a delegitimizing effect on claims 
to expertise.  
To simply think, “I am here to help you, so you follow my lead” is a big mistake. 
They [senior experts] are not taken seriously by the local people. From the point 
of view [of the locals], Korea is only a small country with little influence. To 
them, it is like a joke to see some people from such a small country, not like the 
US or France, and who know nothing about their [the host country’s] culture and 
pride say, “You follow my lead as I am here to help you.” To the locals, [the 
senior expert] is just someone from some very small country out there. 
Kim’s comment illustrates the political nature of knowledge, and its validity is 
constituted in the relational. Kim uses the word “small” to describe the lack of Korea’s 
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presence in the host country and the low level of familiarity and interest among the local 
population. He compares Korea to countries such as Germany, France, and Japan, that 
have more established, systematized, and sizable development budgets and agendas.  
Many volunteers echoed Kim’s comments in noticing that, on the ground, they 
were given different treatment from the volunteers belonging to the US Peace Corps and 
the Japanese International Cooperation Agency. They attribute the difference in treatment 
to the lack of cultural and economic clout of Korea. “Even if [the Korean volunteers] 
speak better English than the Japanese volunteers, they have a much greater advantage 
because they are Japanese,” one volunteer who served in Southeast Asia said. Unlike the 
Japanese and the US counterparts, the lack of Korea’s international presence was 
commonly seen as the reason for the discriminatory treatment received by the Korean 
volunteers on ground. The inferior status of the country was perceived to override the 
individual competency of the volunteers in determining the relational dynamic with the 
host nationals. 
The comments made by the volunteers are indicative of a perceived disjuncture in 
power relations that arises as the volunteers see their roles as helping to improve the 
capacity of the host, which may be questioned or dismissed by the host community. The 
senior experts were separated from their expertise and, instead, embodied by the low 
level of influence ascribed to the country to which they belong. The embodiment of the 
nation, in cases of volunteers from Europe or North America, frequently works to ascribe 
legitimacy of the volunteers. For example, Korean volunteers mention that the German 
and the Japanese volunteers are respected by the host for their large-scale projects and 
engineering skills. Within such a discourse, Korean volunteers felt they were not given 
the legitimacy to claim the role of aid provider, being questioned about their legitimacy 
based on their (lack of) national image. 
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6.1.3. PERFORMING TO BE THE “BETTER ASIAN”: NAVIGATING THE RACIALIZED 
IMAGINARY OF DEVELOPMENT 
As the phrase “White man’s burden” encapsulates, systemic power issues in 
development cannot be addressed apart from race. Race constitutes the most visible 
factor in a volunteer’s identity and, as an aspect of representation, works to construct a 
frame of reference of what a volunteer should look like and, on the other hand, what the 
recipient of aid should look like. Existing literature on international development 
volunteers have shown that volunteers have a sense of entitlement to the privileges that 
are enjoyed by white, Euro-American (as well as Australian) development actors 
(Georgeou, 2012; Hanchey, 2015). These studies also point out that such hegemonic 
understanding of the superiority of Western development actors over local staff and the 
superiority of Western knowledge is oftentimes taken for granted by the host 
constituents. Such internalized perceptions of the hegemonic understanding of 
development is an important dimension of volunteer-host encounters. It entitles certain 
people to the role of aid while undermining the legitimacy of those who do not fit into 
such internalized imagery. Within the dominant imaginary of development, Korean 
volunteers are faced with a disjuncture in their position as development actor.  
All Korean volunteers who took part in these interviews remarked that they were 
racially ridiculed by local publics, no matter the host countries. They stated that they 
were called names such as “monkey,” and picked on for their small eyes. Volunteers’ 
experiences of racial discrimination were much more pronounced in countries outside of 
Asia. Particularly in smaller remote towns where there were no foreigners, volunteers 
tended to be perceived by the essentialized category of race as a set of appearance cues. 
Park, who stated earlier that he and the volunteer who came before him were the only 
Asians in the town, laughingly remarked:  
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When I replaced the previous volunteer, no one could tell us apart. We look 
nothing like each other, but people would still call me Daniel. That was the name 
the previous volunteer went by. Then after awhile, they noticed that I was actually 
much shorter than Daniel. So from that they, they started calling me “Danielito.” 
The name stuck with me for the first year that I was there.  
Hwan’s story illustrates the ways in which volunteers are categorized as 
essentialized racial subjects. But most of my interview participants sought to navigate the 
racialized hierarchy in power relations by asserting their racial identity by looking 
“cleaner” and “smart.” When volunteers appeared in public well-dressed and well-
groomed, the volunteers noted that they were frequently asked by the host nationals if 
they were Japanese. Even as the volunteers told the people that they were Korean, they 
“for some reason,” felt better for being addressed as Japanese, as opposed to being 
labeled as Chinese, which was usually followed by racial ridicule.   
The first point to note is that the ways in which Korean volunteers navigate within 
their everyday encounters indicates a different understanding of race and ethnicity from 
that of the context in which race is signaled by appearance features. The racialized 
hostility from host nationals were based on assumptions of racialization of ethnic label 
(i.e. “all Asians are Chinese”). However, among Koreans and their East Asian neighbors, 
race is conceived in terms of the ethno-national. Korean volunteers sought to contest the 
racialization by “strategy of disidentification” (Kibria, 2000). In other words, they sought 
to distance themselves from the perceived “problem group” (Goffman, 1963, as cited in 
Kibria, 2000). Their assertion of ethnonational identities was situated within the 
established racial scheme that associated being Chinese with cheap products, exploitative 
nature of the country’s development projects, and stealing jobs in the host country. 
Furthermore, putting in extra effort to appear more presentable signaled an aspect of class 
as imbricated in volunteers’ assumptions of ethno-nationality. Han, who had volunteered 
in Myanmar, said,  
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I was on my way to a bank one day. Being in hurry, I got into a taxi. The taxi 
driver asked me if I were Japanese. This was really funny because I happened to 
have make-up on that day, but when I didn’t have any make-up on, I would 
normally be asked if I were Chinese.  
Although she never asked the driver about the reason for his assumption of her 
nationality, Han guessed that it was the fact that she was going to a bank and looked 
presentable that led the taxi driver to identify Han as Japanese. In such ways, the 
volunteers highlight the ways in which being perceived as Japanese is associated with 
socioeconomic wealth.   
Nonetheless, my interview participants did acknowledge that such efforts took 
them only so far. The performative aspect of race among Korean volunteers is indicative 
of their strategic positioning within the constraints of the dominant imaginary of 
development actor. However, rather than attempting to disrupt the racialized 
identification of the volunteer, most volunteers positioned themselves within such 
established frames of references. Volunteers’ coping methods complicated the dominant 
racialized hierarchies by incorporating ethno-nationality into the hegemonic colonial 
understanding of race, ascribed on the basis of perceived physical characteristics.   
For the most part, volunteers in Southeast Asia such as Vietnam or Indonesia 
were less subject to racialized treatment by the host compared to those in South American 
or African countries. This is in line with Smith et al.’s (forthcoming) study on South–
South volunteering, which points out that similar shades of skin color were associated 
with “sameness” that fostered identification and friendly relations among volunteers and 
hosts. In fact, for Korean volunteers in Southeast Asian countries, that their shade of skin 
tends to be slightly lighter on average than people of Southeast Asia was a source of 
admiration for the local public. Furthermore, in these countries where the ethnic Chinese 
comprise a large majority of the upper socio-economic stratum, the volunteers were less 
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subject to racially derogatory comments associated with being Chinese. This 
demonstrates how racial/ethnic understanding is not homogeneous, but a cultural and 
political construct that takes on different meanings across parts of the world.  
While the volunteers mostly demonstrated asserting their ethno-national identities 
in ways that conformed to the racialized imaginary, as volunteer-sending organizations 
from non-Western countries continue to grow, they are complicating the racial hierarchy 
in a way that sees race and ethnicity as multi-layered and multi-faceted understanding.  
6.1.4. THE GENDERED IMAGINARY OF DEVELOPMENT IN VOLUNTEER RELATIONS 
In many cases, gender worked as an added element of spectacle for the Korean 
volunteers. Many female volunteers told me that the local children and women would 
touch their hair and arms in both curiosity and admiration. One volunteer jokingly 
commented, “This is what I imagine it would feel like being a celebrity.” Korean female 
volunteers were frequently seen as novel and subject to the gaze of other foreigners. 
Cheon, a former volunteer in Ecuador, illustrates being subject to a frame that is defined 
and captured by white, foreign tourists.  
In the past, I was into taking photos, too. I would always be on the search for 
great scenes and all. So, I know that being in a touristy city, an Asian girl having a 
fun time with the locals, it makes a great picture. And I noticed that I was having 
photos taken of me without knowing. It was a very unpleasant feeling, to be the 
one being photographed. A small local girl and an older Asian girl sitting side-by-
side having candy, reading a book together in the market square … these 
moments were framed by [the foreign tourists] holding up their cameras, and I 
found it to be really disturbing. 
The power asymmetry embedded in the act of taking pictures is well documented 
(Sontag, 1977). However, most analyses have examined the divide that separates the 
passive, silent subject, being framed by the visual composition, from that photographer 
who has the power to tell the story of the person depicted in the photo. In this case, the 
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volunteer who is an Asian female is also regarded as an added spectacle to the frame. The 
moment complicates the power asymmetry by adding a layer of racialized and gendered 
expectations. Although Cheon is there as a facilitator to work on a photovoice project 
with the girls and women in her village, to an outsider, by being photographed, she is 
disempowered, silenced, and framed in a simplified way as a racialized and gendered 
construct. 
Gender identity was also seen to compromise the professional identities of female 
volunteers. My interview participants oftentimes told me that they were not taken 
seriously by their male co-workers. Park was a former KOICA volunteer who worked in 
a local library in Sri Lanka to digitize the library system. She explained:  
In the beginning, I noticed that the director was treating me not as a colleague but 
as if I were a child. I felt like an intern in the library. Maybe it was because I’m 
thin and I look younger than my age? 
Then she went on to explain the culture of gender roles in her village. “Where I 
was located, women are mostly confined to the home and do not leave the house often. 
Even everyday errands like grocery shopping are done by men.” Park’s experience 
illustrates the ways in which Korean female volunteers are pushed to navigate both 
gendered stereotypes of Asian women as well as gender norms in their host society. In 
particular, mass mediated stereotypes of Asian women affected how female volunteers 
were perceived by the host people. Cheon explained the discomfort of walking around in 
the streets in Bolivia as a Korean female volunteer.  
We are either taunted by people on the streets who shout at us, “Ching Chang 
Chong” [derogatory term directed at Chinese people] or we are associated with 
the image of Japanese women and pornography, which was everywhere in the 
country. Female volunteers went through a lot of stress.    
The smaller physique and youthful appearance of Korean volunteers contributed 
to host perceptions of them as like children. Interview participants noted that their racial 
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features added to this perception, making it more difficult to maintain an equal stance in 
positionality with the co-workers in the host institution.  
The interview participants’ accounts of how they were hyperfeminized, 
infantilized, and prone to media-driven stereotypical assumptions diverge substantially 
from the experience of female volunteers of the US Peace Corps, whose positionality as a 
white American automatically granted them access to masculinity. Female Peace Corps 
volunteers were respected “even though” they are women. Hanchey (2015) explains how 
female volunteers are able to assert masculinity and accepted for their roles, 
notwithstanding the local culture.  
Rather than having to deal with the gender roles of that particular South American 
village’s culture, she gets to trade her status as a white U.S. American for 
masculine clout: the positionality of the U.S. American is automatically 
considered a masculine positionality (2015, p. 241).  
The tendency to perceive white women as an “exception” to local gender norms is 
also evident in Maria Baaz’s (2005) study of development actors in Tanzania. White 
women were primarily identified by their race, referred to by Tanzanians as mzungu. 
Baaz interprets the absence of gendered identity as going hand-in-hand with class 
privilege. “Whereas being a woman was automatically equated with an unprivileged 
power position – not being taken seriously, not being listened to – most women 
contended that they did not experience this as such a problem in Tanzania. And this was 
often attributed to economic privilege” (p. 106).  
While white female volunteers are given an exceptional status as being separate 
from the local culture, the Korean volunteers were expected to work through the 
pervasive stereotype of the Asian woman, as well as assumptions regarding their 
appearance, at the same time as dealing with the gender roles of the host culture. 
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An exception to such findings, however, was observed during an interview with 
Choi. Choi, a university student majoring in international sport management, is a former 
volunteer who served as a Taekwondo Peace Corps member. She spent six months 
training national athletes in a Taekwondo academy in Tanzania. Upon being asked 
whether she was discriminated by the male counterparts in the host institution, she 
contended that she never felt as though she was being treated differently from the other 
male volunteers. For female volunteers who serve in the Taekwondo Peace Corps, being 
adept at what is considered to be an elite martial art may have granted them access to a 
masculine identity. The Taekwondo Peace Corps presents a masculine identity through 
promotion of a martial art that stresses discipline and spiritual training. For this reason, 
the Taekwondo Peace Corps enjoys a privilege that distinguishes them from most 
other volunteers. They are frequented by local elites and are given respect. In this regard, 
female volunteers, “although they are women,” enjoy equal treatment as their male 
volunteers because they are embedded in a masculine space, just as the female volunteer 
of the US Peace Corps enjoys a male status due to her country-of-origin that is associated 
with masculinity. 
 
6.2. Cultural Conditions 
6.2.1. MEDIATED RELATIONSHIPS  
When I was in Kenya on a volunteer project in 2003, I was greeted by many smiling boys 
on the streets who asked me to show them my Kung Fu moves. Ten years later, most of 
my interview participants, no matter what country they were in, told me that they were 
met by host students eager to exchange conversations about Korean dramas or K-pop. 
Although the extent varies by region, the level of enthusiasm toward Korean mass culture 
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has risen sharply in a little more than a decade. In response to such enthusiasm, K-pop 
performance is commonly presented during cultural exchange events. One interview 
participant even offered K-pop dance as an after-school curriculum. The class, which was 
set up due to request by the students, was so popular that students who could not fit into 
the classroom stood outside, following every move through the windows.  
 Korea Day, which is organized by KOICA, is held annually as a part of 
government initiative to introduce and spread Korean culture to host countries. On the 
day of the event, people of the host country can experience a range of cultural activities 
from trying on hanbok, getting a taste of Korean dishes, to taking photos with life size 
stand-up posters of K-pop stars. WFK volunteers are invited to participate as staff 
members in these events hosted by KOICA or the Korean Embassy. For volunteers, 
events such as Korea Day and Korea Festival serve as opportunities to take a day off 
from their daily volunteer-related work and to meet fellow volunteers, eat much missed 
Korean food, and to have fun. During these events, the highlight is the K-pop contest. K-
pop contests are open to any nationals of the host country, which according to Soh, is 
very competitive among the contestants because the winner is awarded a free travel 
package to Korea. For many volunteers like Soh, Korea Day festivals and K-pop contests 
are joyful memories of their volunteer experience. Watching the locals perform on stage 
K-pop, volunteers expressed feeling of elatedness and unity. Recalling back, Soh 
remarked, “It was raining so much that day that the organizers were worried that nobody 
would show up for the contest. But we [fellow Korean volunteers and Soh] were there 
yelling and cheering the whole time. We didn’t even bother to stay dry – we were 
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dancing along with the contestants. After the event was over, the organizer said that we 
saved the day.”             
 Driven by active support of Korean government to spread popularity of Hallyu 
globally, Korean volunteers engage in such volunteer-host relationships mediated by 
popular culture. This is distinct from the curiosity that locals express towards foreigners 
in that Korean volunteers are approached with certain preconceived notions of K-pop idol 
groups. Particularly for female university volunteers that served in South/Southeast Asian 
countries where K-pop had gained widespread popularity, it was common for them to be 
likened to members of idol girl bands. The volunteers’ accounts illustrate the ways in 
which the volunteer–host relationship is mediated by understanding of culture through 
commercialized celebrities. In the official WFK blog, one easily comes across photo 
images of teams of young female volunteers on stage, dressed identically and executing 
homogenized choreography. K-pop idol girl bands are characterized by their 
“hypergirlish-femininity that prioritizes submissiveness, pureness, and cuteness over 
Westernized notions of powerful and independent womanly sexiness” (Oh, 2014, p. 56).  
What is noteworthy is that the volunteers engage as both spectators and 
performers of K-pop. Perhaps, in developing volunteer-host relationship mediated by K-
pop, we are witnessing how cultural proximity (Straubhaar, 1991) may be worked into 
this relationship formation. However, in reproducing the performative act, the volunteers 
mediate and are subject to racialized femininity. The accounts of these volunteers 
illustrate the ways in which K-pop as soft power reinforces the self-stereotyping and 
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transient understanding of the national form as a spectacle, in a way that is self-
stereotyping and self-Orientalizing. 
6.3. Institutional Conditions 
6.3.1. KOICA-VOLUNTEER RELATIONS  
In addition to ideological and national structures that influence volunteer-host 
relationships, volunteers navigated the institutional conditions that provided opportunities 
as well as constraints in building relationships with their hosts. All interview participants 
informed me that volunteers operate largely outside of the radar and control of the 
volunteer-sending agency, KOICA. The relative freedom of the volunteers is indicative 
of their positionality located outside of politics of the broader development field, even as 
they constitute a growing flow of development actors. While they are required to submit 
periodic reports of their activities to the regional office, they are not constrained in terms 
of the kinds of activities implemented in the field. The ideas for projects come from the 
volunteers based on their perceptions of the hosts’ needs. Especially for volunteers 
located outside of the capital city, it is difficult for the volunteers to request help. Because 
of the volunteers remaining outside of the purview of the agency, there are strict 
restrictions. Among others, volunteers are not allowed to travel certain distance outside of 
their region of assignment. Intake of alcohol and driving are both forbidden among all 
volunteers. Nevertheless, instances where volunteers use this time for personal travel and 
when volunteers don’t show up to their workplace are not uncommon (CITE).   
The biggest reason for the relative freedom enjoyed is the lack of managerial staff 
in KOICA regional offices. The proportion of the managerial staff to volunteers is much 
lower than the U.S. Peace Corps and Japan International Cooperation Association (JICA) 
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counterparts. Hwan, who worked in Paraguay, served as a development cooperation 
volunteer in place of his military service. Among my interview participants, Hwan was 
by far, the most actively engaged with his host town and surrounding villages in 
Philadelphia. He undertook numerous secondary projects, most of which were outcomes 
of his daily talks with the school principal and students. But looking back, Hwan reflects 
that he probably could not have done that if it were not for the remoteness of the area to 
which he was assigned (“there wasn’t much else to do”) and his status as a military 
volunteer, which left him no choice to turn back.  
I was assigned to an area that most people don’t know about. Even Paraguayans 
don’t recognize the town of Philadelphia. I was the second and the last KOICA 
volunteer to be assigned there. There was one other Peace Corps volunteer but he 
was pulled out early on in my volunteer service and since then, no one replaced 
his place... Many volunteers end up going back to Korea in the middle of their 
volunteer service. But I wasn’t in a place to complain about my assignment nor 
did I have a choice to go back home. All I could do was to hold out and I think 
that [my status] was the reason I was able to complete my service there.     
Until recently, overseas volunteer work was available as a replacement for 
mandatory military service. However, this system was abolished in 2014 due to a number 
of accidents. Such service also brings an interesting perspective to the country’s 
understanding of overseas development in that the system was justified as constituting a 
form of serving the nation similar to that of the military. However, it gave an opportunity 
for male youth to partake in volunteering as an alternative to military service. In the case 
of Hwan, his position as a military soldier led him to approach volunteering more as a 
duty than voluntary, and therefore, contributed to him enduring the difficulty of adjusting 
to an inhospitable environment.   
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6.3.2. FINANCIAL FLOW IN RELATIONSHIP BUILDING  
Negotiating the dissonance in perspectives required volunteers to position 
themselves strategically and to build relationships with their host nationals in order to 
undertake their roles as volunteers. Most often, volunteers relied on projecting their 
professional identities. They affiliated themselves with the local public institution where 
they worked. Because all volunteers are assigned to national or public institutions in their 
host country, their affiliation grants them a degree of credibility and status. Volunteers 
who are professionals in Korea, such as school teachers or librarians, state that they are 
certified professionals, which also works to present themselves as being more credible. 
Park, who worked as a librarian, became fluent in the local language, Tamil, which 
granted her a certain degree of authority and respect from her co-worker. Oftentimes, 
demonstrating their professional identities would grant them acceptance from even the 
most skeptical of community members. Hwan, a volunteer in South America, recounted 
his experience visiting a community that remained mostly closed off because of the 
members’ skeptical and unfriendly attitude toward outsiders. He too was misconstrued as 
a religious missionary or a temporary laborer in town. Hwan told me that he strategically 
introduced himself as a certified primary school teacher in the district and a volunteer 
from Korean government program, which gave him the opportunity to talk to the chief of 
the community.    
Throughout my interviews, volunteers shared their challenges and dilemmas. 
While most volunteers reflected back positively on their experiences, every one of the 
interview participants went through difficult periods due to their limited language skills. 
This was prominent for volunteers who worked in the social service sector where 
knowledge of not only professional linguistic ability was essential to go about in their 
daily jobs. Jeon and Sohn, who majored in social welfare shared similar dilemmas. Jeon, 
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who worked in a city hall in Ecuador, spoke of the dilemma of being assigned to a 
position that was too challenging:  
Compared to other volunteers, I was one of the best in Spanish, and I didn’t have 
any trouble adjusting. But still, I was not competent enough to deliver the kind of 
work that was expected in the host institution. I was there sitting on my seat in the 
office everyday, but I didn’t know what was going on. Every day, I felt like I was 
sitting on a thorny cushion. The first three months, I cried to and from work every 
day 
 Sohn also faced similar challenges. She was assigned to a legal division in the 
City Hall. Her Spanish, no matter how hard she tried, was just not proficient enough to 
perform any particular task in the office. However, the position of the volunteers as 
representing a Korean government organization23 contributes to their status no matter 
how crude their language skills may be. Furthermore, it was also their potential to 
channel funds that gave them a degree of authority. During their two-year service, each 
volunteer was able to apply for up to US$ 50,000 worth of support from KOICA 
headquarters for their secondary project (KOICA, 2017b) 24 . Secondary projects 
encompass cosmetic refurbishing of buildings, expanding infrastructure and developing 
educational content such as storybooks and textbooks. Volunteers have also implemented 
health campaigns to promote awareness of personal hygiene and sexual health, as well as 
provide medical check-ups in collaboration with Korean nurses and doctors volunteering 
in neighboring cities.  
                                                 
23 KOICA volunteers are given an official diplomatic passport in exchange for the duration of their service 
abroad.  
24 Overall, the funds channeled to secondary projects are growing. In 2014, KOICA supported 200 
projects, allocating approximately US$ 4.5 million. That means that on average, US$ 25,000 was provided 
to implement one secondary project (KOICA World Friends Team, 2018). According to KOICA, the size of 
the project in terms of the number of application and the amount provided is growing as the application and 
evaluation process is becoming less bureaucratic (KOICA World Friends Team, 2015) In addition to funds 
channeled through secondary projects, KOICA provides up to US$ 2,000 during volunteer service to 
support their activities. Volunteers can purchase items necessary for their activities, such as books and 
office supplies (KOICA, 2017). 
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For volunteers like Sohn and Jeon, secondary projects offered resources that 
provided them with the potential to change local conditions outside the confines of their 
office. Jeon used the secondary project as an opportunity to engage students in creative 
art lessons.  
Within the district where I was deployed, there were communities located an hour 
or two away. My co-worker, the only social worker in the city hall, and I had to 
visit each of these communities each month. When I visited the communities, I 
noticed that there was only one school, made of one classroom for all the students. 
The school was decrepit and the students would be scattered here and there, and 
there was only one teacher who taught all the curriculums. Being the only teacher, 
he couldn’t cover all the subjects. So I decided to teach art in the schools. I made 
a ten-week curriculum with the help of a Korean volunteer nearby who was an art 
instructor. Then I wrote out and memorized every word of my presentation. I 
went around the school in every community in the district and asked the teacher to 
give me an hour a week to teach the students art. And that’s how I started my 
secondary project.           
Sohn who was also assigned to work in a city hall office, told me that she also 
involved herself in secondary projects. For Sohn, her drive came from a desire to be 
treated not as an outsider. She wanted to know what it was like to be a member of the 
local communities.  
When I first came to Cotacachi, I was taken aback at the majority of the residents 
who would go about in their everyday lives fully dressed in their traditional attire. 
They weren’t doing this for show. The people maintained their traditional ways of 
lives, and I would meet these people in the supermarket and on the bus… It was 
quite an awe-inspiring sight for me. I found out later on that Cotacachi has one of 
the highest concentrations of indigenous population. But I still wondered, why are 
these people still sticking to their traditional ways of life?  I wanted to know how 
life was like for people living here. But I was perceived as an outsider, and my 
broken Spanish didn’t help to engage people in spontaneous casual conversations. 
So, I thought about a good way to approach the people when I remembered a 
documentary that I saw in Seoul International Women’s Film Festival about kids 
born in a red light district India who were taught photography to depict their 
everyday lives25. I thought, this might work. I raised funds in Korea and was able 
                                                 
25 Born into Brothels: Calcutta’s Red Light Kids is a 2004 documentary film was written and directed by 
Zana Briski and Ross Kauffman.  
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to purchase some cameras. I wanted to try the activity with women and girls in the 
community to encourage them to photograph their daily lives.  
Although Sohn did not apply for funding from KOICA, she enacted the 
photovoice method as a secondary project. Photovoice (Wang & Burris, 1997) is a 
strategic intervention method that corresponds to a culture-centered approach (Dutta, 
2011) in that giving the participants a camera acts as handing over the discursive control 
over narratives and representations to the local community members. The discursive 
space created through visual expression engages the lived experience of the cultural 
members and represents the voice of the local participants. Further, the camera as a 
physical object served as a symbolic source of power that transformed the local 
community members from passive objects involuntarily placed within a narrative frame 
to a position in control of the narrative, “a maker of meaning” (Mulvey, 1989, p. 804).  
Sohn remarked that the project was the most memorable thing she did because it 
opened a discursive space for dialogue with the women from the outskirts of Cotacachi. 
The dialogue, in turn, enabled her to understand issues of development from the 
perspective of the women in the town. When I asked her to explain, Sohn spoke of a 
microcredit project, which the city hall staff were trying to promote to women in smaller 
communities even though the borrowing rate was very low. They were frustrated because 
the project was not taking off as expected. However, it was through discussions with 
women during a photovoice session where she found out that an indigenous form of 
microlending had already existed among the women, and despite its organic form, the 
system was deeply rooted within the network of women in the community. The 
disconnect in such understanding was due to the ethnic/racial and class divide between 
the city hall staff who were mestizo elite class and the community women, who 
comprised mostly indigenous groups. When I asked Sohn if she did anything about the 
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disjuncture in understanding among the city hall staff and the indigenous women’s group, 
she stated that she did not have the capacity to take this matter further. Her negative 
response may indicate that the project did not lead to any form of directed action and, 
therefore, the outcome of her secondary project is minimal. However, grounded in praxis, 
which emphasizes the process by which critical awareness of conditions are formed, 
Sohn’s project is noteworthy for its act of engaging and exercising reflexivity. Her 
interest in the women began with somewhat romanticized understanding of the 
indigenous people and communities, and her desire to be perceived as an insider. 
However, her project shifted her initial curiosity and opened room for critical reflection 
awareness of the conditions of the women in structural conditions of development.    
While support from KOICA headquarters offered volunteers opportunities to 
engage in need-based short-term projects, the rather generous support volunteers received 
from KOICA to buy necessary material and infrastructure for their host institution made 
it seem like the volunteers were there for providing resources rather than capacity 
building for both parties. My interview participants told me that they have requested 
funds from KOICA to buy and install things such as drinking fountain, volleyball court, 
computers, beam projectors, books, refurbishing classrooms, and soccer balls, among 
others.  The fact that the volunteers were capable of channeling funds was apparent for 
most of the institutions that had hosted Korean volunteers in the past. In this regard, the 
large amount of funding that can be tapped into through these volunteers posed 
constraints in volunteer-host relations. Compared to their western counterparts as well as 
volunteer programs run by Korean NGOs, WFK volunteers receive a generous amount of 
monthly stipend, leading some critics to sarcastically refer to them as the “royalty of 
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volunteers” 26  (Park, 2016). Many of my interview participants expressed critical 
viewpoints to the ways in which the host constituents treated the volunteers. Soh spoke 
about comments received from co-workers in the school where he worked.  
My co-workers would say to me in a joking manner, “but aren’t you rich? You 
can do this and that for us.” They would say it jokingly, but it was frequent 
enough to make me feel uncomfortable. 
 Other interview participants recalled similar experiences. Jeon told that her co-
workers would ask her to pay for t-shirts that the city hall employees would wear during 
the town’s field day. Park mentioned that he was asked to replace a well-functioning 
printer with a fancy new printer by the principle of the school where he worked. The host 
constituents tended to view Korean volunteers as a gatekeeper of funds. Many interview 
participants attested to feeling hurt at noticing that they had traveled all this way only to 
be used as a source to channel funds and at being perceived as transient rather than being 
recognized for who they were both professionally and as individuals. In such ways, the 
access to funds functioned as both enabling and constraining factor in forging 
relationships with host constituents.  
This chapter examined South Korea’s international development volunteers as an 
emerging actor in the global aid landscape. Korea legitimizes its government-run 
volunteer program as a way to give back the help that was once given to the country. 
Culturally, it draws on values of respect and identification based on a shared story of 
economic hardship. As such, it seeks to create a narrative of South-South development 
based on moral obligation and cultural proximity. This chapter explored through the 
                                                 
26 KOICA provides round-trip airfares and moving expenses. In addition, monthly living allowance and 
housing fees are provided. These amounts vary according to living costs of the country where volunteers 
are assigned, but in general, volunteers have all agreed that these allowances are sufficient enough to live 
comfortably in their host countries. KOICA also provides transition funds at the end of their service, which 
are intended to assist returned volunteers’ transition in their home country. A KOV receives around USD 
8,400 in transition fees (KOICA, 2017b).    
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analytical lens of development communication as practice whether Korean volunteers 
were able to re-work or transcend the dominant ideology of development. The chapter 
examined social, cultural, and institutional structural conditions in which volunteers are 
embedded. Situated in these structures, volunteers were both enabled and constrained in 
forging relationships with their hosts. The ways in which they navigated the structural 
conditions positioned them as ambassadors and consumers, the powerful and powerless, 
the colonizer and the oppressed. What is for certain is that Korean volunteers do not 
automatically enjoy the privilege granted to white, Euro-American volunteers. 
Volunteering serves as a period of continuous struggle of positioning their identity in 
relation to the host, no matter whether the purpose is to gain influence, to forge mutual 
relationships, or just to be able to get things done.  
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 
This research project began with an overarching question about the potential of 
recipient-turned-donor countries to dismantle the dominant paradigm of development, 
which sustains an asymmetrical global relationship in economic, social, and political 
realms that continues to marginalize the beneficiaries of aid. The question reflects the 
emergence of alternative strategies and principles guiding development intervention in 
the contemporary field of development aid. As such, my purpose of this study was to 
examine South Korea as an emerging donor that was once a recipient of aid and whether 
and how this experience is implicated in its development thinking, representation, and 
practice. In other words, does Korea’s past status as a recipient of aid complicate or 
rework the dominant understanding of development?  
This dissertation was guided by such overarching questions. In chapter 4, I argue 
that developmental nationalism serves not only as a legitimizing principle for domestic 
governing of the Korean people but also as a guiding principle in Korea’s engagement in 
development aid, particularly the country’s overseas volunteer program. By illustrating 
the ways in which developmental nationalism is integrated with government’s nation 
branding policy, I suggest that development is conceived as a trajectory by which to 
manage its growing number of unemployed youth population and to gain what is asserted 
as much-needed cultural attractiveness of the country.  
Second, in illustrating how developmental nationalism operates in the volunteer 
program, World Friends Korea (WFK), I argue that representational practices of 
volunteer activities through a branding mechanism centers on the national as a 
compassionate, youthful, and culturally attractive while the host is infantilized, racialized, 
and decontextualized. Displaying these photos to the Korean public further disciplines the 
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Korean youth to embody the character and spirit of the volunteers, who are depicted as 
competent, youthful, adventurous, and compassionate.  
Third, I illustrated the ways in which developmental nationalism is enacted and 
consumed by the volunteers during their work in host countries. In chapter 6, I argue that 
such national and institutional conditions reproduced the categorization of race, poverty, 
and culture as essentialized definers of national difference. Furthermore, it ill-prepared 
the volunteers to deal with the Eurocentric imaginaries of development deeply ingrained 
in both volunteers and host. Although the positionality of volunteers enabled them to 
engage in a wide range of volunteer-related activities, the institution’s neglect in social 
justice pedagogy left volunteers oftentimes working within and re-producing Eurocentric 
understandings of development. Volunteers who were more aware of critical 
development practices demonstrated greater self-reflexivity of their positionality and 
critical consciousness in the process of working with the host people.  
In whole, I argue that in the case of Korea, development aid, specifically the 
volunteering program, serves as a state apparatus of discourses and practices, which 
mobilizes its citizens to project a successfully transformed nation state, further 
reproducing asymmetrical relations with the host socially, culturally, and economically.  
7.1. Developmental Nationalism in Past and Contemporary Times   
This study historicized Korea’s development thinking “as a way to gain 
awareness of our present circumstances” (Foucault, 1982, p. 209) by looking at how 
development thinking comes to pervade the Korean popular discourse in the period 
between 1960 and 2013. In chapter 4, I illustrated how development became a hegemonic 
national ideology and a core component of nation-building. Geundaehwa 
(modernization), segyehwa (globalization), and seonjinhwa (making advanced) 
  167 
represented discourses that were organized according to the ruling power’s policy, 
localized in response to particular global political economic conditions, and distributed 
through multiple state apparatus and public institutions. The discourses worked to sustain 
a narrative of a country in crisis, which served as a legitimacy of power and control. 
Using the rhetoric of a country at a crossroads between advancing past or falling through 
the cracks, the government subjected the Korean populace as national individuals 
obligated to their country above all else. The government exhorted its people to reform 
their mindset and consciousness to embody a set of traits that befit a modern, global, or 
advanced individual. State-mobilized rural reform movements, state subsidy of sports and 
leisure, and public discourse surrounding model individuals were some discursive 
strategies used to discipline and invoke the populace to embody a modern or global 
cultural mindset while maintaining their core allegiance to the nation state. Such 
discursive strategies articulated developmental nationalism as a moral imperative and a 
norm, whereby development (through capital accumulation) was seen as the primary way 
by which nationhood is practiced.  
During the modernization period, state-mobilized campaigns sought to invoke a 
sense of affiliation and loyalty to the nation state. Saemaul Undong consisted of 
modernizing village aesthetics and infrastructure. In particular, state apparatuses such as 
centralized media and the census brought the villages under bureaucratic control of the 
nation state and produced national subjects whose affiliation and loyalty was, above all 
else, to the “fatherland.” In the contemporary era, Saemaul Undong takes an important 
place in Korea’s development thinking. It constitutes what is celebrated by the 
government as a unique model of development. But contrary to the widely held assertion, 
top-down villagization programs were common among postcolonial states during the 
latter part of 1960s through the 1970s, including Kenya’s harambee movement (Ngau, 
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1987), Ujamaa in Tanzania (Jennings, 2008), as well as in Ethiopia and Mozambique 
(Cannon-Lorgan, 1999). While the movements differed in terms of the specifics of 
implementation, they constituted the villagization movement guided by the principle of 
self-reliance where the village was envisioned as a modern unit of communally-based 
capital generation. Ironically, Saemaul Undong is advertised as “a uniquely Korean 
model of development” and exported precisely to these countries. The globally exported 
Saemaul Undong reinforces the dominant paradigm of development in that it strips all 
ideological context and complexities within and sells it as a set of technocratic, 
formulaic, and neutral product to be consumed. Saemaul Undong is rendered 
authoritative through the research community and endorsement by international 
organizations (like the UNDP).  
As development workers and experts preach to the local people in these African 
countries about the promises of Saemaul Undong for prosperity to rural villages of 
developing countries (see, for example, Kimani, 2016), they do not take into 
consideration that very similar movements had once existed in these countries. However, 
even in the case that the promoters are aware, whether it would matter in promoting 
Saemaul Undong is questionable, because it is the process by which Saemaul Undong is 
made into authoritative knowledge and narrative that is of importance. The discursive 
process by which Saemaul Undong is exported to developing countries in Africa and 
South/Southeast Asia demonstrates privileging of certain knowledge over others, and 
how Korea uses the power relations to further advance itself as an “expert” whose 
experience serves as a proof of how development initiatives can lead to economic growth. 
As such, Saemaul Undong serves both as a source of power at both the national and 
international level: Internally, it serves as legitimating discourse of Korea’s 
  169 
developmental nationalism. Externally, it constitutes a branded narrative of an allegedly 
proven model of development that Korea leverages to gain international recognition.    
7.2. Branding Development, Branding Nation      
In examining this international development volunteer program as a site of doing 
good and looking good, this study sought to address how the current market-oriented 
globalization that privileges promotional practices of branding as a tool of governance 
and identity politics brings together development and nation under a single framework of 
branding.  
Just as commercial branding relies on consumption and production practices of 
consumers (Arvidsson, 2005), nation branding initiatives depend on enlisting citizens to 
identify with and spread the messages. Korea’s international development volunteering 
program, which constituted an important nation branding program for the PCNB, enlisted 
Korean citizens to identify with, embody, and spread pre-defined set of nation branding 
components. The pre-departure training prepared volunteers for this role and the mindset 
they need to assume as brand ambassadors befit to spread Korea’s moral commitment 
and its culture abroad. The volunteers were given knowledge of the history of ODA to 
embody professionalism as change agents while also encouraged to demonstrate the 
morality of compassion and care. In terms of learning about Korea’s culture, this study 
found that volunteering is also closely aligned with Korea’s Hallyu policy.  
Furthermore, the award-winning photos of volunteer experiences, which are used 
for publicity purposes of KOICA, represent the volunteers’ role in producing Korea’s 
nation branding message. This is easily appropriated to “communicate the good done” 
(Enghel & Noske-Turner, 2018) by a state-affiliated development agency. Volunteer 
program is valued by the agency because of the human-centered story it tells to the 
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Korean public as well as the international community. The images of volunteers spread 
abroad not only publicize the agency but also construct certain ways of understanding 
what development is and how people might understand the nation’s relationship with 
others. The photos commodify volunteer experience in that they are selected to be 
awarded and publicized not for the outcome of the volunteer work and its benefits to the 
host, but for the degree to which they conform to imageries projecting Korea’s role as a 
development actor and its cultural visibility.  
The photo images are only partial in that they do not cover the range of volunteer 
work or volunteer experiences with the host and staged in that many scenes in the photos 
are deliberately performed. Nonetheless, the consistency in the themes and the message 
conveyed in the photo images create a dominant understanding of development, which is 
undergirded by a romanticized understanding of poverty, simplified and decontextualized 
imagery of the host, and depoliticized through appearance of host children. The donor-
centric representation of development undergirded by assumptions of “banal 
internationalism” (Iwabuchi, 2015) further highlights cultural borders rather than to break 
them down. Furthermore, effects of branding development such as appearance of darker 
skinned children, decontextualizing the host while national markers of Korea abound, and 
written text of envy and pity toward the host work to divide and rank order culture and 
race as superior and inferior.      
I argue in chapter 5 that Korea’s promotion of its do-gooding (i.e. looking good) 
come at serious cost to the host. Here, I agree with Karin Wilkins’ claim that “when the 
performance of development becomes more a matter of looking good, then the goal of 
doing well may be sacrificed” (Wilkins, 2018, p. 76). The photos of volunteer work 
abroad were much less about the good done than moments of compassionate encounters 
in ways that romanticize and racialize poverty and social depravation. The visibility of 
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volunteer program logos as well as national symbols assert their identity to the extent that 
the racialized and decontextualized setting is relegated as a background upon which the 
institution promotes its do-gooding. As such, I hold, with Wilkins (2018), that public 
branding of development asserts the interests of donor citizens as opposed to host 
citizens. Finally, I argue that the photos further distance public awareness of global social 
injustice upon which poverty and disparities are sustained.  
7.3. From Developmental Nationalism to Brand Nationalism  
Chapter 6 showed that volunteers associated themselves with their nation through 
different trajectories between senior volunteers in their 60s and the younger generation of 
volunteers in their 20s and 30s. For the generation that has gone through this period of 
developmentalist era, developmental nationalism continued to invoke deep emotional 
appeal. Senior volunteers who are retired professionals were at the forefront of the 
country’s transition from one of the poorest countries in the world to a strong economy. 
For this generation, commitment to developmental nationalism was ingrained into their 
motivation to take part in the volunteer program. While senior volunteers were more 
forthcoming about their motivation to serve the nation through volunteering, the younger 
generation volunteers identified with their country through encounters of popular culture. 
Oftentimes, volunteers expressed surprise at the level of enthusiasm toward Korean 
popular culture by the host constituents and expressed nationalistic sentiments upon 
encounters with Korean popular culture in their host country. The findings may support 
the claim made among branding consultants who offer nation branding as a “rallying 
point not only for promotion the nation internationally but also for providing individuals 
with an empowering sense of self-discovery and self-understanding” (Volcic & 
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Andrejevic, 2011, p. 608). However, the implications of such commodified forms of 
nationalism being invoked needs to be interrogated.  
Nationalism toward such commodified forms of cultural goods, which scholars of 
global studies have referred to as “brand nationalism” (Iwabuchi, 2015) “commercial 
nationalism” (Volcic & Andrejevic, 2011), or “global nationalism” (Sklair, 2001), is 
instrumental to reinforcing the nation state’s capital accumulation in contemporary world 
order. Brand nationalism, according to Iwabuchi, reflects a widely shared perception that 
“[popular culture, such as computer games and animation] are key cultural commodities 
for enhancement of soft power” (Iwabuchi, 2015, p. 19). For younger generation Korean 
volunteers it was in observing Korea’s cultural ascent in the world through everyday 
encounters Psy’s Gangnam Style in rural parts of Sri Lanka, for example, or watching 
Taekwonmu performances during Korean festivals upon which invoked feelings of brand 
nationalism. However, nationalistic sentiment that is primarily mediated by deliberately 
selected and commodified cultural goods by the governing elite further distances citizens 
from values of pluralism in views and perspectives because cultural hegemony operates 
in a way that “celebrate particular kinds of diversity while submerging, deflating or 
suppressing others” (Wilk, 1995, p. 118). Brand nationalism imbues an assumption of 
nation states being containers of distinct but market-friendly commodified cultural goods 
and second, it suppresses perspectives and groups of people who do not live up to the 
hegemonic discourse of national identity. Brand nationalism further distances itself from 
cosmopolitanism in the sense of “cultural co-existence” and “refusal of monoculturalism 
as governing value” and individuals working with and through differences. Volunteers 
were more prone to solidifying differences through their volunteer experiences, rather 
than overcoming them.   
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Existing research tend to categorize brand nationalism as being distinct from 
previous versions of nationalism. For example, Van Ham (2001) claims that chauvinist 
nationalism is deep-rooted, ideological, and entails an antagonistic sense of national 
identity as a contrast to nation branding. Rather than viewing brand nationalism as a 
distinct phenomenon that is separate from previous forms of nationalism, this study 
suggests that brand nationalism is an extension of developmental nationalism in Korea. 
Historicizing the national discourse of Korea across five decades, I find consistency in 
the ways in which national subjects are envisioned and spoken about by the governing 
elites. By invoking exigency in national affairs, public discourse constantly exhorts 
Korean citizens to partake in the developmental project of the nation state. This discourse 
to enlist citizens to the national project depended just as much on othering those countries 
that fell behind in the global competition as much as the country emphasized “catching 
up” with the advanced western nation states (and although more complicated, Japan). Just 
like developmental nationalism, brand nationalism ensures that consumption and 
production practices of citizens contribute to capital accumulation of the state, and 
citizens are mobilized to prioritize national advancement in the end. As such, 
cosmopolitanism in Korean context resides on strengthening, rather than decentering, 
national identity to bolster the visibility, attractiveness, and competence of the nation 
state in a neoliberal global order. And end the end, the host countries for which Korea is 
commitment to doing good serve as a marker of a national status symbol, showing how 
much the country has developed. Such donor-centeredness in the volunteer program 
makes the parallels in developmental nationalism and brand nationalism the more 
evident. The fundamental logic of developmental and brand nationalism, therefore, 
remains consistent, and brand nationalism is a manifestation of how Korea has embraced 
and localized neoliberalism in accordance to its developmentalist ideology.          
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7.4. Revisiting South-South Development Volunteering 
The concept of south-south development is actively taken up by policy circles. 
However, what I found in this study is that the term South-South development 
cooperation needs to go beyond both optimistic and pessimistic perspectives toward 
dismantling and complication of the term itself and its assumptions. I suggest that used as 
an analytical framework, we may end up further reifying the very binary divide that 
South-South development has worked to complicate. First, we may end up naively 
celebrating development intervention programs by Southern nation states as being more 
detached from exploitative or national foreign policy interests than the Northern 
counterpart. This study found that in the case of Korea, its development intervention is 
imbricated in concerns over its own growth and appropriated as a status symbol. 
However, Korea is not alone. India, for example, rejected British development aid in 
view of the perceived negative publicity it affords (Gilligan, 2012) as well as 
humanitarian aid for its natural disasters (Withnall, 2018). Here, India is just as self-
conscious of nation branding through development – being a recipient of aid negatively 
affects India’s national image.  
Second, by containing development initiative by non-Western nation states into 
the category of South-South development cooperation, we are continuing to enforce and 
perpetuate a categorical label that is no longer applicable in the contemporary era. By 
historicizing Korea’s development discourse and by contextualizing the local to the 
global and vice versa, this study complicated the common assumptions of South-South 
development cooperation. In chapter 6, I sought to transcend the binary divide by looking 
at volunteering practice as taking place within multiple structures and contingencies. This 
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research defined development as a field where multiple interests and agendas are 
contested and negotiated. Likewise, volunteering takes place within multi-dimensional 
structures of global forces, national agenda, and institutional regulation, which constrain 
and enable how volunteering is practiced by volunteers. Findings from the chapter 
indicated that volunteers oftentimes were conscious of their inferior positionality but at 
the same time, reproduced racial hierarchically, further complicating it beyond the racial 
hierarchy by skin color to division according to ethnic identity. From South-South 
development perspective, it echoes the concern that the emerging donors engaging in 
South-South development cooperation may further subjugate the marginalized (Gray & 
Gills, 2016). However, at the same time, this study found that volunteers who were aware 
of critical approaches to development, such as structural causes of poverty, enabled these 
volunteers to form relationships that privileged the voice of the host. Furthermore, these 
volunteers expressed greater concern towards structural issues within host communities 
that marginalized certain groups. As such, South-South development cooperation needs 
to go beyond being juxtaposed to the Northern counterpart. South-South development 
needs to be contextualized with greater nuance, taking account of how the Eurocentric 
discourse of development continues to be maintained while some aspects are complicated 
or decentered. 
7.5. Suggestions for Future Study  
This research project was one of the first to take a critical approach to examine 
how Korea’s development aid as an extension of the country’s developmental discourse. 
Furthermore, despite the large size and scale of its international development volunteer 
program, it has yet to garner academic attention within and outside of Korea. Future 
projects on the dynamics and significance of international development volunteering can 
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be imagined both along empirical and theoretical lines and may concern geographical 
dimensions.  
South-South development volunteering is characterized as offering important 
benefits compared to North-South volunteering, in that shared understanding, similar 
systems, processes, living conditions and cultures are considered advantageous 
conditions for South-South volunteering. However, multidirectional flow of people and 
resources make such claims overly simplified. Increased flow of capital to centers of the 
world, so that cities located in countries that are identified as the South may comprise 
global financial hub, such as Shanghai, Mumbai, and Johannesburg. Countries like China 
and India have one of the greatest income disparities, and in more cases than not, 
volunteers sent abroad are from the upper half in terms of their living conditions. 
Furthermore, a flow of people, such as labor migrants and refugees to Western countries 
is common. Against such global conditions, it would be too simplistic to define the South 
as a unified entity. Studies need to examine the notion of identity from multiple levels, at 
an individual (in terms of social, economic, and cultural identities) as well as regional 
(within nation state), national, and transnational conditions. Comparative research would 
further help to complicate and transcend the binary of North, South divide in 
development volunteering.  
Second, this study calls for further research related to development, branding, and 
national identity. For example, we may expand critical interrogation of branding practices 
among the so-called rising donors, such as Korea, India, Turkey, and Thailand, among 
others. What are their interests and motivations? Who do these countries give to? And 
how do they communicate their development work to the domestic and international 
public? Such comparative approach may offer a more nuanced understanding of 
development by previous recipients of aid in terms of the extent to which the dominant 
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discourses of development are adopted, reworked, or dismantled. A limitation in this 
study is the small number of interviews with volunteer sending agencies, including 
KOICA. Given the fragmented nature of the volunteer program, interviews with the staff 
would have offered a clearer picture of the interests of different actors. Furthermore, this 
study had to rely on archival data to understand the role of PCNB. By the time the study 
had taken off, PCNB was already shut down by the subsequent government and former 
staff members could not be located. More in-depth knowledge about the internal 
structure, coordinating bodies, and different interests guiding the volunteer program 
would help to strengthen the study. As such, future study might further delve into 
identifying differing interests and visions of World Friends Korea, and the extent to 
which the nature of the program itself changed before, during, and post- PCNB. This 
material would lead to further insights on the implication of nation branding on 
development.   
My intent in broadening the research agenda is to foreground development as a 
field of struggle that is constantly in flux. Communication plays an important role in the 
dynamic contestation and negotiation of interests and concerns. To uncover such 
dynamics of South-South development, we need to shed simplified assumptions and 
continue the critical exercise of engaging with its discourses, representations, and 
practices at the intersection of global and local levels and in cultural and political 
contexts.    
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. Organizational Breakdown of WFK 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Jurisdiction Program Implementing 
Agency 
Length  Range of Activities Volunteers 
Deployed 
in 2015 
Ministry of 
Foreign 
Affairs 
(MOFA) 
KOICA 
Overseas 
Volunteer (KOV) 
KOICA 2 yrs. - education 
- public health  
- industrial energy  
- public administration  
- farming and fishery  
- transfer of technology  
 
1,263 
World Friends 
KOICA Advisors 
KOICA 6 mo. – 
1 yr. 
146 
Ministry of 
Education  
Korea  
Youth Volunteer  
Korean 
University 
Council for 
Social Services 
(KUCSS) 
2 wk – 
6 mo. 
- education (Korean and   
 English language, sports,    
 Taekwondo, etc.) 
- cultural exchange 
- facility repairs/maintenance,   
 sanitation 
 
2,235 
Pacific Asia 
Society 
(PAS) 
440 
Ministry of 
Science, ICT 
and Future 
Planning  
WFK-Korea  
IT Volunteer 
Korea 
Information 
Society Agency  
1 – 3 
mo. 
- IT education 
- IT Korea promotion 
 
564 
WFK-Korea  
Techno Peace 
Corps 
National 
Research 
Foundation of 
Korea 
1 yr. - IT education 
- technology consulting and  
 transfer  
 
49 
Ministry of 
Trade, 
Industry and 
Energy  
World Friends 
NIPA Advisors 
National IT 
Industry 
Promotion 
Agency 
1 yr. -Industrial technology 
- IT 
- energy resource 
- trade investment 
- regional development 
 
117 
Ministry of 
Culture, 
Sports, and 
Tourism 
(MCST) 
World 
Taekwondo 
Peace Corps 
World 
Taekwondo 
Peace Corps 
Foundation 
6 mo. – 
1 yr. 
- Taekwondo education  236 
  5,050 
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Appendix 3. List of Abbreviations  
BRICS  Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa 
DAC  Development Assistance Committee 
EDCF  Economic Development Cooperation Fund 
FAO   Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GNI   Gross National Income 
HLF4   Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness 
IMF  International Monetary Fund  
JICA  Japan International Cooperation Agency 
JOCV  Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers 
KDI  Korea Development Institute 
KSP  Knowledge Sharing Program  
KOICA Korea International Cooperation Agency  
KOV  KOICA Overseas Volunteers  
KSP   Knowledge Sharing Program 
KUCSS Korea University Council for Social Service 
LDC   Least Developed Country 
MOFA  Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization  
ODA  Official Development Assistance  
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PCNB  Presidential Council of Nation Branding  
UNDP  United Nations Development Program 
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